Conquered Populations in Early Islam by Urban, Elizabeth

Conquered Populations in Early Islam
Edinburgh Studies in Classical Islamic History and Culture
Series Editor: Carole Hillenbrand
A particular feature of medieval Islamic civilisation was its wide horizons. In this respect 
it differed profoundly from medieval Europe, which from the point of view of geography, 
ethnicity and population was much smaller and narrower in its scope and in its mindset. The 
Muslims fell heir not only to the Graeco-Roman world of the Mediterranean, but also to that of 
the ancient Near East, to the empires of Assyria, Babylon and the Persians – and beyond that, 
they were in frequent contact with India and China to the east and with black Africa to the 
south. This intellectual openness can be sensed in many interrelated fields of Muslim thought: 
philosophy and theology, medicine and pharmacology, algebra and geometry, astronomy and 
astrology, geography and the literature of marvels, ethnology and sociology. It also impacted 
powerfully on trade and on the networks that made it possible. Books in this series reflect this 
openness and cover a wide range of topics, periods and geographical areas.
Titles in the series include:
Arabian Drugs in Early Medieval Mediterranean Medicine
Zohar Amar and Efraim Lev
The Abbasid Caliphate of Cairo, 1261–1517: Out of the Shadows
Mustafa Banister
The Medieval Western Maghrib: Cities, Patronage and Power
Amira K. Bennison
Keeping the Peace in Premodern Islam: Diplomacy under the Mamluk Sultanate, 1250–1517
Malika Dekkiche
Queens, Concubines and Eunuchs in Medieval Islam
Taef El-Azhari
The Kharijites in Early Islamic Historical Tradition: Heroes and Villains
Hannah-Lena Hagemann
Medieval Damascus: Plurality and Diversity in an Arabic Library – The Ashrafīya Library Catalogue
Konrad Hirschler
A Monument to Medieval Syrian Book Culture: The Library of Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī
Konrad Hirschler
The Popularisation of Sufism in Ayyubid and Mamluk Egypt: State and Society, 1173–1325
Nathan Hofer
Defining Anthropomorphism: The Challenge of Islamic Traditionalism
Livnat Holtzman
Making Mongol History: Rashid al-Din and the Jamiʿ al-Tawarikh
Stefan Kamola
Lyrics of Life: Sa‘di on Love, Cosmopolitanism and Care of the Self
Fatemeh Keshavarz
Art, Allegory and The Rise of Shiism In Iran, 1487–1565
Chad Kia
A History of the True Balsam of Matarea
Marcus Milwright
Ruling from a Red Canopy: Political Authority in the Medieval Islamic World, From Anatolia to South 
Asia
Colin P. Mitchell
Islam, Christianity and the Realms of the Miraculous: A Comparative Exploration
Ian Richard Netton
Conquered Populations in Early Islam: Non-Arabs, Slaves and the Sons of Slave Mothers
Elizabeth Urban
edinburghuniversitypress.com/series/escihc
Conquered Populations in 
Early Islam
Non-Arabs, Slaves and the Sons of 
Slave Mothers
Elizabeth Urban
Dedicated to the memory of Cricket
Edinburgh University Press is one of the leading university presses in the UK. We publish 
academic books and journals in our selected subject areas across the humanities and social 
sciences, combining cutting-edge scholarship with high editorial and production values to 
produce academic works of lasting importance. For more information visit our website: 
edinburghuniversitypress.com
© Elizabeth Urban, 2020
Edinburgh University Press Ltd
The Tun – Holyrood Road
12 (2f) Jackson’s Entry
Edinburgh EH8 8PJ
Typeset in 11/15 Adobe Garamond by
Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Stockport, Cheshire, 
and printed and bound in Great Britain
A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN 978 1 4744 2321 2 (hardback)
ISBN 978 1 4744 2322 9 (webready PDF)
ISBN 978 1 4744 2323 6 (epub)
The right of Elizabeth Urban to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in 
accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 and the Copyright and 
Related Rights Regulations 2003 (SI No. 2498).
Contents
List of Tables and Figures vi
Acknowledgements vii
Notes on the Text x
1 Introduction: Why Muslims of Slave Origins Matter 1
2 Insiders with an Asterisk: Mawālī and Enslaved Women in the 
Quran  19
3 Abū Bakra, Freedman of God 48
4 Enslaved Prostitutes in Early Islamic History 77
5 Concubines and their Sons: The Changing Political Notion of 
Arabness 106




viii | conquered populations in early islam
Tables and Figures
Tables
5.1 Generational scheme derived from Ibn Saʿd’s ˝abaqāt 110
5.2 Database categories 110
5.3 Sample database entry 110
6.1 Chronological change in scribal practice according to identity 156
6.2 Scribal identities according to place (numbers and percentages) 158
6.3 Scribal practice according to occupation (numbers and 
percentages) 160
Figures
5.1 Percentage of children born of umm walads (UWs) 112
5.2 Average number of free wives (FWs) and umm walads (UWs) 
per man 113
5.3 Birth rates of free wives (FWs) vs umm walads (UWs) 115
5.4 Percentage of children born to umm walads (UWs) according to 
tribe 116
5.5 Adjusted numbers of free wives and umm walads according to 
tribe 117
6.1 Changing percentages of scribal practice according to identity 157
6.2 Percentage of scribal identities according to place  159
 acknowledgements  | ix
ix
Acknowledgements
This monograph has grown from the green seed of my 2012 doctoral disserta-
tion at the University of Chicago. As such, I can only begin by acksnowledg-
ing my dissertation advisor, Fred Donner. He is a brilliant professor and 
gracious mentor, and he has continued to advocate for me and perform the 
often-thankless, behind-the-scenes work of supporting an advisee. Likewise, 
my other teachers at the University of Chicago guided the initial stages of 
this research and equipped me with the language skills I needed to conduct 
it successfully. These supporters include (in alphabetical order) Orit Bashkin, 
Ahmed El Shamsy, Kay Heikkenen, Frank Lewis, Farouk Mustafa (allāh 
yarªamhu), Wadad Kadi, Walter Kaegi, Tahera Qutbuddin, Michael Sells, 
Donald Whitcomb and John Woods. I also benefited greatly from dialogues 
with my fellow University of Chicago graduate students, whether it was in 
class, at Arabic circle or over lunch.
Many conversations and conference panels have helped shape the mono-
graph into its current form. I have profited greatly from discussions with 
other scholars about historical ‘sites of memory’, and about the narrative 
strategies that Arabic-Islamic authors employ in their writings. In this regard, 
Antoine Borrut deserves special thanks for his stimulating scholarship and his 
professional mentorship. I also thank Sarah Bowen Savant, Tayeb El-Hibri, 
Ari Hagler, Gershon Lewenthal and Scott Savran for their contributions and 
insights. I have also enjoyed thought-provoking exchanges with Michael Bates 
on early Islamic coinage and on strategies for de-centring the Rashidun and 
Umayyad caliphates, and also with Luke Yarbrough on non-Muslim scribes 
in the Umayyad bureaucracy. Beyond the field of early Islamic  historiography, 
x | conquered populations in early islam
I have also learned much from scholars who specialise in enslavement and 
unfreedom. My initiator into this field is Matthew Gordon, who also invited 
me to participate in the illuminating Binghamton Conference on Medieval 
Unfreedoms in 2018. I have also engaged in fruitful conversations with Kurt 
Franz, Kathryn Hain, Younus Mirza, Karen Moukheiber, Lisa Nielson, Craig 
Perry, Dwight Reynolds, Majied Robinson and Noel Mellick Voltz.
Throughout the process of researching and writing this book, I have 
received much scholarly support. First, I have received gracious invitations 
to contribute parts of my research to edited volumes, special issues and 
handbooks. Many thanks to Paul Cobb for inviting me to participate in the 
festschrift for Fred Donner; to Myriam Wissa for the Scribal Practices edited 
volume; to Matthew Gordon and Kathryn Hain for the Concubines and 
Courtesans edited volume; to Mohamad Rihan for the Hawliyat special issue 
dedicated to Aziz El Azmeh; and to Murad Idris for the Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Political Theory. Thanks also to the anonymous peer reviewers 
of my research, including this monograph – they have helped me become a 
better scholar. (Although of course, any mistakes that remain in my work are 
my own.)
Second, I am thankful for the institutional backing I have received while 
conducting my research. Joseph Lumbard supported me during my first post-
graduate job, as a visiting assistant professor in the Near Eastern and Judaic 
Studies department at Brandeis University. Subsequently, the History faculty 
at Williams College was incredibly gracious and inclusive during my Mellon 
post-doctoral fellowship; thanks particularly to Magnús Bernhardsson for 
his mentorship. Finally, my home institution, West Chester University of 
Pennsylvania (WCUPA), has enabled me to complete the monograph. Many 
thanks are due to my colleagues in the History department for their friend-
ship, encouragement and advice on how to balance a heavy teaching load 
with an ambitious research plan. Particularly, I thank Lisa Kirschenbaum for 
sharing her experience and expertise in crafting a successful book proposal. 
Additionally, the College of Arts and Humanities at WCUPA granted me a 
2018 Research and Creative Activities Grant that allowed me to complete the 
research for Chapter 5 of this monograph.
I am incredibly grateful for all the academic and institutional support 
I have received, but my deepest thanks go to my family and friends. My 
acknowledgements | xi
parents and siblings have read many drafts of my work in order to ensure that 
it is accessible to non-specialists. Writing workshops with Rebecca Makas, 
Amy Anderson and Kristine Ervin have helped keep me on task. Hayley 
Brown always pushes me to think more deeply and articulate my ideas more 
clearly. In addition to being a fantastic friend, Tanya Treptow has brought 
me several early Islamic history books from her travels to Egypt. Special 
thanks go to Jennifer London for her undying enthusiasm, patience and 
generosity. Finally, my husband, Glenn McDorman, has been a boundless 
source of love and support. Not only is he a fantastic scholar and teacher, but 
he also makes sure that I remember to eat and sleep when I am deep inside 
my writing bubble.
There are so many more people I could name – my editors, my students 
and others I may have inadvertently neglected to mention. While writing can 
at times feel like a solitary affair, the creation of scholarship is truly collabora-
tive, and I could not have succeeded without these many sources of support.




Why Muslims of Slave Origins Matter
This book traces the journey of new Muslims in the first and second cen-turies AH (seventh and eighth centuries CE), as they joined the nascent 
Islamic community and articulated their identities within it. It focuses par-
ticularly on Muslims of slave origins, who belonged to the Islamic religious 
community but whose slave backgrounds linked them to the outside world 
and rendered them somehow alien. By analysing how these liminal Muslims 
resolved the tension between belonging and otherness, this book reveals the 
shifting boundaries of the early Islamic community. Particularly, it illumi-
nates how Islam transformed from a small and relatively egalitarian piety 
movement in Western Arabia into the official doctrine of a Near Eastern 
empire that tried to uphold a hierarchical distinction between the conquerors 
and the conquered.
This monograph concentrates on three groups that inhabited a grey area 
between insider and outsider in early Islamic history: 1) the mawālī (singular: 
mawlā) – freed slaves, captives and other conquered people who became 
subordinate members of conquerors’ households, often glossed as ‘non-Arab 
Muslims’; 2) enslaved women ( jawārī) who acted as prostitutes, concubines 
and courtesans in the Islamic community; and 3) ‘mixed-breed’ or ‘half-
blood’ (hajīn) children born to enslaved mothers and free Arab-Muslim 
fathers. Each of these groups is worthy of its own individual study, but taken 
together as three different types of unfree or liminal Muslims, they intersect 
in illuminating ways. For example, it appears that enslaved men and women 
played an active role in negotiating the boundaries of the earliest community 
under Muªammad (c. 610–632 CE). However, later rulers such as ‘Abd 
Notes on the Text
Throughout this book, I have written dates in a dual Hijra/Common Era 
(AH/CE) format. For example, the date of Abū Bakra’s death is rendered 
52/672; likewise, the scholar Muªammad ibn Saʿd is described as working in 
the third/ninth century.
When transliterating Arabic words, I have used the Library of Congress 
system, with a few small modifications (in particular, I render the tā marbū†a 
as ‘a’ rather than ‘ah,’, and I render the feminine nisba ending as ‘iyya’ rather 
than ‘īyah’). The specialist reader will be able to discern the original Arabic 
spelling of terms; the non-specialist reader can simply disregard diacritical 
markings. For place names with a standard English usage (such as Mecca and 
Medina), I have used the English spelling instead of the transliterated Arabic.
With the exception of a few key Arabic terms that I have left untrans-
lated, I have translated all Arabic texts cited in this monograph into English. 
Unless otherwise stated, all translations in this monograph are my own, 
including Quranic translations.
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al-Malik (r. 65–86/685–705) instituted a stronger socio-political hierar-
chy that rendered enslaved and freed persons subalterns whose ties to the 
non-Arab, non-Muslim world needed to be controlled. In this hierarchical, 
imperial setting, enslaved people could gain power by mastering Arabic, but 
they had to use their linguistic expertise in ways that pleased their masters. 
Additionally, it appears that the children of enslaved mothers resolved their 
liminal position by re-defining themselves as full ‘Arabs’ by the mid-second/
eighth century; they were only able to do so by excluding the mawālī as ‘non-
Arabs’. Moreover, one can only understand how these children of enslaved 
mothers transformed from liminal ‘half-breeds’ into full ‘Arabs’ by analysing 
the position of the enslaved mothers themselves. Thus, by examining these 
groups together as three facets of the same prism, this monograph sheds light 
on the expansion of the young Islamic community and its accommodation 
of diverse peoples.
It is difficult to paint a comprehensive picture of enslaved and freed 
persons in the Islamic sources – they are everywhere, from anonymous serv-
ants and nameless mothers to famous bureaucrats and consorts of prophets. 
In order to make sense of this overwhelming material, this book analyses 
multiple types of Arabic-Islamic sources, using multiple scales of enquiry. 
For instance, on a small scale, it analyses specific verses of the Quran and 
individual biographies from sources such as al-Balādhurī’s Ansāb al-Ashrāf 
(Genealogies of the Notables) and Ibn ʿAsākir’s Tārīkh Madīnat Dimashq 
(History of Damascus). To get a large-scale picture of demographic patterns 
and institutional changes, it presents quantitative analyses of sources such as 
Ibn Saʿd’s Al-Tabaqāt al-Kubrā (Greatest Generations) and al-Jahshiyārī’s 
Kitāb al-Wuzarā’ wa-al-Kuttāb (Book of Viziers and Scribes). To com-
pensate for the difficulties of the Arabic-Islamic source material, this book 
also employs a range of historical methodologies. For instance, it analyses 
oral chains of transmission to pinpoint more accurately when and where 
particular prophetic traditions were circulating. It uses literary analysis to 
show how different authors, working in different genres, wrote about early 
Islamic history in ways that fit their wider ideological visions. Throughout, 
it uses feminist historical analysis to attempt to recover the experiences of 
women and subalterns, as well as their interpretations of normative texts. By 
using these varied sources and techniques, this monograph paints a pointil-
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list image of early Islamic history, made up of a dozen little bright spots of 
insight.
Historical Background
Following recent trends in the scholarship, this monograph divides early 
Islamic history into two general periods: a period of Islamic Origins in the 
first/seventh century, and a period of Imperial Elaboration in the second/
eighth century. While there is no hard-and-fast boundary between these 
two periods, it appears that the first period was more open and ecumenical, 
while the second was more hierarchical and imperial. The earliest decades of 
Islamic history were more fluid in terms of integrating enslaved members, 
or as Patricia Crone says, the earliest community was ‘open to reshuffling’ 
identity categories.1 As the empire spread and became increasingly central-
ised, identity categories hardened, and in particular the boundary between 
the subaltern conquered populations and the free conquerors became more 
rigid. However, the boundaries were never completely solid; there was always 
tension between more inclusive and more exclusive interpretations of who 
belonged to the umma.
The first period of Islamic Origins – which has also been called the 
‘Believers’ Movement’ and ‘Paleo-Islam’2 – centres on the first-/seventh-
century Hijaz, in Western Arabia. It includes the career of the Prophet 
Muªammad and his immediate successors, the so-called ‘Rightly Guided’ 
caliphs (11–40/632–661). This period also witnessed the first wave of 
Islamic conquests outside Arabia, as well as the devastating First Fitna, or 
Civil War (35–40/656–661), which was eventually won by the Umayyad 
family. Arabic-Islamic source materials write extensively about this period 
as a Golden Age of piety and the triumph of God’s message. However, the 
problem with most of these Arabic-Islamic source materials is that they are 
late; most were written in the second to fourth/eighth to tenth centuries, a 
century or more after the events they purport to describe. These sources have 
also been written by particular authors with particular agendas, shaped into 
salvation histories and moralising tales. Since the mid-twentieth century, 
scholars of early Islamic history have become critical – indeed sceptical – of 
these late literary sources and the vision of early Islam that they present.3 
By instead relying on a few extant documents, inscriptions and non-Arabic 
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writings from this period, historians have radically revised their interpreta-
tions of Islamic Origins.4
Several works of revisionist scholarship have informed the underly-
ing assumptions of this monograph. First, following scholars such as Fred 
Donner and Aziz Al-Azmeh, I view the Quran itself as an authentic source 
from the first/seventh century, and I attempt to reconstruct it as a ‘polyvalent 
communicative act’ between Muªammad and his followers.5 I take it as axi-
omatic that these first decades of Islamic history were not an ossified golden 
age, but a period of dynamism, creativity and adaptability. I heed Al-Azmeh’s 
call to analyse ‘Paleo-Islam’ on its own terms, rather than ‘looking backwards’ 
at this period from the viewpoint of the Classical Islamic tradition elaborated 
in the second to fourth/eighth to tenth centuries in imperial centres such as 
Damascus and Baghdad.6 I also accept Donner’s thesis that the earliest adher-
ents of Muhammad’s message did not call themselves ‘Muslims’ or think 
of themselves as constituting an entirely new religion; rather, they called 
themselves ‘Believers’ and represented an ecumenical reform movement that 
could include all kinds of righteous, pious monotheists. In addition, I accept 
Peter Webb’s recent thesis that the earliest Believers did not view themselves 
as ‘Arabs’, but rather the notion of ‘Arabs’ as an elite class of Muslim con-
querors only emerged in the Umayyad period.7 The first three chapters of this 
book contribute to this field of Islamic Origins, using the text of the Quran 
and close analysis of later literary sources to understand how enslaved persons 
belonged to the nascent Believers’ Movement in the Hijaz.
The second period, Imperial Elaboration, covers the Umayyad caliphate 
(r. 41–132/661–749) and the first decades of the Abbasid caliphate (r. 132–
656/749–1258).8 During this period, caliphs and governors grappled with 
the practical realities of governing a vast empire, including the need to define 
the relationship between religion and politics. The first Umayyad caliph, 
Muʿāwiya (r. 41–60/661–80) appears to have been a brilliant administrator; 
he adopted many trappings of the Byzantine Empire, including minting 
Byzantine-style coins, introducing some Roman laws, and nominating his 
own son as heir apparent in typical imperial fashion.9 However, the Great 
Fitna, or second Civil War (60–73/680–692), revealed deep-seated, unre-
solved debates about the nature of Islamic rule and the structure of the Islamic 
polity. After defeating his rival ʿAbdallāh Ibn al-Zubayr and resolving the 
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Great Fitna, the fifth Umayyad caliph, ʿAbd al-Malik (r. 65–86/685–705), 
instituted imperial reforms that consolidated the Umayyads’ control over the 
empire. The period of ʿ Abd al-Malik and his successors (known collectively as 
the Marwanids) was a period of internal contraction, as the caliph attempted 
to control more tightly who could belong to the imperial elite. ʿAbd al-Malik 
was apparently trying to gain greater control not only over the conquered 
populations, but also over the growing Islamic community itself.
First, ʿAbd al-Malik and his children increasingly defined the empire as 
explicitly Islamic, as opposed to ecumenical or generally monotheistic. For 
example, in Jerusalem ʿAbd al-Malik built the Dome of the Rock, which 
contains several anti-Trinitarian inscriptions; he also issued new coins that 
contained the so-called ‘double shahāda’, which professes faith not only in 
God but also in Muªammad as God’s messenger.10 Other scholars have noted 
that Christian soldiers and bureaucrats had played a prominent role in early 
Umayyad history but appear to have lost their place of prominence under the 
Marwanids.11 Milka Levy-Rubin has also argued that the earliest conquerors 
dealt with the conquered populations in relatively flexible, ad hoc ways, while 
the Marwanids began adopting more systematic, hierarchical and restrictive 
methods (familiar from other Late Antique empires such as the Byzantines 
and Sasanians) for differentiating the conquerors from the conquered.12
Second, ʿAbd al-Malik and the socio-political elites of his day increas-
ingly defined the empire as Arab. Most famously, ʿAbd al-Malik and his 
sons adopted Arabic as the official language of the bureaucracy, and they had 
Greek/Byzantine and Persian/Sasanian government registers translated into 
Arabic.13 Recently, Peter Webb has argued that Muslim elites began using 
the term ‘Arab’ in the Umayyad period in order to differentiate themselves 
from the conquered populations. Before then, the elites had seen themselves 
as ‘Muhājirūn’ (Emigrants), that is, those who emigrated to garrison towns 
such as Basra, Kufa and Fustat in order to conduct the conquests. In the 
Umayyad period, as members of the Muslim elite settled down to civilian 
jobs and stopped emigrating and conquering, they needed a new way to dif-
ferentiate themselves from the subalterns. ‘Arab’ – as the Quran’s description 
of its own language and as a marker of linguistic purity and transcendence – 
seemed like a good choice. The final two chapters of this monograph address 
this field of Imperial Elaboration. I suggest that the Umayyad caliphs came 
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to rely increasingly on concubinage as a reproductive practice, in order to 
 consolidate political power in the Umayyad family alone. I also argue that, 
as the Marwanid government became increasingly centralised and autocratic, 
slaves and subalterns could access a certain degree of political power through 
their proximity to the caliph. Finally, I provisionally suggest that enslaved 
and unfree groups might have influenced the Marwanid desire to more rig-
idly define ‘Islam’.
Slavery and Unfreedom
This monograph takes enslaved and freed persons as its main historical sub-
jects.14 Thus, it is important to understand the basic parameters of early 
Islamic forms of slavery. It is particularly important that non-specialist 
audiences realise that the model of modern trans-Atlantic slavery does not 
accurately describe pre-modern Islamic slavery – early Islamic forms of slav-
ery more closely resembled those of the ancient and Late Antique Roman 
world. Kurt Franz has recently identified four features of normative Islamic 
slavery, derived from the Quran and hadith: 1) slaves are ‘deemed in many 
respects to be humans and not mere chattels’; 2) slaves’ inferiority is legal, 
not ontological, making emancipation easy or even expected; 3) domestic 
slavery is the norm, and masters and slaves ‘relate to each other personally in 
a familiar household framework’; 4) and masters are repeatedly encouraged 
to be kind to slaves and to manumit them.15 It is also worth emphasising 
that several Quranic verses allow men to have licit sexual intercourse with 
‘those their right hands possess (mā malakat aymānuhum)’, the common 
Quranic euphemism for slaves.16 While the master had sexual access to the 
female slaves in his household, the same exhortations towards kindness and 
manumission presumably still applied in this case.
Islamic law did not substantially change any of these features of slav-
ery, although it added more details about categories and regulations. 17 For 
example, lawyers extrapolated from a single Quranic verse that all slaves who 
commit crimes should only be given half the punishment that a free person 
would receive. Lawyers clarified that female slaves must only cover their 
genitals and buttocks when in the company of strangers, while free females 
must cover most of their bodies.18 Lawyers decreed that no Muslim or Arab 
could be reduced from a state of freedom to a state of slavery.19 (Muslims 
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could still be slaves, if they were born into slavery or if they converted to 
Islam after their enslavement.) Lawyers were also particularly interested in 
matters of inheritance and manumission, including the institutions of kitāba 
(contractual manumission) and tadbīr (automatic manumission upon the 
death of the master). For the purposes of this book, however, the two most 
crucial legal categories are the umm walad (slave-mother) and the mawlā 
(freedman). Neither of these legal concepts appears to have direct roots in the 
Quran; rather, they appear to have precedent in Near Eastern and Roman 
law, and they represent Islamic lawyers’ attempts to accommodate the many 
captives and slaves who entered Islamic society as a result of the conquests.20
As for the umm walad, classical Sunni law gives a female slave some 
limited rights if she bears a child that her master acknowledges as his own. 
By doing so, she becomes an umm walad, or ‘mother of a child’. According 
to Sunni law, the umm walad could never be sold, and she was automatically 
freed upon the death of her master. Additionally, her child was considered 
freeborn and fully legitimate.21 (Conversely, Imami-Shii lawyers reserved 
none of these rights for the umm walad, who was treated like a normal slave 
who could be sold or inherited by her master’s heirs.) In some Sunni law 
schools, the umm walad was also exempted from menial labour, and she was 
often expected to be veiled or secluded, like a free wife. Ultimately, classical 
Sunni lawyers considered concubinage a perfectly legitimate form of sexual 
relationship and means of producing children,22 and motherhood also placed 
concubines on the path to manumission.
As for post-manumission status, classical Sunni law insists that all freed 
persons maintain a tie of patronage with their former master.23 The legal 
term for this form of clientage is walā’, and both client and patron are 
called mawlā (pl. mawālī).24 There was much debate and discrepancy among 
early Islamic lawyers regarding walā’, but by the third/ninth century classical 
lawyers considered walā’ to be a form of kinship that permanently tied the 
freed person to the former master’s family.25 The patron was responsible for 
protecting his client and paying the fine for any crime that his client might 
commit; in return for this protection, the patron had a right to inherit some 
of his client’s estate.26 Thus, even after manumission, the freed slave was in 
some ways legally subordinated to his master.
Classical Islamic law is immensely informative, but it is important to 
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realise that such legal material does not encapsulate the institution of slavery. 
It tells us little about the experiences of the earliest slaves in the umma, the 
different occupations slaves held, the actual practice of buying and selling 
slaves, the kinds of social relationships slaves built or the ways that slaves 
could exercise political power. In fact, Islamic law seems in many cases to be 
completely divorced from, or uninterested in, contemporary social practice. 
Many scholars have analysed this gap between theory and practice.27 For 
instance, as Kurt Franz reminds us, Islamic lawyers write nothing about 
agricultural slavery or serfdom, military slavery or corvée labour – all of which 
existed in Islamic history. Likewise, Jonathan Brockopp has highlighted the 
divide between the theory and practice of concubinage: early Maliki jurists 
showed no interest in the contemporary Abbasid practice of using umm 
walads to produce heirs to the throne.28 Jamal Juda has also shown that 
mawālī provided all kinds of service for their former masters, including acting 
as business agents, messengers, water-carriers, scribes, personal bodyguards 
and many other activities not stipulated in Islamic law.29 Moreover, the clas-
sical Islamic law books provide no information on the qayna (pl. qiyān), that 
is, the courtesan or ‘singing girl’. Instead, scholars learn about the qiyān from 
the medieval Arabic-Islamic authors who devoted many literary anthologies, 
poetry collections and essays to them.30 Thus, while I certainly do not advo-
cate a disregard for legal sources, this monograph focuses instead on narrative 
historical texts, biographies and genealogical literature in order to unpack the 
experiences of early Islamic enslaved and freed persons.
In order to avoid over-emphasising normative legal definitions of slavery, 
this monograph suggests that the concept of ‘unfreedom’ is useful in studying 
Muslims of slave origins.31 Unfreedom highlights the personal, relational 
nature of enslavement, servitude and other forms of coercion; one is ‘unfree’ 
in relation to another person or entity. Unfreedom allows scholars to ana-
lyse those social bonds that limit personal freedom but also provide ‘social 
life’,32 bonds that embed people in unequal but mutually beneficial social 
networks. Put otherwise, unfreedom allows us to see the relationship between 
conquerors and conquered as reciprocal, if unequal.33 It allows scholars to 
analyse how the enslaved or freed person was expected to show loyalty to the 
master in return for receiving welfare, support and patronage. In many early 
Islamic contexts, it seems that the enslaved or freed person was assumed to 
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have the master’s interests at heart; the enslaved or freed person was expected 
to practice ‘inter-agency’, that is, to make individual choices that served the 
greater needs of the master’s household.34 Enslaved persons may not have 
been fully equal to adult members of the natal family, but they were certainly 
not outsiders. They likely adopted the language, values, beliefs and social 
networks of their patrons. They were assimilated into the household, or they 
were at least on the path towards assimilation. The sources provide plenty of 
evidence of slaves and mawālī in this familiar household context.
Unfreedom also provides a flexible framework for understanding forms 
of subjugation that do not fall under the legal rubric of ‘slavery’ per se (as 
mawālī and the children of enslaved mothers were not technically slaves). 
The freedman was legally free, but socially he inhabited something like a 
state of extended adolescence – he could make many of his own decisions, 
but he was ultimately dependent on his patron’s support and curried his 
patron’s favour. Unfreedom presents itself as more of a fluid continuum than 
an artificially stark dichotomy; instead of viewing slavery and freedom as 
mutually incompatible opposites, unfreedom offers more of a sliding scale.35 
Using this framework also allows scholars to analyse various manifestations of 
unfreedom. For instance, scholars can use this concept to parse the difference 
between mawālī and other subordinated or subaltern groups, such as serfs 
and dhimmīs. Finally, unfreedom provides value-neutral language for analys-
ing the costs and benefits of being enslaved or manumitted, for examining 
the ways subalterns exercised agency and the ways their agency was limited, 
and for interrogating the ways enslaved and freed persons were subordinated 
but also active participants in society.36 While the Arabic-Islamic sources do 
not use the term ‘unfreedom’ to describe historical actors, I suggest that the 
term is nevertheless useful in interrogating the position of groups such as 
concubines, courtesans, mawālī and the children of enslaved mothers.
Book Layout
The book proceeds roughly chronologically, with the first three chapters 
treating the period of Islamic Origins, and the final two chapters focusing 
on the period of Imperial Elaboration. Chapter Two analyses two Quranic 
passages that express the liminal position of believing slaves. The first passage, 
33:4–6, assures believers of unknown parentage that they fully belong to the 
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umma as ‘brothers in religion’, but it also indicates that such believers lack 
deeper social bonds to other members of the umma. I argue that the key term 
mawālī in this passage refers to the bonds of support that cement all believers, 
but that such bonds do not necessarily entail full social equality. The second 
passage, 24:32–33, discourages men from forcing their slave women into 
prostitution, but it also indicates that believing slave women are unable to 
attain certain morality standards. I argue that the key term ‘taªa‚‚un’ in this 
passage places the master–concubine relationship somewhere between licit 
and illicit sexual activity for the slave woman. These two Quranic passages 
illustrate the tension of a first-/seventh-century community struggling to 
define the relationship between spiritual equality and social hierarchy.
Both Chapters Three and Four build upon these ambiguous Quranic 
foundations to further elucidate first-/seventh-century Islamic history, as well 
as to show how later Muslims re-worked early Islamic history to fit their 
own ideological needs. Chapter Three investigates an early Muslim freed-
man named Abū Bakra (d. 52/672) who appears in exegeses of Q 33:5. 
While Abū Bakra is not a particularly famous or prominent member of early 
Islamic history, he is important as a micro-historical case study precisely 
because his identity is so contested. I argue that during his lifetime in the 
first/seventh century, Abū Bakra was identified primarily as a ‘freedman of 
God’ (†alīq allāh), an anomalous phrase that highlighted his belonging to the 
umma. However, in the subsequent centuries, this inclusive designation lost 
its meaning, so that later authors sought to place Abū Bakra into the more 
familiar social categories of Arab and mawlā. Historians such as al-Balādhurī 
use Abū Bakra’s mawlā identity to illustrate the values of piety, humility and 
political neutrality; conversely, hadith compilers such as al-Bukhārī present 
Abū Bakra as an Arab in order to highlight literalistic legal standards for 
determining identity. Thus, Abū Bakra’s story helps us discern that seemingly 
straightforward identifiers such as mawlā and Arab are deeply intertwined 
in the wider narratives different authors hoped to tell about the trajectory of 
early Islamic history.
Chapter Four analyses a group analogous to the early Islamic mawālī, 
namely enslaved prostitutes. Just as Abū Bakra invoked Q 33:5 to articulate 
his place in the early Islamic umma, so two prostitutes of the first/seventh 
century seem to have invoked Q 24:33 to seek justice and inclusion in the 
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earliest umma. But by the third/ninth century, Quranic exegetes had down-
played or even forgotten the stories of these two prostitutes; they instead 
told symbolic tales of Muʿādha, a reformed harlot who stopped working as 
a prostitute when she converted to Islam. While exegetes tell this uplifting 
story of a ‘good’ prostitute, narrative historians instead focus on the figures 
of ‘bad’ prostitutes who enjoyed fornicating. Unpacking such dichotomous 
portrayals of female sexuality allows scholars to recover more nuanced and 
complex visions of the status of enslaved women in the earliest umma.
Chapters Five and Six move away from the history of the earliest umma in 
the first/seventh century, and into the Umayyad empire of the second/eighth 
century. Chapters Five and Six each study a dyad of male and female Muslims 
of slave origins, in order to elucidate how gender and slavery shaped Umayyad 
politics. Chapter Five examines Umayyad-era concubines (umm walads) and 
their sons. Concubines raised questions in the Umayyad period about the role 
of genetic lineage in determining who belonged to the umma, who counted 
as an ‘Arab’ and who deserved the right to hold the caliphate. In order to be 
embraced as full insiders, concubines’ children first had to demonstrate that 
they were true Muslims, loyal to the Islamic empire and knowledgeable in 
religious lore. Later, in order to gain political power as caliphs, the children 
of concubines had to re-define themselves as full ‘Arabs’. To do so, they 
dismissed their mothers as essentially inconsequential, and they justified this 
move by invoking paradigmatic examples of slave mothers from the Islamic 
religious tradition. Thus, slave women indirectly changed the face of Umayyad 
politics, challenging the elite ‘Arab’ class to define its doctrine of lineage more 
clearly, and impelling the articulation of new political ideologies.
Chapter Six turns away from mothers and their sons, and towards two 
subaltern groups who used their Arabic language mastery to gain politi-
cal power in the Umayyad empire: the qiyān (courtesans) and the kuttāb 
(scribes). Both groups reveal the complex intersection of language mastery, 
cultural identity, unfreedom and political power in the Umayyad period. 
Both groups indicate that the increasing centralisation of the Marwanid 
ruling household (r. 64–132/684–749) provided increased opportunities 
for educated unfree persons to exercise political power. While these groups 
could be powerful, they were always in a precarious position, for they had to 
use their linguistic mastery in ways that pleased their imperial masters. For 
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instance, the late-Umayyad courtesan Óabāba used her poetic and musical 
talents to gain a powerful position in the harem; yet, she was unable to secure 
the more lasting, systematised forms of power that later Abbasid concubine-
queens would exercise. Likewise, Umayyad-era scribes could influence Arabic 
prose style and act as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the caliph, but they could just as 
easily be cast out as scapegoats.
The Conclusion chapter, in addition to reflecting on the main ideas of the 
monographs, suggests potential avenues for future research. In particular, it 
suggests that scholars should continue to study the mawālī through the lens of 
unfreedom, rather than through the lens of ‘non-Arab’ ethnicity. Many ques-
tions remain about the relationship between individual mawālī and the collec-
tive known as ‘the mawālī’ or ‘the society of mawālī’ (maʿshar al-mawālī).37 The 
lens of unfreedom may also help scholars discern subtle differences between 
various conquered groups, such as peasants, vassals, ahl al-dhimma and mawālī. 
Finally, it is worth considering the relationship between unfree groups and the 
emergence of ‘Islam’ as the official name of Muhammad’s religion.
Ultimately, Muslims of slave origins provide a valuable window onto 
Islamic history because their identities are complex and contested. They 
reveal debates about who can belong to the faith, who can belong to the 
social elite and who can wield political power. They also reveal debates about 
the meanings of seemingly straightforward terms, such as ‘Arab’. They show 
that the meanings of these terms are neither simple nor obvious, but are 
re-negotiated as new members enter the Islamic community. For example, 
Muslims of slave origins raise tensions between more closed, lineage-based 
definitions of Arabness and more open, language-and-culture-based defini-
tions. Rather than attempting to resolve these tensions, this monograph 
hopes to analyse what these tensions show us about the contested boundaries 
of the nascent umma.
Notes
 1. Patricia Crone, Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law, 89.
 2. Fred Donner has coined the term ‘Believers’ Movement’, and Aziz Al-Azmeh 
has coined the term ‘paleo-Islam’. I will discuss these scholars’ contributions 
below. See Fred Donner, Muhammad and the Believers; and Aziz Al-Azmeh, The 
Emergence of Islam in Late Antiquity.
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 3. For definitions and examples of the different approaches to early Islamic history, 
see Fred Donner, Narratives of Islamic Origins, 1–31.
 4. The most famous example of revisionist scholarship that completely scandal-
ised and galvanised the field is Patricia Crone and Michael Cook, Hagarism. 
This book relied only on non-Arabic, non-Islamic sources to re-construct early 
Islamic history. While many of their findings have now been rejected, the prac-
tice of reading contemporary non-Arabic, non-Islamic texts remains a mainstay 
of the field of early Islamic history. See particularly Hoyland, Seeing Islam as 
Others Saw It.
 5. Aziz Al-Azmeh, The Emergence of Islam in Late Antiquity. Al-Azmeh also writes 
that ‘the paleo-Islamic Qur’ān was a process of communication in action’ (ibid., 
444) and he urges scholars to read it ‘in statu nascendi and in its pre-canonical 
forms’ (ibid., 448). Angelika Neuwirth likewise argues that scholars can recover 
the pre-canonical Quran as a communicative process (Angelika Neuwirth, 
‘Qur’an and History – A Disputed Relationship’, 1–18.)
 6. Al-Azmeh, Emergence, 358. While I take Al-Azmeh’s point, I am not entirely 
sure how the term ‘Paleo-Islam’ avoids the assumption of inevitability, as it 
still invokes the later term ‘Islam’. That is, replacing the English term ‘early’ 
with the Greek term meaning ‘early’ (paleo) does not appear to resolve the 
problem of prefiguring a linear development into Islam. Avoiding the term 
‘Islam’ altogether is why Donner uses the term ‘Believers Movement’, although 
Al-Azmeh argues that Donner’s analysis focuses too much on piety and belief 
(see Emergence, 403–407). Al-Azmeh himself suggests that ‘Muªammadanism’ 
is an accurate term to describe Paleo-Islam, but perhaps he avoids continuing to 
use the term because of the Orientalist baggage associated with it.
 7. Whenever possible, I attempt to use the terms ‘Believers’ and ‘Arabians’ when 
I speak of this period. It proves exceedingly difficult to avoid the term ‘Islam’ 
altogether – as I use the term ‘Islamic origins’ to describe this period. I hope it 
is clear that when I speak of ‘early Islam’ or ‘Islamic origins’, I am not trying to 
posit that Islam emerged fully formed in its classical iteration.
 8. Traditionally, Arabic-Islamic sources (and many modern scholars) present the 
‘Abbasid Revolution’ of 132/749 as a true revolution that swept away the wicked 
Umayyad dynasty and instituted a new age of righteousness. However, many 
other recent scholars do not see such a sharp break between the late Umayyad 
and early Abbasid periods. As Paul Cobb says, ‘there is little in ‘Abbāsid statecraft 
that is not recognizably Marwānid’. Rather, the Abbasids simply did a better job 
of symbolically portraying themselves as cosmopolitan Muslim rulers, rather 
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than exclusively Arab ones (Paul Cobb, ‘The Empire in Syria’, 268). For other 
recent reconsiderations of the ‘Abbasid Revolution’, see Borrut, Entre mémoire 
et pouvoir, Chapter 7; El-Hibri, ‘The Redemption of Umayyad Memory by the 
Abbasids’, 241–265; Al-Azmeh, Emergence, 499.
 9. In doing so, Muʿāwiya was drawing upon a great Late Antique heritage of mon-
archy and imperial legitimacy. These Late Antique symbols were not ‘foreign’ 
borrowings or influences, but the very language in which Muʿāwiya and his 
Umayyad family were steeped, the ancient and familiar heritage of Syria and 
Iraq. On the resonances between Late Antique and early Islamic symbols of rule, 
see particularly Al-Azmeh, Emergence, especially Chapters 1 and 8.
10. Donner, Muhammad and the Believers, 195–208.
11. On the contested role of Christians in the Umayyad government, see Borrut and 
Donner, eds, Christians and Others in the Umayyad State, especially the chapters 
by Muriel Debié (‘Christians in the Service of the Caliph: Through the Looking 
Glass of Communal Identities’,) and Luke Yarbrough (‘Did ʿUmar b. ʿAbd 
al-ʿAzīz Issue an Edict Concerning Non-Muslim Officials?’).
12. Milka Levy-Rubin, Non-Muslims in the Early Islamic Empire: From Empire to 
Co-Existence.
13. Recent scholarship indicates that this ‘Arabisation’ was neither as swift nor as 
complete as has previously been assumed. Allison Vacca has concisely summa-
rised some of this promising scholarship in her ‘Conference Report: Navigating 
Language in the Early Islamic World (The Marco Institute for Medieval 
and Renaissance Studies, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 6–7 April 
2018)’, Al-Usur al-Wusta, 26 (2018), https://islamichistorycommons.org/mem/
wp-content/uploads/sites/55/2018/11/UW-26-Vacca.pdf, accessed 12 March 
2019.
14. I generally prefer terms such as ‘enslaved person’, ‘enslaved woman’ or ‘enslaved 
Muslim’ to the word ‘slave’ throughout this monograph, although sometimes I 
use the word ‘slave’ for readability. As Kecia Ali notes, the term ‘enslaved person 
. . . highlights that enslavement is not a natural state but something that is 
actively done to one human being by another’. Kecia Ali, ‘Review of Matthew 
S. Gordon and Kathryn Hain, eds., Concubines and Courtesans: Women and 
Slavery in Islamic History’, Al-Usur al-Wusta, 26 (2018), https://islamichisto 
rycommons.org/mem/wp-content/uploads/sites/55/2018/11/UW-26-Ali.pdf, 
accessed 12 March 2019.
15. Kurt Franz, ‘Slavery in Islam: Legal Norms and Social Practice’, 53–54. This 
excellent survey of legal norms and social practice engages deeply with previ-
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ous scholarship on the topic of slavery in the Islamic world, and it should be 
required reading for anyone interested in studying Islamic slavery.
16. Q 23:6 and 70:30, which both say: ‘[Successful will be the Believers who abstain 
from sexual activity] except with their wives or “those their right hands possess”, 
in which case they are free from blame’ (illā ‘alā azwājihim aw mā malakat 
aymānuhum fa-innahum ghayru malūmīn). See also Q 33:50–52. Female slave 
owners did not enjoy similar rights over their male slaves.
17. Jonathan Brockopp has shown that the Quran and Islamic law use different 
vocabularies of slavery. For instance, the Quran uses ‘that which your right 
hands possess’ (mā malakat aymānukum) to refer to slaves, while law uses the 
term ʿabd (plural ʿabīd ). The Quran uses taªrīr and fakk to refer to manumis-
sion, while law uses ʿitq (Jonathan Brockopp, Early Mālikī Law, 128–131).
18. On this, see Baber Johansen, ‘The Valorization of the Human Body in Muslim 
Sunni Law’.
19. The prohibition against enslaving Arabs is apparently prescriptive, not descrip-
tive. As Chase Robinson indicates, ‘we know that Arabs were sometimes 
enslaved’ (Chase Robinson, ‘Slavery in the Conquest Period’, 158). I suggest 
in this monograph that muwalladāt, or women born into slavery in Arabian 
cities, should perhaps be viewed as ‘Arab slaves’. In any case, because of these 
normative prohibitions against enslaving Arab-Muslims, many slaves in the 
Islamic polity were brought in through conquest or trade in outlying regions 
such as East Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Accordingly, slavery in 
some historical contexts appears to have taken on racial overtones not condoned 
in Islamic law. While the law forbids the enslavement of Arabs, it does not 
imply that certain groups, such as Black Africans or Turks, should be conflated 
with ‘slaves’, as often seems to have happened. See on the association of black-
ness with slavery particularly Bernard Lewis, Race and Slavery in the Middle 
East.
20. Jonathan Brockopp has well established that the umm walad category has no 
clear roots in the Quran or the hadith, but instead developed relatively late, 
probably in response to the Islamic conquests (Brockopp, Early Mālikī Law, 
Chapter 3). Likewise, Patricia Crone has argued that the legal features of clas-
sical walā’ have no roots in pre-Islamic Arabian practice, but were instead 
borrowed indirectly from Roman law in Syria (Crone, Roman, Provincial and 
Islamic Law).
21. This definition has been simplified for clarity, for the specifics of umm walad 
status depend on the legal school. On debates about the status of the umm 
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walad, see most recently Younus Mirza, ‘Remembering the Umm al-Walad ’, 
297–323.
22. Such protections for concubine-mothers have deep roots, going back to 
Hammurabi’s code. See Crone, Roman Provincial and Islamic Law, p. 87, fn. 
130.
23. Imami lawyers once again diverge from the Sunnis here. For Imamis, only slaves 
manumitted by an act of individual volition on the part of their masters become 
the master’s mawlā. See Crone, Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law, 77–84.
24. In this monograph, I almost always use the word mawlā to refer to the client, 
freedman or ‘lower’ mawlā – not the patron, master or ‘higher’ mawlā.
25. On the debates about the parameters of walā’, including its pre-classical form 
as a vestige of slavery rather than a metaphorical kinship tie, see Crone, Roman, 
Provincial and Islamic Law.
26. On the characteristics of classical Islamic walā’, see Crone, Roman, Provincial 
and Islamic Law, Chapter 3. On pre-classical walā’, see ibid., Chapter 4; and 
Ulrike Mitter, Das frühislamische Patronat.
27. Kurt Franz suggests that forms of unfreedom that diverge from the normative, 
domestic model of Islamic slavery should not be considered ‘slavery’ at all. For 
example, he suggests that the Zanj should be considered unfree agricultural 
labourers (more like serfs than slaves), and the Mamluks should be considered a 
caste of military overlords, not military ‘slaves’. Hannah Barker likewise shows 
that slave-merchants ignored the instructions of religious, public morals (ªisba) 
manuals and instead followed medical slave-buying manuals. Hannah Barker, 
‘Purchasing a Slave in Fourteenth-Century Cairo’. Both Franz and Barker 
essentially argue that the rules of Islamic law were more humane and protective 
towards slaves than these other practices, and thus slave-buyers and slave-users 
ignored Islamic law because it did not serve their exploitative aims.
28. Brockopp, Early Mālikī Law, 205. As far as I know, there has only been one 
study of case law, rather than legal theory, in the case of the umm walad: Ehud 
Toledano has used Ottoman Cairene police records to recover the story of a 
late-Ottoman umm walad called Şemsigul (Ehud Toledano, ‘The Other Face of 
Harem Bondage: Abuse and Redress’, Chapter 2 in Slavery and Abolition in the 
Ottoman Middle East).
29. See Jamal Juda, ‘The Economic Status of the Mawālī in Early Islam’, Chapter 
7 in Patronate and Patronage in Early and Classical Islam, edited by Monique 
Bernards and John Nawas. Juda convincingly explodes the notion, propounded 
by Patricia Crone and especially Daniel Pipes, that all mawālī shared a single, 
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low status. As Juda indicates, shared legal status does not necessarily imply 
shared social status.
30. For a brief review of the qiyān in both primary and secondary source litera-
ture, see Urban, ‘Gender and Slavery in Islamic Political Thought’, in Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Political Theory (forthcoming). See also Chapter 6 of 
the current monograph for a deeper discussion of the qiyān.
31. The notion of unfreedom has been most often deployed in studies of ancient 
Greek and Roman slavery. See, for example, M. I. Finley, ‘Between Slavery and 
Freedom’; and Léonie J. Archer, ed., Slavery and Other Forms of Unfree Labour. 
Scholars of medieval European society have also adopted the term to describe 
phenomena such as serfdom and fealty. See, for example, Alice Rio, ‘Freedom 
and Unfreedom in Early Medieval Francia’ and ‘Self-sale and Voluntary Entry 
into Unfreedom, 300–1100’; and Alice Taylor, ‘Homo Ligius and Unfreedom in 
Medieval Scotland’.
32. I am here inverting Orlando Patterson’s famous concept of ‘social death’; see 
Patterson, Slavery and Social Death, Introduction and Chapter 2.
33. As Alice Taylor says, ‘one could have certain freedoms in a state of unfreedom; 
equally, there was unfreedom inherent in the dependence that was a necessary 
part of free status’ (‘Homo Ligius’, 110).
34. On the concept of loyalty undergirding the master–slave or patron–client rela-
tionship, see P. G. Forand, ‘The Relation of the Slave and Client to the Master or 
Patron in Medieval Islam’; Roy Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership in an Early 
Islamic Society; Reuven Amitai, ‘The Mamlūk Institution’; and Ehud Toledano, 
As If Silent and Absent: Bonds of Enslavement in the Islamic Middle East.
35. As many people working in many different fields expressed at the Binghamton 
Medieval Unfreedoms conference in October 2018, the idea of total and com-
plete ‘freedom’ would have been a terrifying idea for most pre-modern peoples 
– it evokes an image of living alone, on a desert island, without any home, family 
or protection. In many monotheistic traditions, ‘freedom’ is also an unappealing 
theological concept, as God is the only truly free agent, while humankind’s goal 
is to submit as God’s worshipful ‘slaves’. Salvation comes precisely through 
slavery to God, while freedom implies damnation.
36. I also find unfreedom a helpful concept for pushing back against the language of 
Patricia Crone, whose Slaves on Horses is foundational for understanding mawālī 
military contingents in Umayyad society, but who is too dogmatic when she 
describes mawlā status as a ‘humiliation’, mawālī as inherently ‘despised’, the 
conquerors as hoping to completely distance themselves from the conquered 
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societies and the conquered populations as adding nothing particularly valuable 
to Islamic society. Her analysis of the Umayyad mawālī concludes by noting the 
‘moral failing’ of the Islamic experiment, which is a provocative but dubious 
claim. See Crone, Slaves on Horses, 51–57.
37. Al-JāªiÕ uses this phrase, maʿshar al-mawālī, in his ‘Al-Risāla fī al-Nābita’ 
(Rasā’il al-JāªiÕ, 2:17).
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Insiders with an Asterisk: 
Mawālı̄ and Enslaved Women in the Quran
This book begins with the Quran because it is the earliest and most authentic document that scholars possess for understanding how new 
believers found a place within the umma.1 While the Quran is an anchor 
for any enquiry into early Islamic history,2 it does not provide a definitive 
blueprint for Islamic society – it is a polyvalent and at times inscrutable text. 
Attempting to reconstruct the Quranic worldview requires a careful compari-
son of many concepts and vocabularies, scattered across many verses.3 Such 
an analysis allows scholars to glimpse the range of beliefs and practices that 
were meaningful for the earliest Muslims, as well as to uncover a series of 
questions with which the nascent umma grappled. One of these questions was 
the place of slaves, foreigners and other outsiders in the new umma.
Accordingly, this chapter investigates two Quranic passages that express 
the liminal position of enslaved believers, or believers with slave origins. The 
first passage, Q 33:4–6, explicates the role of genealogy in building the 
umma. While this passage assures believers of unknown parentage that they 
fully belong to the umma as ‘brothers in religion’, it also indicates that believ-
ers have closer social ties with their own relatives than they do with such 
outsiders. I argue that the key term mawālī in this passage refers to the bonds 
of support that cement all believers, but that such bonds do not necessarily 
entail full social equality. The second passage, Q 24:32–33, speaks of the role 
of sexual ethics in building the umma. While this passage encourages believers 
to marry virtuous slaves and discourages men from forcing their slave women 
into prostitution, it also indicates that believing slave women are unable to 
attain certain morality standards. I argue that the key term ‘taªa‚‚un’ in this 
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passage refers to the enslaved concubine’s relationship with her own master, 
and that it places the master–concubine relationship somewhere between licit 
and illicit sexual activity for the enslaved woman.
These two passages are certainly not the only ones in the Quran that treat 
belonging, slavery or the structure of the umma.4 However, they are especially 
rich because they so clearly express the Quranic tension between spiritual 
equality and social hierarchy, between the desire for inclusivity and the need 
for order. These two passages are seemingly disparate and have not been 
analysed together, but they share many conceptual resonances. Both passages 
are ambiguous: they indicate that outsiders and slaves can join the umma, but 
that they might not belong quite as fully as free believers. Both passages have 
a more inclusive reading that focuses on the cohesion of the entire religious 
community, and a more exclusive reading that highlights the differences 
among believers. And both passages capture the struggle in the first/seventh 
century to create a functional faith community that adhered to high moral 
standards but also dealt practically with everyday social realities. When these 
two passages are analysed in tandem, they help elucidate how believing slaves 
impelled the nascent umma to clarify its criteria for belonging.
Q 33:4–6 ‘They Are Your Brothers in Religion and Your Mawālī’
The term mawālī (singular, mawlā) is crucial for understanding the place 
of outsiders in the Quranic worldview. A common translation of the term 
mawālī in the Quran is ‘clients’,5 but I suggest that the Quranic term is much 
more capacious: it designates the bonds of help, support and kindness that 
unite all believers into a functional faith community.6 Verse 33:5 seems to 
use the term mawālī in this inclusive sense when it describes rootless believers 
as ‘your brothers in religion and your mawālī’.7 However, the wider context 
of the passage Q 33:4–6 also raises the possibility that such outsiders are 
not socially equal to other believers, and it is therefore easy to see how some 
parties understood the term ‘mawālī’ to designate a specific, subordinate 
subset of believers. In this passage, the Quran lays the foundation for both 
the importance and the ambivalence of the term mawālī throughout Islamic 
history.
Arabic philology is key to unlocking this reading of the Quranic term 
mawālī (and its singular, mawlā). Mawālī comes from the tri-consonantal 
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Arabic root w-l-y, which indicates bonds of mutual support shared among 
any coherent community.8 The Quran uses many permutations of this root 
in addition to mawlā, including the verb tawallā (‘to turn towards or away’), 
and the noun walī (‘friend’).9 Many of these permutations are found in 
parallel contexts, in close proximity to one another, or even as synonyms. 
For instance, the Quran describes God as ‘such a good mawlā and such a 
good helper’ (Q 22:78) and ‘sufficient as a walī and sufficient as a helper’ (Q 
4:45). Likewise, Q 47:11 states that ‘the unbelievers will have no mawlā’, 
while Q 42:8 says that ‘the unjust will have no walī or helper’.10 In addi-
tion to describing God as the ultimate patron or source of protection, the 
Quran also uses words from the root w-l-y to describe human relationships. 
Specifically, w-l-y vocabularies imply military support, treating others kindly 
and maintaining family ties.11 It is in the light of this broader semantic 
network that I understand mawālī in the Quran to connote that all believers 
are one another’s friends and supporters.
The Quran is particularly explicit about the relationship between bio-
logical kinship, religious belief and these bonds of social support. It erases 
the seemingly inherent connection between biological kinship and social 
bonds, and instead posits religious belief as the font of social cohesion. 
The Quran several times encourages believers to break their ties with their 
unbelieving relatives, as in Q 9:23: ‘Do not take your fathers and brothers as 
friends (awliyā’) if they love unbelief more than belief. Whoever of you turns 
to them in support (yatawallāhum) is among the unjust.’12 Instead, people 
with shared beliefs and morals are one another’s true friends. For example, 
Q 8:72 states. ‘Indeed, those who believed and emigrated and strove with 
their property and their persons in God’s path, and those who sheltered and 
helped – these are the awliyā’ of one another.’13 This phrasing is resonant with 
the early Islamic document known as the ‘Constitution of Medina’, which 
declares, ‘The believers are the mawālī of one another, to the exclusion of 
other people.’14 On the other hand, Q 5:51 describes the Jews and Christians 
as the awliyā’ of each other, while Q 6:129 indicates that God has ‘made the 
unjust to befriend (nuwallī) one another’.15 Ultimately, these w-l-y words 
indicate that the umma is not merely a community of faith, but a community 
joined together by mutual action; believers work together to achieve security, 
stability and eventually victory in their message.
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This semantic and conceptual background undergirds Q 33:4–6, a piv-
otal passage for understanding the complexities of the Quran’s worldview. 
The verses read (emphasis added):
33:4. God has not given man two hearts in his body. Nor has He made 
your wives whom you have divorced by declaring them to be ‘like the back 
of your mothers’ [actually] your mothers. Nor has He made your adopted 
sons [actually] your sons. This is what you say with your mouths, but God 
speaks the truth, and He shows the right path.
33:5. Call them by [the names of] their fathers: that is more just before 
God. But if you do not know their fathers, then [they are] your brothers 
in religion and your mawālī. There is no blame upon you if you make a 
mistake, but [there is blame] if the heart intends [wrong]. God is forgiving 
and merciful.
33:6. The Prophet is closer (awlā) to the believers than their own selves, and 
his wives are their mothers. Blood relatives are closer (awlā) to one another 
in the Book of God than believers and emigrants; but you should treat your 
friends (awliyā’) well, for this is decreed in the Book.
Traditionally, scholars and exegetes have understood these verses to be speak-
ing about adoption and inheritance laws.16 However, disregarding these later 
interpretations for the time being, I argue that this passage answers some 
questions that new believers of slave origins may have had concerning their 
status within the community. Slaves, foundlings, foreigners or other rootless 
outsiders might have doubted that they could be included in the umma, for 
the Quran sets up genealogy as one of the truths of God’s creation: ‘He has 
made for [humankind] relation by blood and relation by marriage’ (Q 25:54). 
Apparently, pre-Islamic Arabians had used the language of genealogy fairly 
loosely.17 According to Q 33:4–5, pre-Islamic husbands had divorced their 
wives by uttering the formula, ‘You are to me like the back of my mother’, 
while adoptive fathers had used the language of genealogy to authenticate 
and authorise their relationships with their adopted sons.18 Here, the Quran 
abolishes such inaccurate use of language. Verse Q 33:4 dictates that the lan-
guage of genealogy should be used only to reflect biological reality (for God 
‘speaks the Truth’), rather than to perform a utilitarian social function (for 
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that is ‘what you say with your mouths’).19 In particular, believers must know 
the identity of their blood relatives so that they may contract licit marriages. 
Quran Q 4:23 forbids believers from marrying their own children, parents, 
siblings, aunts/uncles, nieces/nephews, parents-in-law, children-in-law, step-
children or two sisters at the same time. In order to follow these prohibitions, 
believers must know their genealogies.20
As a result, believers who did not know their genealogies might have 
faced the dire problem of being unable to follow God’s law, and thus being 
excluded from the umma entirely. Verse Q 33:5 immediately alleviates these 
worries by stating, ‘If you do not know their fathers, then [they are] your 
brothers in religion and your mawālī.’ That is, even believers with unknown 
genealogies can belong to the umma and enjoy the social bonds of help and 
support that all believers share as one another’s mawālī. An early Muslim 
named Abū Bakra – the focus of the next chapter – apparently invoked this 
phrase in reference to himself, claiming: ‘I am one of those whose fathers is 
unknown, so I am your brother in religion and your mawlā.’21 While later 
exegetes understood him to be claiming to be a mawlā (client) of the Prophet 
Muªammad, I suggest that he was instead invoking this phrase in its original 
Quranic meaning, as an affirmation of his belonging to the community. Abū 
Bakra was celebrating his identity as a believer, not as a client or freedman.
The Quran quickly complicates this inclusive vision of the umma, how-
ever, for the next verse indicates that all social bonds within the umma are 
not created equal. Verse 33:6 declares that ‘the Prophet is closer (awlā) to the 
believers than [they are] to themselves’, and that ‘blood relatives are closer 
(awlā) to one another . . . than believers and emigrants’. The first of these 
statements re-affirms that belief in the Prophet’s mission, and not genealogy, 
is the foundational criterion for belonging to the Islamic community.22 The 
primary allegiance of all believers is to the Prophet, and in return they will 
receive the most effective aid from him. As all believers are fundamentally 
equal in this respect, this ‘Prophet is closer’ statement has fundamentally 
egalitarian message. It appears similar to the Shii concept of walāya, wherein 
all Shia are equal in their shared allegiance to the Imam.23
The second statement, ‘blood relatives are closer’, is more explicitly hier-
archical. It finds a parallel in Q 8:75, which states: ‘Those who then believe, 
and emigrate, and strive alongside you, they are of you (fa-ūlā’ika minkum). 
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But blood relatives are closer to one another in the Book of God . . .’ Many 
exegetes understand ‘closer’ in Q 8:75 to refer to inheritance specifically, but 
based on my analysis of the root w-l-y, I argue that it refers to social bonds 
more generally.24 Verses 33:6 and 8:75 are some of the Quran’s most highly 
articulated statements about the relationship between belief and society; all 
believers share some social bonds by dint of their belief, but some believers 
share tighter social bonds than others. The Quran thus charts the transition 
away from a situation where every believer was essentially an unconnected 
outsider who broke their social bonds to join a radical faith community, and 
towards a situation where some believers were unconnected outsiders while 
others had family connections within the umma. The social differentiation 
that is re-inscribed into the umma here using the term awlā does not neces-
sarily entail the forms of subordination and dependency that would later 
become associated with the word mawlā. However, for those parties who 
advocated such subordination, this verse could provide a plausible scriptural 
justification.
Q 24:32–33: ‘And Do Not Force Your Slave Women into Prostitution if 
They Desire Chastity’
The previous Quranic passage could hypothetically apply to both males and 
females: male and female believers are ‘mawālī’ in faith, and both male and 
female blood relatives are ‘closer’ than strangers.25 However, in terms of 
deciding who belongs to the umma and how outsiders should be included 
in it, the context of Q 33:4–6 implies a male audience – it speaks specifi-
cally about ‘sons’ and ‘brothers’. The Quran raises slightly different issues 
for enslaved women than it does for enslaved men, in that it focuses on 
sexual ethics rather than genealogy. On the one hand, the Quran explicitly 
states that enslaved women can be believers, and it allows believing men to 
marry believing or righteous slave women. On the other hand, the Quran 
allows believing slave owners apparently unlimited sexual access to their own 
enslaved concubines. Here, I argue that a key term for understanding the 
Quran’s ambivalent treatment of believing slave women is taªa‚‚un, which 
I understand to mean something like, ‘Trying to emulate the sexual ethics 
of free women’. The Quran seems to place the enslaved concubine into this 
liminal position of taªa‚‚un, potentially treating even her sexual relationship 
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with her own master as falling somewhere between chastity and unchastity. 
While the term taªa‚‚un (unlike mawālī) is not a prominent or contested 
term in early Islamic history, the concept of slave women’s chastity and the 
nature of the master–concubine relationship would remain salient issues for 
centuries.
My reading of taªa‚‚un as a liminal sexual position builds on other 
scholars’ work on slavery and sexual ethics in the Quran.26 The Quran often 
exhorts believers to remain chaste, although it provides slightly different 
rules for (all) men, free women and enslaved women. For a man, chastity 
explicitly means to avoid sex with anyone other than his own wives and 
enslaved concubines.27 For a free woman, chastity means sex only with her 
husband – women are not allowed sexual access to their own slaves as con-
cubines. As for slaves, the Quran explicitly states that believers can marry 
believing slaves (whether male or female), although a person may not marry 
his own slave.28 Married slave women are expected to remain faithful to 
their husbands; the husband’s right to enjoy exclusive sexual access to his 
wife trumps the slave master’s right to have sex with his female slaves.29 
However, apparently recognising the limited agency of enslaved women, 
Q 4:25 states that any married slave woman who commits adultery deserves 
half the punishment of a free woman. Finally, most exegetes and scholars 
consider that an unmarried slave woman could never be ‘chaste’ (muª‚ina).30 
It is this final assumption that I contest in this chapter – I find that the Quran 
does not completely despair of enslaved women’s chastity, but rather places it 
in the liminal position of taªa‚‚un.
Philology is once again pivotal for unpacking the term taªa‚‚un; however, 
unlike the term mawālī analysed above, there is only a single attestation of 
the term taªa‚‚un in the entire Quran. It is certainly related to other terms 
from the Arabic root ª-‚-n, which literally means to guard or protect, and 
figuratively refers to sexual chastity. However, taªa‚‚un seems to have a dif-
ferent meaning than the more common terms iª‚ān (chasity) and muª‚in(a) 
(chaste). Harald Motzki has greatly elucidated the meaning of the latter terms 
in his attempt to solve the puzzling verse Q 4:24,31 but even this exceedingly 
rigorous and careful scholar simply glosses the term taªa‚‚un as ‘having the 
same signification as iª‚ān’.32 Motzki follows most classical exegetes in this 
reading, but I find no textual evidence within the Quran itself to support 
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such a statement, and the basic rules of Arabic grammar indicate that the 
words should not mean the same thing.33 Iª‚ān and muª‚ina come from the 
strongly active, transitive form IV of the root ª-‚-n; they mean to actively 
protect and shelter one’s chastity. On the other hand, taªa‚‚un comes from 
the more reflexive form V, which can also have the connotation of wanting 
or pretending to be something.34 Words of form V often do not have a direct 
object, and they fall somewhere in between the active and passive voice in the 
English language.35 Accordingly, the meaning of taªa‚‚un would be something 
like ‘to try to be chaste’, or ‘to have an internal comportment of chastity’.36 
The term seems to acknowledge that full chastity might not be a realistic goal 
for an enslaved woman, but that she should nevertheless try to be chaste. Her 
intentions and efforts are valuable, even if she never achieves her aim.
Two other Arabic terms are important for my analysis of this passage 
below: fatayāt (young, unmarried, righteous slave women) and bighā’ (illicit 
sex). Most scholars have viewed fatayāt simply as meaning ‘female slaves’, 
and they treat it as a synonym for the most common Quranic term for slave, 
‘what your right hands possess’ (mā malakat aymānukum).37 However, other 
contexts from the Quran indicate that fatayāt is not quite the same thing as 
mā malakat aymānukum. The other uses of fatā/fatāh in the Quran can indeed 
connote enslavement, but they also connote youth and monotheistic right-
eousness. For instance, Q 21:60 describes Abraham as a fatā, likely meaning 
a young, morally upright man; Q 12:30 describes Joseph as a fatā, meaning 
a young, morally upright and also sexually appealing slave. While the Quran 
does not explicate either Abraham’s or Joseph’s marital status at the time they 
are called fatā, they seem to be unmarried. As for the female term fatayāt, the 
Quran uses it only one other time, in verse 4:25:
If any of you do not have the means with which to marry chaste believ-
ing women (al-muª‚ināt al-mu’mināt), then [they may marry] their slaves 
from among their young believing women (mā malakat aymānuhum min 
al-fatāyāt al-mu’mināt) . . .
This verse has led many exegetes and scholars to assert that slave women 
cannot be considered chaste, for it contrasts the terms muª‚ināt (chaste 
women) and fatayāt.38 However, if the word fatayāt here is understood not 
simply to mean a slave, but more specifically a young slave, it colours the 
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picture slightly differently.39 It implies that, if a believer cannot afford to 
marry a free woman, then the only kind of enslaved woman he should marry 
is a young one. Youth here might indicate that the slave has never been 
 married – is perhaps even a virgin – or at least has not lived long enough to 
be corrupted by pre-Islamic notions of sexual ethics. Far from implying that 
the slave women in question are not chaste, it seems to instruct believing men 
to try to marry young and ‘unsullied’ believing slave women (fatayāt) insofar 
as that is possible.
As for bighā’, many translators render it as ‘prostitution’, which is a plau-
sible reading of the term in the context of Q 24:32. Yet, its meaning is not 
straightforward, given that this is once again the only attestation of the term 
in the Quran. When placed in the context of its wider Arabic root, it seems 
that bighā’ may mean ‘illicit sex’ more generally, as opposed to the specific 
practice of prostitution. A related term, baghy, or ‘transgressing the bounds’, 
is used several times in constructions such as this one in Q 7:33: ‘Say: The 
things which my Lord has forbidden are: shameful acts (fawāªish), whether 
open or secret, sins (ithm), and transgressions (baghy) without right.’40 The 
fact that baghy is found in close proximity to fawāªish, which has a sexual con-
notation, indicates that baghy might also have such a connotation. Even more 
strikingly, the active participle, baghiyy (prostitute/whore), occurs twice in the 
Quran, both times in Sura 19 (Mary). When Mary receives the annunciation 
that she is pregnant with Jesus, she asks: ‘How can I have a son, given that no 
man has touched me and I am no whore (baghiyyan)?’ (Q 19:20). Later, when 
her family discovers her pregnancy, they chide her, ‘O sister of Aaron! Your 
father was no philanderer and your mother was no whore (baghiyyan)!’ (Q 
19:28). The term baghiyy here resembles the English word ‘whore’, in that it 
does not necessarily entail prostitution per se, but is a slander word implying 
that a woman has had sex outside marriage. Accordingly, the word bighā’ in 
Q 24:33 might refer to any kind of pre- or extra-marital sexual activity.41
This conceptual and semantic background undergirds the seminal pas-
sage, Q 24:32–33, which I argue is the Quran’s most explicit statement 
about the enslaved concubine’s chastity. The immediately preceding verses, Q 
24:30–31, instruct believing men and women to ‘lower their gaze and guard 
their chastity’.42 Verses 32 and 33 continue (emphasis added):
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24:32. Marry the single among you, or the virtuous among your male and 
female slaves (al-‚āliªina min ʿibādikum wa-imā’ikum). If they are impov-
erished, God will enrich them from His grace, for God is all encompassing, 
all knowing.
24:33 And let those who cannot make a marriage keep chaste until God 
enriches them from His grace. Those of your slaves who seek a contract of 
gradual manumission (kitāba), make the contract with them if you know 
any good in them, and give them some of the wealth of God which He 
has given you. And do not force your young, righteous slave women 
(fatayāt) into illicit sexual activity (bighā’) if they want to try to emu-
late the sexual ethics of free women (taªa‚‚un), seeking the ephemeral 
goods of this worldly life; whoever forces them, after their forcing God 
will surely be forgiving and merciful.
The entire passage raises a host of complex issues, including chastity within 
marriage, affording the dowry for that marriage and slavery/manumission. 
Based on the context of the wider passage, it seems that the final sentence of 
Q 24:33 might not be about the morality of prostitution, but about the role 
of prostitution as it relates to money (money to pay for marriage, or to pay 
for manumission). The sentence might imply that masters should not use 
the proceeds of prostitution to pay for their marriage dowries. Alternatively, 
because the verse also mentions the writ of manumission (kitāba), the sentence 
might mean that masters should not let enslaved women use the proceeds of 
prostitution to purchase their own freedom.43 Finally, it is possible that the 
final sentence of Q 24:33 hearkens back to 24:32 and the first sentence of 
24:33, in which case it would imply that a righteous (‚āliªa), unmarried slave 
woman should remain chaste until she gets married. It is the latter possibility 
that this chapter explores in more detail.
Like the passage Q 33:4–6 analysed above, I argue that this verse answers 
some questions that liminal believers may have had about their status within 
the community. An enslaved woman might have wondered whether she 
could truly belong to the umma, for the Quran sets up chastity as an impor-
tant marker of belief and righteousness. For instance, Q 23:1–8 lists a series 
of attributes of the ‘successful’ believers, which includes upholding the prayer 
and alms, avoiding frivolity, keeping their word and guarding their chas-
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tity. Similarly, Q 33:35 promises that God will reward all men and women 
who submit to God and believe, who are devout, honest, humble, patient, 
charitable and selfless, and who guard their chastity. That is, chastity ranks 
among prayer and almsgiving as one of the main attestations of true belief. It 
is difficult to recover the sexual ethics of the pre-Islamic period, but it seems 
safe to assume that enslaved women had little sexual agency and were gener-
ally not considered ‘chaste’.44 Moreover, the Quran itself explicitly allows a 
master to have sexual access to ‘those his right hands possess’, in verses such 
as 23:6, and 70:30,45 but there is no explicit parallel to these verses from the 
enslaved woman’s perspective. That is, while concubinage is licit from the 
male owner’s perspective, it is unclear from the enslaved woman’s perspective.
As a result, an enslaved woman – particularly an unmarried concubine 
– might have wondered whether she could adhere to the believers’ expected 
standards of chastity and morality. And if she could not, she might have 
found herself unable to belong to the umma in any meaningful sense. I argue 
that verse 24:33 alleviates these worries by indicating that an enslaved woman 
may take more control over her own sexuality. Based on my semantic analysis 
above, there are two fairly divergent, but equally plausible, readings of this 
verse that shed new light on the sexual ethics of enslaved women. First, less 
controversially, this verse may simply indicate that an enslaved woman may 
refuse to work as a prostitute. She would still be her master’s concubine and 
would not be entitled to refuse the advances of her own master. In this case, 
the word taªa‚‚un would describe the concubine’s sexual relationship with 
her own master – that is, it would mean something like, ‘Do not force your 
slave women to prostitution, if they desire to abstain from sex with everyone 
except you.’ From her perspective, concubinage itself would fall somewhere 
between chastity and unchastity. This situation would create something 
of an ethical double standard between men, who are explicitly allowed to 
have chastity (iªsān) within the confines of marriage and concubinage, and 
enslaved women, whose best moral state would be taªa‚‚un.
The second, more radical, reading of this verse would provide an unmar-
ried believing slave woman the prerogative to refuse sex even with her own 
master. In this reading, bighā’ would mean ‘extra-marital sex’ and not merely 
prostitution, and taªa‚‚un would mean trying to avoid any sexual activity 
outside the confines of legal marriage. This reading would not necessarily 
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contradict the Quranic passages that allow male masters to practice concu-
binage with their female slaves (such as Q 23:6 and 70:30), as those passages 
consider chastity from the male master’s perspective. Here in Q 24:33, the 
issue at stake seems to be whether or not concubinage counts as chastity 
from the enslaved female’s perspective. In this reading, a man may still have 
sex with his ‘mā malakat al-aymān’, meaning generally slaves, but he may 
not have unlimited sex with his fatayāt, meaning a specific subset of young, 
unmarried, believing, righteous slaves. (This would correspond well with the 
only other usage of the term fatayāt, wherein the Quran encourages believing 
men to marry them, not to have concubinal sex with them.) This reading 
would provide a stronger sense that belief – and the sexual ethics that go 
along with belief – trumps or at least challenges male slave-owners’ preroga-
tives. Even if this is the case, however, the verse still uses the term taªa‚‚un 
and not the more forceful iª‚ān to describe the concubine’s position. The 
softened vocabulary seems to imply that refusing her master’s advances is 
difficult (if not impossible) for an enslaved woman, and it provides her some 
moral leeway for her in case her master continues to force himself on her. 
It implies that an enslaved woman may in the end have no power to enact 
her own chastity, but that she can at least have correct intention and a moral 
attitude. It is the effort itself that counts as taªa‚‚un for the enslaved concu-
bine. While more radically empowering for the concubine in some ways, this 
reading still effectively places the master–concubine relationship in the grey 
area of taªa‚‚un for the enslaved woman.
In either case – the more conventional or the more radical reading of the 
passage – the word taªa‚‚un seems to pertain to the enslaved woman’s sexual 
relationship with her own master, and it puts her in a liminal ethical position. 
While all other Muslims, male or female, are held to the standard of iª‚ān, 
the enslaved woman is only held to the standard of taªa‚‚un. This liminal 
status has a more inclusive reading, and a more exclusionary one. On the 
inclusive side, it is clear that an enslaved woman can be a believer, and that 
belief gives her some control over her sexuality. (An enslaved woman can still 
be compelled to marry whomever her master wishes, so the issue here is not 
the enslaved woman’s complete agency to choose her sexual partners. But she 
can at least demand to have only chaste sexual relations.) Additionally, these 
lowered moral expectations can be read charitably, as a theological mercy for 
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enslaved women. According to verse 2:286, God does not charge the believers 
to do what they are not capable of doing; thus, God does not charge enslaved 
women to become full muª‚ināt because they would likely fail, and such a 
moral failing could send them to hell. In order to help the believing slave 
woman achieve paradise, the Quran lowers its moral expectations.
On the more exclusive side, these lowered moral expectations can be read 
less charitably, as giving in to exploitative social practices and power dynam-
ics instead of changing them. One potential upshot of the Quran’s focus on 
attaining the afterlife (as in the Bible and other scriptures) is that it seems to 
condone the continuation of unjust practices on Earth. It puts the burden on 
the enslaved woman to ‘try to be chaste’, instead of demanding that society 
change such that enslaved women are able to be fully chaste. Moreover, it 
seems clear that unmarried slave women are still unable to embody their 
faith quite as fully as any other believer – even married slave women are all at 
least hypothetically able to follow God’s command to remain chaste. And if 
chastity, like prayer and charity, is a marker of truly belonging to the umma, 
then unmarried slave women are also unable to belong to the umma quite as 
fully as any other believer. In the end, it appears that chastity for the enslaved 
woman is not black and white in the Quran, but a murky grey taªa‚‚un.
Finally, it is worth considering the resonances, and the ruptures, between 
this Quranic view and the early Christian view of slavery and sexuality. Jennifer 
Glancy has noted the polyvalence of the Greek term porneia, used by Paul in 
several of his epistles. This term can mean sexual irregularity more broadly, or 
prostitution more specifically; the exact parameters of porneia are unclear and 
open to interpretation.46 The Quranic terms bighā’ and zinā appear to have a 
similar polyvalence. Paul urges his readers to shun porneia, and he instructs 
Christian men to ‘obtain their own vessel’ (that is, woman) for licit sexual 
activity. As Glancy shows, this ‘vessel’ may have been understood to be either 
a wife or a slave – for first-century CE society assumed that masters may have 
sex with their slaves, who were ‘morally neutral sexual outlets’.47 Likewise, the 
Quran considers under the rubric of ‘chastity’ a man’s sexual relations with 
his wives and concubines. However, Paul remains  pointedly silent on the 
question of whether such master–slave sexual relationships counted as por-
neia for the enslaved woman herself. Glancy wonders whether Paul’s silence 
‘indicates he believes slaves who are sexually involved with their owners are 
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therefore alienated from the Christian body’, or, on the other hand, that ‘the 
forced sexual activity of slaves was beyond moral judgment’.48 That is, Paul’s 
silence leaves open the question of whether enslaved women could truly 
belong to a group of Christians whose ‘bodies are members of Christ’, and 
whose bodies were ‘not for porneia, but for the Lord’.
In contrast to Paul’s silence, I argue that the Quran makes a more posi-
tive statement that enslaved women can indeed belong to the community of 
believers whose membership is marked by their sexual ethics – they may not 
belong fully, but they belong at least partially. Moreover, in the early Christian 
Roman context, slaves could not contract legal marriages, while the Quran 
clearly allows both male and female slaves the ability to marry, and thus to 
fully embody their community’s sexual ethics. Accordingly, it seems that the 
Quran takes up similar questions to those raised by early Christianity, and it 
exhibits many of the same polyvalences and uncertainties, yet it resolves the 
matter of the slave woman’s sexual ethics slightly more concretely than does 
Paul.
The Disconnect between Exegesis and History
In the light of this co-textual analysis of Q 33:4–6 and 24:30–33, it is 
worth returning to the traditional Muslim exegeses of these passages, to 
analyse their concerns and to consider how and why they fail to raise the 
tensions this chapter has highlighted.49 The exegetes almost universally say 
that God revealed Q 33:4–5 regarding the Prophet Muªammad’s adopted 
son Zayd, who had previously been called Zayd ibn Muªammad but was 
re-named Zayd ibn Óāritha following the command to ‘call them by [the 
names of] their fathers’.50 As for the statement in Q 33:6 that ‘relatives are 
closer to one another’, exegetes almost universally treat it as an abrogation 
of the ‘brotherhood’ (mu’ākhāh) agreement that Muªammad had instituted 
between the Medinan Helpers and Meccan Emigrants shortly after the hijra. 
The metaphorical ‘brothers’ of this tiny core of believers inherited from and 
bequeathed to one another for a short while, but, after enough blood rela-
tives had joined the umma, the old kinship-based inheritance practices were 
re-instituted.51 As for the final sentence of Q 24:33, exegetes understand that 
this verse forbids the practice of forced slave prostitution, and that it absolves 
enslaved women if their masters nevertheless prostitute them. These exegeses 
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provide several examples of Medinese women who escaped forced prostitu-
tion in this way.52
From the perspective of a historian attempting to reconstruct first-/
seventh-century history, these exegeses prove largely disappointing. First, 
on the level of grammar and vocabulary, exegetes sometimes interpret the 
text inconsistently in order to fit their own frameworks. For instance, they 
essentially ignore the conditional phrase, ‘If you do not know their fathers’, 
when associating Q 33:5 with Zayd ibn Óāritha. This conditional phrase 
should exclude Zayd, for his father was known to be the Kalbī tribesman 
Óāritha ibn Shuraªīl. The early exegete Muqātil ibn Sulaymān acknowledges 
this problem when he explains, ‘Even if they had not known a father for 
Zayd to be traced back to, he still would have been your brother in religion 
and your mawlā.’53 The exegetes’ association of Q 33:6 with inheritance 
laws is also problematic because of their inconsistent understanding of the 
word awlā (‘closer’). Regarding blood relatives, they say that awlā refers to 
inheritance; yet, this very same verse also describes Muªammad as awlā, and 
the exegetes do not indicate that Muªammad inherited from or bequeathed 
to his believers.54 Finally, while there is no inherent problem in associating 
Q 24:33 with a ban on slave prostitution, the exegetes raise inconsistencies 
and logical loopholes that they do not resolve when explaining this verse.55 
Shii exegetes solve these problems by arguing that Q 24:33 had been abro-
gated by Q 4:25, but the Sunni exegetes generally do not even recognise the 
internal inconsistencies in their own thinking about enslaved women’s sexual 
ethics. Moreover, as I will discuss further in Chapter 4, most of these exegeses 
provide unhistorical, symbolic examples of women who escaped prostitution 
as a result of the revelation of this verse.56
The usual interpretations also effectively shatter the semantic and con-
ceptual coherence of these passages. Very few exegetes treat Q 33:4–6 as a 
coherent unit; most treat 33:4–5 separately from 33:6, while others treat 
verses 4, 5 and 6 separately.57 As for Q 24:33, most exegetes treat each clause 
of the verse separately, not considering the entire verse as a unit (much less the 
wider passage).58 This trend is not surprising – for medieval exegetes tended 
to break down their analyses into small units, while moderns have moved 
towards analysing entire passages, Suras or even the entire Quran as a whole. 
However, it does mean that the medieval exegetes do not engage with the 
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wider themes of these passages. For example, the tension I find in the term 
mawālī comes from comparing the many versions of the root w-l-y found 
across verses 33:5 and 33:6. Similarly, the tension I notice in the meaning 
of 24:33 comes from noting the other uses of terms referring to chastity and 
slavery in the Quran. That is, I have not chosen my analytical units based on 
scholarly convention, oral tradition or a theory about the chronological order 
of revelation, but on semantic and conceptual coherence.
More importantly from my historian’s point of view, the exegetes 
mostly fail to consider what these verses might say about Islamic history, 
or the exegetes’ own societies, cultures or polities.59 For instance, al-˝abarī 
(d. 310/923), whose historical accounts of the Umayyad era and Abbasid 
revolution are full of mawālī, makes no attempt to connect those mawālī 
with this Quranic passage in his tafsīr of 33:5. The exegeses of 33:4–6 provide 
essentially no details about the changing meaning of the word mawālī, or 
insights into how outsiders were incorporated into the umma in different 
historical contexts. Instead, exegetes are interested in legal details, such as 
what happens if a man inadvertently refers to someone as ‘sonny’ or ‘pops’, 
or what happens when a man actually claims someone as his biological son. 
For instance, al-Zamakhsharī goes into great detail:
If the ‘claimed’ one is of unknown paternity and is younger in years than 
the one claiming him as a son, then his paternity is set thereupon. If [the 
claimed son] is a slave of his, then he must be immediately manumitted 
along with the setting of his paternity. If he does not look at all like him, 
then the paternity is not set, but he is still freed according to Abū Óanīfa; 
but according to the two Sahibs [Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī], he is not 
freed. As for one whose paternity is known, then his paternity is not set by 
[such a claim], but if he is a slave he is still freed.60
Many exegetes are also interested in naming practices. They suggest that 
if a man does not know someone’s full name, he should address them as 
‘O brother’ or ‘O cousin’, to avoid accidentally misattributing their pater-
nity. Exegetes also give suggestions on how to name a slave or freedman of 
unknown paternity. Suggestions are to call such a slave ‘Ibn Muslim’ or ‘Ibn 
ʿAbdallāh’, or simply to call them ‘the mawlā of so-and-so’, using the mawlā 
tie as a replacement for their missing genealogy. (It seems that Muslims 
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generally followed such advice, for it is fairly easy to spot mawālī in the 
sources because they have such generic names as ‘Muªammad ibn ʿAbdallāh’ 
or ‘ʿAbdallāh ibn Muslim’.) Finally, most sources – and Shii sources in 
particular – care more about the elative term awlā (‘closer’) in Q 33:6 than 
they do about the related terms mawālī or awliyā’. For example, al-Qummī 
finds that ‘blood relatives’ in Q 33:6 means the Imams, and ‘closer’ means 
more deserving of command (al-amr). I suggest that the exegetes show little 
concern for the meaning of the terms mawālī and awliyā’ because they are 
no longer concerned with the incorporation of outsiders into the umma, 
but rather with the delineation of the umma’s internal boundaries and legal 
structures.61
Likewise, pre-modern tafsīrs of Q 24:33 never treat the issue of the qiyān 
(enslaved courtesans, sometimes likened to high-class prostitutes), who are 
prominent figures in Abbasid-era historical and literary works.62 They do not 
consider how the Quranic text might apply to the sex trade in Islamic history 
or society,63 or engage with the possibility that prostitutes might struggle with 
economic hardship or limited personal agency.64 Instead, they are interested 
in philosophical questions, such as what constitutes true compulsion (ikrāh), 
as opposed to lesser forms of pressure or intimidation. In answering this ques-
tion, they draw parallels to Q 16:106, which expresses forgiveness for people 
who deny their faith under duress. For example, al-Zamakhsharī explains that 
compulsion means, ‘One who is compelled on pain of death, or fears injury 
or loss of limb, as from a violent blow.’65 That is, economic hardship or social 
pressure is not enough to constitute true compulsion. The exegetes are also 
much concerned with the grammatical function of the phrase ‘if they desire 
chastity’. They are generally perplexed by this clause, and some of them ask 
rhetorically: ‘How can a woman be described as “compelled” to prostitution 
if she doesn’t desire chastity?’ To solve this problem, the exegetes generally 
agree that ‘if’ (Arabic in) is not a true conditional here, but that its meaning is 
more akin to the Arabic word idhā, ‘if-and-when’. As al-Bay∂āwī explains, ‘In 
is preferred to idhā here because the desire for chastity among slave women 
is like a unique aberration.’66 Exegetes seem to think that the only woman 
who would work as a prostitute is one who enjoys fornicating, or exhibits an 
‘unusual perversion’ as al-Zamakhsharī puts it.67 There are also a few sectarian 
issues here, particularly the Sunni exegetes who view ‘prostitution’ here as a 
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veiled reference to the Shii practice of mutʿa marriage, and the Shii tendency 
to view Q 24:33 as abrogated by 4:25. In short, these are legal and grammati-
cal minutiae that do not attempt to reckon with the continued practices of 
prostitution and sexual exploitation in the exegetes’ own societies.
Ultimately, exegetes divide their interpretations into two main parts: 
haggadic stories (asbāb al-nuzūl ) that are relegated to the distant past of the 
Quranic revelation and sundered from current events, and halakhic legal 
details that consider the grammatical issues and juridical particulars of certain 
parts of scripture.68 On the one hand, this gap between exegesis and social 
history is simply a matter of genre. Exegetes have their own conventions, 
and their focus tends to be on theological, legal and sectarian issues rather 
than social or historical ones. On the other hand, I suggest that the exegetes 
of the third/ninth century (and later) had a vested interest in sundering their 
exegeses from history. The exegetes might have missed the tensions raised 
in these passages because they almost universally come down on the side of 
hierarchy. No matter their sectarian affiliation or theological school, these 
authors represent the class of literate, free, male, slave-holding Muslims in 
urban centres such as Baghdad. They would almost certainly clamour against 
my more radical reading of Q 24:33, not because it is textually unsupport-
able, but because they have a personal stake in upholding the unlimited right 
of the master to his concubines. They see the world from the perspective of 
an insider hoping to bolster his position vis-à-vis other Muslims, not from 
the perspective of an outsider hoping to join the umma in the first place. 
They worry about debates and identity groups within the Islamic community, 
rather than wondering about new converts’ sense of belonging.
Conclusion
The medieval exegetes’ viewpoints are not the only valid ones – they do not 
have a monopoly on the Quran’s meaning. Accordingly, this chapter has 
attempted to view the Quran from the perspective of enslaved persons and 
other outsiders hoping to join the community, and to consider the questions 
they might have had about their status within the community. In doing so, 
it highlights the tensions within the Quranic text as it seeks to create a com-
munity that balances faith, justice, morality and order. The Quran does not 
resolve these tensions, but it does grapple with them. Particularly, for rootless 
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outsiders without a known genealogy, the Quran affirms that all believers 
belong to society as one another’s ‘mawālī’, but it also indicates that not all 
believers have access to equal social support. For enslaved women, the Quran 
certainly discourages masters from prostituting their believing slaves, and it 
might even more radically discourage slave owners from using their believing 
slaves as concubines. However, from the enslaved woman’s perspective, it 
also places the master–concubine relationship into the liminal position of 
taªa‚‚un.
In the coming chapters of this book, I seek to re-connect these Quranic 
verses with tensions and debates unfolding in early Islamic history. I suggest 
that the Quran is deeply connected to Islamic history, in that it lays the 
groundwork for debates surrounding the early Islamic mawālī and enslaved 
women, including both the struggle of some elites to define and subordinate 
these groups, and these groups’ own struggles to articulate their identity 
and sense of belonging. Particularly, the next two chapters will argue that 
the earliest umma in first-/seventh-century Arabia leaned towards a more 
inclusive resolution of these tensions. If they never achieved perfect equality, 
they seem to have been trying to build a society where the salient social bonds 
grew out of faith and moral probity, and where people were differentiated 
primarily by their degrees of piety. Thus, this earliest community manumitted 
slaves without any bonds of subordination, and they actively intervened to 
stop situations of forced prostitution (or perhaps even forced concubinage). 
However, these more egalitarian strands can only be found by digging care-
fully through works of Islamic scholarship, for by the time such works were 
codified in the second/eighth and third/ninth centuries, the tide had turned 
in the other direction. Scholars from this later period justify hierarchy and 
assume the existence of unequal social categories. But ultimately both his-
torical trends, the egalitarian and the hierarchical, trace their way back to the 
tensions latent within the Quranic text itself.
Notes
 1. This book does not begin with the pre-Islamic period for two reasons. One, 
Arabic sources for the pre-Islamic period were generally written by authors 
in the Islamic era. That is, these sources are illuminating for the elaboration 
of Arab identity in the Umayyad and Abbasid periods, but difficult to use for 
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understanding pre-Islamic values. See Rina Drory, ‘The Abbasid Construction 
of the Jahiliyya: Cultural Authority in the Making’, Studia Islamica, 83 (1996): 
33–49. Second, and more importantly, this book focuses on the elaboration of 
Islam per se – how slaves and outsiders joined the umma – rather than on Islam’s 
historical connections to pre-Islamic laws and customs. Many other scholars 
have traced such connections, including but not limited to Patricia Crone, 
Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law on legal connections; Mohamad Rihan, 
The Politics and Culture of an Umayyad Tribe: Conflict and Factionalism in the 
Early Islamic Period (London: Tauris, 2014) on tribal connections; and Thomas 
Sizgorich, Violence and Belief in Late Antiquity: Militant Devotion in Christianity 
and Islam (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014) on ideological 
connections. Such studies are illuminating and greatly help contextualise early 
Islamic history, but pre-Islamic Arabia is simply not the focus of my research.
 2. Scholars still hotly debate the history of the Quranic text, including its author-
ship and its codification. Until the mid-twentieth century, scholars tended to 
accept the traditional Muslim account that caliph ʿ Uthmān (r. 23–35/644–656) 
codified the Quran and gave it its final, canonical shape. Scholars such as 
Richard Bell, Rudi Paret and Theodor Nöldeke mostly concerned themselves 
with trying to refine the traditional dating of the order of revelations. However, 
John Wansbrough’s Quranic Studies revolutionised the field, for he suggested 
that the Quran, as it has come down to us today, is the result of a centuries-long 
compilation process led by scholars in third-/ninth-century Iraq. Wansbrough 
was not arguing that the Quran was wholly invented in that context or that it 
contains no authentic first-/seventh-century materials, but that its repetitive and 
elliptical style is a result of a compilation of many different regional versions of 
the text in a highly sectarian milieu. Since then, some scholars have been quite 
sceptical of the Quran’s historicity, while others maintain the basic integrity 
of the Quranic text. For current debates in the field of Qur’anic studies, see 
the chapters in Angelika Neuwirth, Nicolai Sinai and Michael Marx, eds. The 
Qur’ān in Context; Gabriel Said Reynolds, ed. New Perspectives on the Qur’an; 
and Angelika Neuwirth and Michael Anthony Sells, eds, Qur’ānic Studies Today.
 3. This technique is called ‘reading the Quran through the Quran’. It deliber-
ately avoids using other types of sources, such as Quranic exegesis (tafsīr) and 
biography of the Prophet (sīra), to understand the Quran. Scholars generally 
agree that these later types of sources are unhelpful for recovering the Quran’s 
original meaning. As F. E. Peters says, ‘the suspicion is strong that medieval 
Muslim scholars were re-creating the “occasion [of revelation]” by working 
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backwards out of the Qur’anic verses themselves, an exercise at which a modern 
non- Muslim might be equally adept’ (Peters, ‘The Quest of the Historical 
Muhammad’, 301). Patricia Crone puts it more bluntly, in her signature incisive 
style: ‘The exegetes had no better knowledge of what this sura meant than we 
have today’ (Crone, Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam, 210). While I argue that 
the tafsīrs can be valuable historical sources for early Islamic history, and will 
analyse them more carefully in later chapters, I agree that it is crucial to begin 
with an internal, co-textual analysis of the Quran itself.
 4. See, for instance, Kecia Ali, Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam; Brockopp, Early 
Mālikī Law; Ingrid Mattson, ‘A Believing Slave Is Better than an Unbeliever’; 
Harald Motzki, ‘Wal-Muª‚anātu Mina N-Nisā’i’; and F. M. Denny, ‘The 
Meaning of Ummah in the Qur’ān’.
 5. For modern scholars, see, for instance, Günther, ‘Clients and Clientage’, EQ; 
David S. Powers, Muhammad is Not the Father of Any of Your Men, 62–63; 
and Ella Landau-Tasseron, ‘Adoption, Acknowledgment of Paternity, and False 
Genealogical Claims’, 171–173. For Quran translations, Pickthall and Arberry 
translate the term in Q 33:5 as ‘clients’, while others translate it as ‘those 
entrusted to you’ (Sahih International), ‘friends’ (Shakir) and ‘protéges’ (Abdel 
Haleem). For a side-by-side comparison of more than forty English transla-
tions of the Quran, see http://www.islamawakened.com/quran/33/5/default.
htm (last accessed 12 March 2019). Finally, many medieval exegetes suggest 
that mawālī here simply means ‘freedmen’; see, for instance, al-˝abarī, Tafsīr 
al-˝abarī: Jāmiʿ Al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy Al-Qur’ān (hereafter Jāmiʿ al-Bayān), 
19:12; and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, 25:193.
 6. While I rely only on the Quran to construct the meaning of walā’, Patricia 
Crone has likewise found that pre-Islamic poetry almost always uses the term 
mawālī ‘in connection with the theme of mutual help, frequently military, but 
sometimes also material or moral’. Crone, Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law, 
55.
 7. Medieval exegetes generally understand the verb in this passage to be ‘call them’ 
your brothers in religion and mawālī, rather than ‘they are’ your brothers in 
religion and your mawālī. For example, al-Zamakhsharī explains that if you 
do not know someone’s lineage, you should call them ‘O my brother’, or ‘O 
my mawlā’, and he outlines what should happen if someone accidentally calls 
their non-relative ‘sonny’ or ‘pops’ (Al-Zamakhsharī, Al-Kashshāf, 3:506–507). 
Likewise, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī explains that this means you should call them 
‘brother of so-and-so’ if they are free, or ‘mawlā of so-and-so’ if they are a freed 
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slave. (Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, 25:193). The Quran is slightly 
ambiguous here, for it does not provide an explicit verb for this phrase; the 
exegetes apparently apply the force of the verb in the immediately preceding 
clause, ‘call them by the names of their fathers’. However, the usual vocalisation 
of this phrase is ‘fa-ikhwānukum fī al-dīn wa-mawalīkum’, in the nominative 
case, which implies that the meaning is that ‘they are’ your brothers in religion 
and mawālī. (If the meaning were ‘call them’ your brothers in religion, one 
would expect the vocalisation to be ‘fa-ikhwānakum fī al-dīn wa-mawāliyakum’, 
in the objective case.) Most modern translations render the phrase here as ‘they 
are’ your brothers in religion and māwālī, which is the stronger reading in my 
view.
 8. W-l-y is one of the many Arabic roots that can mean one thing and its opposite. 
In the Quran, it can mean to turn towards in support, or conversely, to turn away 
from and revoke support. For the sense of turning towards, see, for example, 
Q 60:13: ‘Do not turn in friendship and support (lā tatawallaw) toward a 
people with whom God is angry.’ For the sense of turning away, see Q 64:6: 
‘. . . They disbelieved and withdrew their support (kafarū wa-tawallaw) . . .’ In 
either case, the root pertains to social bonds – building them with believers, or 
breaking them with unbelievers.
 9. For a quick reference to this root in the Quran, consult El-Said Badawi and 
M. A. Abdel Haleem, Arabic-English Dictionary of Qur’anic Usage, 1,047–1,049. 
For a deeper analysis, see Elizabeth Urban, ‘The Foundations of Islamic Society 
as Expressed by the Qur’anic Term Mawlā’.
10. God is commonly described as a mawlā or walī; for just a few examples, see 
Q 2:120, 4:45, 13:11, 29:22, 33:17, 42:31 and 48:22. Alternatively, those who 
refuse the protection of God are sometimes described as having Satan, hell, jinn 
or other evil things as their mawlā or walī. For instance, Q 57:15 says, ‘. . .Your 
refuge is the fire, it is your mawlā – what an evil outcome!’; and Q 7:30 says: 
‘. . . they took satans as awliyā’ instead of God . . .’ See also Q 4:76, 7:27, 19:45, 
22:4 and 22:13, among others.
11. See Q 2:83, 3:36, 2:205, 3: 8:15, 9:76, 47:22 and 48:22. For more examples 
and a deeper discussion of these types of support, see Urban, ‘The Foundations 
of Islamic Society’.
12. For a similar sentiment, see also Q 3:150 and 9:51.
13. The same idea is conveyed in Q 9:71, which states that ‘the male and female 
believers are the awliyā’ of one another’.
14. Muªammad ibn Isªāq, Sīrat Rasūl Allāh, ed. Ferdinand Wüstenfeld, 342. For 
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an in-depth analysis of this document and its many textual variants, see Michael 
Lecker, The ‘Constitution of Medina’: Muhammad’s First Legal Document. See 
also R. B. Serjeant, ‘The “Constitution of Medina”’ and ‘The Sunnah Jami’ah, 
Pacts with the Yathrib Jews, and the Tahrim of Yathrib’; Moshe Gil, ‘The 
Constitution of Medina: A Reconsideration’; F. M. Denny, ‘Umma in the 
Constitution of Medina’; Uri Rubin, ‘The ‘Constitution of Medina’: Some 
Notes’; and Said Amir Arjomand, ‘The Constitution of Medina: A Sociolegal 
Interpretation of Muhammad’s Acts of Foundation of the Umma’.
15. See also Q 2:257, 3:28, 5:80, 45:19, 60:1, 60:9, 60:13 and 62:6, among others.
16. I will discuss these exegeses in further detail below.
17. For example, Arabian tribes shifted their genealogical histories to accord with 
political realities; whenever two tribes allied with each other, they would ‘dis-
cover’ a common ancestor. There is an extensive literature on the use of fictive 
kinship to solidify tribal ties in Arabia from ancient times to the present day. For 
some perceptive recent studies, see Edouard Conte, ‘Agnatic Illusions’; Daniel 
Martin Varisco, ‘Metaphors and Sacred History’; and Zoltán Szombathy, The 
Roots of Arabic Genealogy, and the sources cited therein.
18. Another famous example of this phenomenon is the pre-Islamic poet and folk 
hero ʿAntara ibn Shaddād. ʿAntara had been raised as a slave, but when he 
distinguished himself in battle, his mother’s master claimed ʿAntara as his own 
son. A similar thing happened to an early Muslim named Abū Bakra, the subject 
of the next chapter.
19. It thus strikes me as somewhat ironic that the classical jurists would come to 
understand walā’ patronage as a form of agnatic kinship, that is, as a form of 
nasab. The Quran seems to speak explicitly against treating human-constructed 
relationships as akin to God-given genealogy. See Crone, Roman, Provincial and 
Islamic Law, 37, 40 and 83, where she notes the strangeness of treating walā’ as 
nasab, and shows that the pre-classical jurists treated walā’ not as a replacement 
genealogy, but as a vestige of slavery.
20. Verse 33:37 makes it clear that the reason that genealogical language must reflect 
the biological truth is ‘so that there would be no prohibition for the Muslims 
against [marrying] the wives of their adopted sons’.
21. Al-Qur†ubī, Al-Jāmiʿ Li-Aªkām Al-Qur’ān, 17:59. See also al-˝abarī, Jāmiʿ 
al-Bayān, 19:13, where Abū Bakra only says, ‘I am your brother in religion’; and 
Ibn ʿAsākir, Tārīkh Madīnat Dimashq, 62:213–214, where Abū Bakra says, ‘I 
am your brother in religion and a mawlā of the messenger of God.’ Apparently, 
some of Abū Bakra’s companions had teased him for his unknown paternity, 
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for his mother was a prostitute. The meaning of Abū Bakra’s so-called ‘mawlā’ 
identity is the subject of the next chapter, but I suggest that here Abū Bakra is 
invoking this verse in its original, community-affirming sense.
22. The Quran uses a similar phrase when describing Abraham in verse 3:68: ‘Indeed, 
the closest (awlā) of people to Abraham are surely those who followed him, 
and this prophet, and those who believe. For God is the walī of the believers.’ 
Abraham, too, had valued belief over genealogy – he had broken the strongest 
tribal social bond, the bond between father and son, in the name of right belief.
23. For the idea that all followers are equal before the Imam, see Patricia Crone, 
‘Mawālī and the Prophet’s Family: An Early Shi’ite View’, 185–187. According 
to Maria Massi Dakake, the Shii concept of walaya ‘describes an all- encompassing 
bond of spiritual loyalty that describes, simultaneously, a Shiite believer’s alle-
giance to God, the Prophet, the Imam, and the community of Shiite believers, 
collectively’ (Maria Massi Dakake, The Charismatic Community, 7). The Shii 
concept of walāya also hinges on the term mawlā, not in the Quran, but in the 
Prophet Muªammad’s famous statement at Ghadīr Khumm: ‘Whosoever I am 
his mawlā, Ali is also his mawlā.’
24. Al-Zamakhsharī precedes me in this reading. While most exegetes understand 
‘treat your awilyā’ well’ to mean that people should give their friends a wa‚iyya, 
or voluntary bequeathal in their will, al-Zamakhsharī says: ‘If you say, “the rela-
tive is closer than the stranger, except in wa‚iyya,” what you mean is, he is more 
deserving of every help, inheritance, gift, present, charity and everything, except 
a wa‚iyya.’ That is, a person can remember his friend in his will, but every other 
form of social and legal help should go first and foremost to a person’s relatives 
(Al-Zamakhsharī, Al-Kashshāf, 3:509).
25. In Arabic, masculine plural nouns, pronouns and verbs can refer either to a 
group of males, or to a mixed group of males and females. See Amina Wadud, 
Qur’an and Woman, 4–7 on the application of the Quran’s masculine plural 
words to Muslim women as well as Muslim men.
26. See first and foremost Kecia Ali, Sexual Ethics and Islam and Marriage and 
Slavery in Early Islam. See also Harald Motzki, ed., ‘Wal-Muhsanatu Mina 
N-Nisa’i’; Brockopp, Early Mālikī Law; and Mattson, ‘A Believing Slave is 
Better than an Unbeliever’.
27. As expressed in Q 23:6: ‘[Believers should abstain from sex] except with their 
spouses and slaves, for they are blameless.’ A nearly identical sentiment is 
expressed in Q 70:30.
28. It is a bit unclear whether the Quran exhorts or simply allows the marriage 
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of slaves. On the one hand, Q 24:32 appears to encourage Muslims to marry 
righteous slaves. However, Q 4:25 indicates that a man should only marry an 
enslaved woman if he cannot afford a free spouse, and does not trust himself to 
remain abstinent outside legal marriage.
29. That is, by getting married, the enslaved woman becomes a full muª‚ina, or 
chaste woman. See Motzki, ‘Wal-Muhsinatu Mina N-Nisa’i’, 200–201; Ali, 
Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam, 68–69; Brockopp, Early Mālikī Law, 202, 
n. 187.
30. On this point, see particularly J. Burton, ‘The Meaning of “Ihsan”’. As Burton 
explains, classical Muslim jurists used the term muª‚ana to designate a free, 
married, Muslim woman who must remain chaste – and who is stoned to death 
if she commits adultery. These scholars almost universally did not consider slave 
women to be muª‚anāt, and thus adulterous slave women were not stoned to 
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Abū Bakra, Freedman of God
Building upon the foundation of the ambiguous term mawālī in the  Quran, this chapter investigates an early Muslim freedman named Abū 
Bakra (d. 52/672) who appears in a few exegeses of Q 33:5, saying, ‘I am one 
of those whose fathers is not known, so I am your brother in religion and 
your mawlā.’ Abū Bakra is a relatively obscure figure who should not be con-
fused with the famous second caliph, Abū Bakr; Abū Bakra is a bit player, a 
lowly curmudgeon on the sidelines of Islamic history. Yet, he is important as 
a window onto early Islamic history precisely because of his liminality. He 
provides a case study for how early Muslims navigated the tension between 
egalitarianism and social hierarchy inherent in the new umma, and he also 
allows us to see how later authors tried to make sense of his identity. I argue 
that during his lifetime in the first/seventh century, he was identified as 
a brother in religion, as a mawlā in its inclusive Quranic sense (without 
the overtones of later clientage), and as a ‘freedman of God’ (†alīq allāh). 
This latter anomalous phrase seems to indicate a radically inclusive, faith-
based community that was not concerned with legal ownership, but instead 
focused on the mutual cooperation and support of all members. However, 
by the second/eighth and third/ninth centuries, these inclusive designations 
had become confusing or even meaningless to the authors of Islamic his-
tory, so they sought to place Abū Bakra into more familiar social categories. 
These sources alternatively describe him as an Arab and a mawlā, a moral 
authority and an unrepentant sinner, a powerless individual and a member 
of a powerful family. It is clear that none of these descriptions is simple or 
objective, but that different authors used Abū Bakra to represent their dif-
ferent worldviews. Thus, Abū Bakra’s story helps us discern that seemingly 
straightforward identifiers such as mawlā and Arab are deeply intertwined in 
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the wider narratives that authors hoped to tell about the trajectory of early 
Islamic history.
While the details of Abū Bakra’s biography vary from source to source 
and will receive fuller analysis below, a brief overview will provide a sense of 
orientation.1 His given name is Nufayʿ. He was born sometime in the early 
seventh century CE in the city of Taif, just east of Mecca. His mother was a 
slave-prostitute named Sumayya, who was also the mother of Nufayʿ’s several 
half-brothers (including the infamous Umayyad governor, Ziyād ibn Abīhi).2 
The identity of Nufayʿ’s father is uncertain. It could have been Sumayya’s 
master, al-Óārith ibn Kalada, a well-to-do physician of the Arabian tribe 
of Thaqīf, or it could have been Masrūª, another one of al-Óārith’s slaves. 
When Sumayya was pregnant, al-Óārith seems to have been fully prepared to 
accept her child as his own, as he had done for Nufayʿ’s older brother Nāfiʿ. 
But when little Nufayʿ emerged with dark skin, al-Óārith declared that the 
father must have been the Abyssinian Masrūª, and Nufayʿ was raised as a 
slave.3
The sources next mention Nufayʿ in the year 8/630, when Muªammad 
and his army of Muslims took control of Mecca and besieged nearby Taif. 
During the siege of Taif, the Muslims announced that any slave who fled his 
master and joined the cause of Islam would be freed. When they heard this 
promise, Nufayʿ and a handful of other slaves escaped to the Muslim camp. 
Nufayʿ reportedly rappelled down from Taif’s high citadel wall on a rope 
and pulley, which is how he earned his moniker Abū Bakra, or ‘father of the 
pulley’. Abū Bakra was manumitted and became the mawlā of the Prophet 
Muªammad (according to some sources). While this particular siege of Taif 
proved abortive, the Muslims soon thereafter subdued the town and its main 
tribal contingent of Thaqīf. The town’s leading tribesmen converted to Islam 
and asked to have their former slaves back, but Muªammad denied their 
request – those slaves had been permanently freed by their prior acceptance 
of Islam.
The sources preserve little information about the relationship between 
Abū Bakra and the Prophet Muªammad. The only clues about this relation-
ship come from the hadiths that Abū Bakra transmitted, some of which 
depict him learning proper forms of religious observance directly from 
Muªammad.4 Instead, most historical sources skip ahead to Abū Bakra’s 
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career in the newly founded garrison town of Basra, Iraq, where he moved 
with his uterine brothers during the caliphate of ʿUmar ibn al-Kha††āb 
(r. 13–23/634–644). Here transpired two events that would occupy the 
attention of later scholars, up to the present day. First, he became embroiled 
in a legal dispute that strained his relationship with his half-brother Ziyād 
(d. 53/673). In this dispute, which will be analysed in more detail below, 
Ziyād caused Abū Bakra to be found guilty of slander, or falsely accusing 
someone of adultery (qadhf ). Second, Abū Bakra refused to take part in the 
Battle of the Camel, one of the battles of the First Civil War that took place 
near Basra. He excused himself from aiding one of the leaders of this battle 
– the Prophet’s widow ʿĀ’isha, who encouraged the troops from atop her 
armour-clad camel – by quoting the hadith: ‘Those who entrust their affairs 
to a woman will never know prosperity.’ 5 While Abū Bakra unfortunately 
demurred in gender-specific terms that have had a lasting impact on gender 
ideologies in the Islamic world, it was not only ʿĀ’isha whom he refused to 
help in this conflict. He repeatedly expressed a politically detached attitude 
and a desire for reconciliation between the warring factions.6 As a vocal 
advocate for political neutrality, he never held any political office in the 
Umayyad government.7 After living a fruitful life, fathering many children, 
and amassing a great estate in Basra, Abū Bakra died in the year 52/672.
Transforming Arabian Society: Abū Bakra as ‘Freedman of God’
A basic methodological approach to the early Islamic historical sources is to 
search for traces that do not fit neatly into the main historical narrative and 
therefore are not likely ideological back-projections. Far from destroying 
scholars’ confidence in the historical narratives, such an against-the-grain 
reading confirms that our sources have not been altered beyond all recogni-
tion. Reading between the lines of the historical sources in this way, the 
sources provide circumstantial evidence that Abū Bakra was not a mawlā of 
the Prophet Muªammad, or even a mawlā at all. For instance, several other 
slaves reportedly escaped from Taif and joined the Muslims along with Abū 
Bakra, yet none of these other slaves has been remembered as a mawlā of the 
Prophet.8 Additionally, the historical narratives generally associate Abū Bakra 
more closely with his old master’s tribe of Thaqīf than with Muªammad’s 
tribe of Quraysh – one report even says Abū Bakra was a mawlā of his 
abū bakra,  freedman of god | 51
master, al-Óārith ibn Kalada.9 However, the most intriguing anomaly is that 
the phrase used to describe Abū Bakra’s post-manumission status in several 
accounts is not mawlā, but †alīq allāh (‘freedman of God’).
According to two accounts presented in the Al-˝abaqāt al-Kubrā 
(Greatest Generations) of Ibn Saʿd (d. 230/845), after the city of Taif had 
surrendered and its leading tribe of Thaqīf had converted collectively to Islam, 
a delegation of Thaqīf tribesmen asked Muªammad to return their former 
slave Abū Bakra to them. Muªammad rebuffed the Thaqafis by saying, ‘No, 
he is the one set loose by God and his apostle’ (†alīq allāh wa-†alīq rasūlihi). 
10 Al-Wāqidī (d. 207/823) and Ibn Hishām (d. 218/833) preserve similar 
accounts in which the Thaqafīs request all their slaves back, and the answer is: 
‘No, they are the ones freed by God’ (hum ʿutaqā’ allāh).11 I take this unusual 
phrase, †alīq (or ʿatīq) allāh, to be Abū Bakra’s original designation in the 
community of believers. The sources never explicitly describe what it meant 
to be a †alīq allāh, but they provide a few scant clues. Based on circumstantial 
evidence derived from a variety of sources, the †alīq allāh seems to be com-
pletely free from bondage, including the usual bonds of dependency inherent 
in mawlā status. The freedom of the †alīq allāh was justly ordained by God, 
and any attempts to re-enslave or reduce the †alīq allāh to a subordinate 
status were therefore unjust. The †alīq allāh fully belonged to the Muslim 
community and received care and support from the entire community, rather 
than from an individual kinsman or patron. As such, the term is a marker of 
the radical inclusiveness of the earliest Islamic community, bound together 
first and foremost by their monotheistic belief and their devotion to the 
Prophet Muªammad.
The first clue for reconstructing the meaning of †alīq allāh comes from 
the many Arabic-Islamic historical sources that use the plural term †ulaqāʾ 
to refer to the late, reluctant converts of the Quraysh tribe, who finally 
capitulated during the Muslim conquest of Mecca in 8/630. These conquered 
Qurashīs should legally have been the war captives of the Prophet, but he 
chose to release rather than to enslave them. On the one hand, Abū Bakra’s 
case seems to be quite different from that of the Qurashi †ulaqāʾ. Abū Bakra’s 
designation as a †alīq is overwhelmingly positive, for it connotes his brave 
decision to adopt Islam before the rest of Taif, his freedom from bondage and 
possibly even his spiritual superiority over the freeborn members of Thaqīf. 
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On the other hand, both uses of the term †alīq share one salient feature: 
they both imply unconditional freedom, without any subordinate bonds of 
clientage. (Certainly, no source ever argues that the Qurashī †ulaqāʾ became 
Muªammad’s mawālī.) Accordingly, I suggest that Abū Bakra’s original des-
ignation as a †alīq allāh meant that he became no one’s legal client or mawlā.
A few more glimmers of evidence come from two early Arabic poems. 
While these poems do not address Abū Bakra’s case directly, they provide 
examples of how the phrase †alīq allāh was used and understood. The 
first poem was composed by a man named Imām ibn Aqram al-Numayrī, 
who was arrested by the notorious Umayyad governor al-Óajjāj ibn Yūsuf 
(d. 95/714). Imām managed to escape from prison using his own cunning, 
at which point he extemporised a poem declaring himself ‘freedman of God’ 
and ridiculing the ugly faces of the police who had incarcerated him:
The freedman of God was shown no favours
By Abū Dāwūd or Ibn Abī Kathīr
Or Óajjāj, with eyes like a stork
Who turns up her gaze, fearing vultures.12
Imam uses †alīq allāh to refer to his escape from jail rather than slavery, but 
it nevertheless expresses that his incarceration was unjust and that his escape 
was ordained by God. The second poem continues this theme of justice. It is 
a simple teaching tool used to explain the word bahz (a violent strike or blow) 
in early grammatical textbooks:
I am the freedman of God, Ibn Hurmuz.
He rescued me from a ruthless master,
Vehement against the people, felling, striking.13
Here, the speaker appears to be a slave of Persian descent (Ibn Hurmuz), and 
to have escaped from an abusive master by the grace of God. The overarching 
message of both poems is that it is wrong to mistreat one’s fellow Muslims, 
whether through political oppression or brutal violence. All Muslims deserve 
to be treated with dignity, and God will come to the rescue of those who are 
mistreated. This implication holds true for Abū Bakra as well, for his legal 
freedom was inextricable from his belief, and his former master’s request to 
re-enslave him was unjust.
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A third poem raises new conceptual issues about the †alīq allāh. In 
a panegyric poem in praise of the Abbasid caliph al-Mahdī (reigned 
158 –169/775 –785), the court poet Marwān ibn Abī Óaf‚a asks: ‘The freed-
man of God, who is his manumitter? / The one killed by God, who is his 
killer?’14 The answer to these rhetorical questions (in addition to the most 
obvious answer of ‘God’) is caliph al-Mahdī himself, as the lynchpin of the 
Islamic polity and upholder of God’s statutes. While its phrasing here is 
poetic and underscores the ideological importance of the caliph, this question 
is also important from a social-historical standpoint: if God is the ultimate 
manumitter of the †alīq allāh, what human being bears the responsibility for 
his manumission and subsequent care? It is by no means conclusive, but some 
evidence exists that ‘the freedman of God’ became the joint responsibility 
of the entire Islamic community, rather than becoming the mawlā of any 
individual patron.
Al-Wāqidī, the only author who lists each of the freed slaves of Taif by 
name, says:
The Messenger of God manumitted all of these [slaves], and gave each one 
of them to a Muslim to provide for him and look after him. Abū Bakra 
went to ʿAmr ibn Saʿīd ibn al-ʿĀ‚; al-Azraq went to Khālid ibn Saʿīd; 
Wardān went to Abān ibn Saʿīd; Yuªannas al-Nabbāl went to ʿ Uthmān ibn 
ʿAffān; Yasār ibn Mālik went to Saʿd ibn ʿUbāda; and Ibrāhīm ibn Jābir 
went to Usayd ibn Óudayr. The messenger of God ordered them to read 
them the Quran and teach them the proper ways (sunan).15
From this account, it seems that Muªammad divided up the responsibility 
for these patronless freedmen among individual members of the Islamic com-
munity as he saw fit. This responsibility had both a social aspect (‘to provide 
for him and look after him’) and a religious aspect (‘to read them the Quran 
and teach them the sunan’.) It was not a tribal arrangement, as the patrons 
listed here are from the various tribes of Quraysh, Aws and Khazraj. Likewise, 
it does not seem to have been a permanent legal arrangement, for there is 
no mention of any walā’ bonds forged between the freedmen and their new 
mentors, and no account indicates that Abū Bakra became the mawlā of ʿ Amr 
ibn Saʿīd ibn al-ʿĀ‚. Rather, it seems to have been a temporary arrangement 
for the integration of these freedmen into the community, perhaps similar to 
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the temporary ‘brotherhood’ (mu’ākha) arrangement that Muªammad set up 
between the Meccan Emigrants and Medinan Helpers.
If al-Wāqidī’s account is true, the ‘freedman of God’ seems akin to 
another category from early Islamic history: the sāʾiba, or slave set completely 
free without becoming anyone’s mawlā. (The term sāʾiba literally refers to a 
camel left to wander alone in the desert without a caretaker, indicating that 
the absolute freedom of the sāʾiba does not have the positive connotations that 
modern audiences might assume.) Early Muslim jurists debated the legality 
of manumitting someone as a sāʾiba, until they ultimately disallowed the 
practice.16 While the terms †alīq allāh and sāʾiba are never explicitly connected 
in the sources and do not seem to be identical, both terms seem to connote 
manumission without subsequent mawlā status. Moreover, the one major 
scholar who did accept sāʾiba manumission, the Medinan scholar Mālik ibn 
Anas, also gave legal responsibility for the sāʾiba and other patronless freedmen 
to the community of Muslims at large.17 Both terms seem to have worked best 
in the relatively small, homogenous environment of western Arabia, which 
could apparently accommodate a small number of foreigners, freedmen and 
other rootless people without relying on the specific institution of clientage.
Finally, a close examination of the accounts in Ibn Saʿd’s ˝abaqāt helps 
clarify the semantic difference between being a †alīq allāh and being a mawlā 
of the Prophet. Ibn Saʿd provides three alternative accounts of how the 
newly converted Thaqīf tribesmen asked to have Abū Bakra back and were 
rebuffed. In two of the accounts, the Thaqīf ask for Abū Bakra to be returned 
to them, presumably to be re-enslaved; in both of these accounts, the Prophet 
Muªammad denies their request by declaring Abū Bakra to be a †alīq allāh. 
In the third account, however, the Thaqīf tribesmen instead ask to ‘adopt’ 
(iddaʿā) Abū Bakra into their tribe.18 Abū Bakra himself responds to the 
insolent request by saying, ‘I am Masrūª (sic), the mawlā of the Messenger 
of God.’ Thus, while †alīq allāh appears to entail freedom from slavery, 
mawlā here appears to entail genealogy and adoption. Additionally, the term 
used for ‘adopt’ in the above account is the same one used by Abū Bakra’s 
infamous half-brother, Ziyād ibn Abīhi, when he ‘adopts’ a falsified Arabian 
lineage. As will become clear later in the chapter, Abū Bakra’s refusal to adopt 
a fake Arabian lineage – in contrast to Ziyād – is a key element of his mawlā 
persona.
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By tracing the oral transmissions of these three variations in Ibn Saʿd, it 
appears that the two †alīq allāh accounts are transmitted almost entirely by 
scholars from Kufa,19 while the single mawlā account is transmitted exclu-
sively by Basrans.20 The death date of the earliest Basran transmitter, Khālid 
ibn Sumayr, is unknown, but it can be estimated to approximately 120/738. 
The identification of Abū Bakra as a mawlā, as well as the contrast between 
mawlā status and the adoption of a fake Arabian lineage, thus seems to have 
emerged in late-Umayyad Basra – a provenance that will be corroborated 
below in the hadith literature. On the one hand, it is perfectly understand-
able that Basran transmitters should celebrate Abū Bakra, for Abū Bakra 
lived there and was something of a hometown hero. Less expected is the fact 
that his identity has been changed from †alīq allāh to mawlā in the Basran 
tradition, or that his mawlāness takes on specific connotations not just about 
manumission and conversion, but also about the proper use of genealogy.
The reasons for this development are speculative. The Arabian tribal 
migrations to Basra and Kufa followed different patterns, and Basra’s origi-
nal foundation was also much smaller than that of Kufa, which may have 
affected the meaning of the term mawlā. Moreover, the towns displayed 
divergent intellectual and sectarian trends: Kufa was a hotbed of pro-ʿAlī 
sentiment, whereas Basra was more known for its Kharijite and proto-Sufi 
tendencies.21 Basra’s particular association with early mawlā-ascetics, such as 
al-Óasan al-Ba‚rī and Rābi’a al-Ba‚riyya, may have elevated mawlā identity 
into an emblem of spiritual pride. Perhaps it was even in Basra that mawlā 
came increasingly to mean ‘non-Arab’ and to be specifically contrasted with 
‘Arab’.22 Whatever the case, Ibn Saʿd’s alternative accounts highlight the 
crucial point that the meaning of the term mawlā is neither universal nor 
obvious, but rather reflects local traditions and specific contexts.
Based on this smattering of evidence, I suggest that the label ‘freedman 
of God’ reflects a time when Abū Bakra’s primary identity was a believer 
whose freedom was ordained by God, rather than someone’s mawlā with 
all the legal rights and responsibilities of classical Islamic clientage.23 This 
finding seems to correspond with Crone’s argument in Roman, Provincial 
and Islamic Law, that pre-Islamic Arabian ways of incorporating outsiders did 
not resemble classical Islamic walā’.24 However, it seems that the term †alīq 
allāh disappeared as a salient designation relatively early in Islamic history. 
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It was  probably lost because †alīq took on specific pejorative connotations 
about the late Meccan converts, and because the legal practice of clientage 
came to replace the more informal process of freeing slaves and caring for 
them communally. The far-flung garrison cities of Kufa, Basra, Fustat, Marw 
and Qayrawan were very different places from the Arabian towns of Mecca, 
Medina and Taif. As the Islamic empire expanded and became more diverse, 
its leaders developed more systematic ways of bringing freedmen into the 
fold.25
The Mawlā and the Arab: The Symbolism of a Brothers’ Feud
Thanks to the scrupulous early scholars who preserved the anomalous phrase 
†alīq allāh, historians today are poised to interrogate Abū Bakra’s more usual 
designations as a ‘mawlā of the Prophet’ or an ‘Arab of the Thaqīf tribe’. If 
Abū Bakra was known neither as the Prophet’s mawlā nor as an Arab in his 
own day, later authors must have categorised him in these ways for a reason.26 
Close textual analysis shows that these categorisations involve more than 
simple legal definitions; they reflect deeper, more normative political and 
moral symbols that vary according to genre. Particularly, several biographers 
present Abū Bakra as a humble everyman, and ‘mawlā’ is a quintessential 
marker of this pious identity. In these accounts, his mawlā status sets him 
apart from his powerful but wicked half-brother, Ziyād ibn Abīhi, who 
faked an Arabian lineage and ruined Abū Bakra’s reputation by causing him 
unjustly to be convicted of slander. On the other hand, most hadith scholars 
identify Abū Bakra as an Arabian tribesman, and they view his slander con-
viction as a clear-cut legal verdict. They lose the communitarian meaning of 
Abū Bakra’s mawlā identity, as well as the symbolic undertones of the slander 
affair.
Abū Bakra as ‘Nufayʿ ibn Masrūª the Abyssinian, Mawlā of the Prophet’
Ziyād, Nāfiʿ, and Abū Bakra
Are very amusing to me.
Three men created in one woman’s womb,
Yet with different genealogy:
One a Qurashi, or so he says; one a mawlā;
And one who claims an Arab to be.27
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With this poem, the belles-lettrist and historian al-Masʿūdī (d. 345/956) 
reveals that Abū Bakra’s social identity – as well as those of his half-brothers 
Ziyād and Nāfiʿ – was a source of interest in the narrative historical tradition. 
Several authors highlight the contrast between Abū Bakra’s mawlā status and 
Ziyād’s claim to belong to the Quraysh tribe. They pepper their accounts 
of Abū Bakra with accounts about Ziyād, treating the two half-brothers as 
inextricably linked and often diametrically opposed. Abū Bakra’s mawlā-ness 
thus becomes a subtle marker of political ideology, used to contrast ‘heroes’ 
like Abū Bakra from ‘villains’ like Ziyād. I suggest that Abū Bakra’s mawlā 
identity always alludes to the conflict between him and Ziyād, and more 
broadly to debates about morality and politics.
Like Abū Bakra, Ziyād was born to the enslaved prostitute Sumayya and 
raised as a slave in the household of al-Óārith ibn Kalada in Taif. Ziyād’s 
actual father was likely a Byzantine slave named ʿUbayd, who belonged 
to al-Óārith and was married to Sumayya. However, in 44/664 the new 
Umayyad caliph Muʿāwiya suggested that his own father, Abū Sufyān – 
arguably the most powerful Arabian tribal chief of his day – had visited 
Sumayya’s tent during one of his visits to Taif, and that the result of this 
visit was Ziyād.28 It seems likely that neither Muʿāwiya nor Ziyād actually 
believed this tale. Rather, it was an olive branch extended from Muʿāwiya 
to Ziyād, meant to solidify their partnership. Ziyād had previously worked 
for Muʿāwiya’s fallen arch-nemesis, ʿAlī ibn Abī ˝ālib. When ʿAlī was mur-
dered, Ziyād withdrew to his Iranian citadel and refused to approach the new 
caliph in Damascus, likely fearing that Muʿāwiya would punish ʿAlī’s former 
supporters. Indeed, Muʿāwiya initially tried to lure Ziyād out of his citadel by 
holding his children hostage (Abū Bakra negotiated their release). However, 
Muʿāwiya was known for his calm-headed political savvy, and he eventually 
declared Ziyād his half-brother to signal that he wanted to work with Ziyād 
rather than harm him. Overnight, Ziyād dropped his mawlā status and 
became an Arabian tribesman, member of the leading tribe of Quraysh and 
half-brother of the caliph. Because of his ‘adoption’, Ziyād is widely known 
by the derogatory name Ziyād ibn Abīhi, which means ‘Ziyād, the son of his 
father (whoever he is)’.
Against this model of political manoeuvring and impious ambition, Abū 
Bakra reportedly revelled in his identity as mawlā of the Prophet, insisted 
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that his children call him ‘the son of Masrūª [the Abyssinian slave]’ and flatly 
refused any attempt to claim him as an Arabian tribesman. He preferred 
to associate himself with the Prophet Muªammad as his mawlā – even if 
mawlā status was disdained in the eyes of the Umayyad aristocracy – than to 
associate himself with secular power. He chose spiritual prestige over secular 
prestige in an age when people were scrambling to define the values of Islamic 
society and the structure of the Islamic state. Abū Bakra’s self-designation as 
the mawlā of Muªammad thus emerges as a marker of honesty and humility, 
as opposed to the crass opportunism of his brother.
Al-Balādhurī is the author who most explicitly draws out the ideological 
ramifications of Abū Bakra’s mawlā status. In his Ansāb al-Ashrāf, he reports 
that the Prophet Muªammad himself manumitted Nufayʿ after the siege of 
Taif, nicknamed him Abū Bakra and took him as his mawlā. As would be 
expected of the Prophet’s humble mawlā, Abū Bakra emerges strongly as a 
foil to Ziyād ibn Abīhi throughout this account. For instance, al-Balādhurī 
transmits one vivid story in which two famous Basran figures – Anas ibn 
Mālik and al-Óasan al-Ba‚rī – visit the elderly Abū Bakra at home when he is 
suffering from a bad case of haemorrhoids. During their conversation, Anas 
wonders whether Abū Bakra is angry with Ziyād for a matter concerning this 
world or the next world. Anas insists that Abū Bakra should not be angry 
with Ziyād for anything concerning this world, for Ziyād has bestowed 
high positions and wealth upon Abū Bakra’s children. To this, Abū Bakra 
responds: ‘What has he done for them, other than to ensure that they will 
enter Hell?’29 Anas then insists that Abū Bakra should not be angry with 
Ziyād for anything concerning the next world, for Ziyād ‘always strives to 
do what is right’ (innahu la-mujtahid ).30 To this, Abū Bakra responds: ‘The 
Kharijites of Harura claim that they strive to do what is right.’31 With one flip 
comeback, Abū Bakra has reduced his half-brother to the same level as a band 
of dangerous Kharijite fanatics.32
While al-Balādhurī provides the most colourful anecdotes, the corpus in 
which Abū Bakra most clearly emerges as an ideological weapon against Ziyād 
is the hadith literature. Hadiths are accounts of the sayings and deeds of the 
Prophet Muªammad, transmitted orally by the first generation of Muslims 
(the Companions of Muªammad), and then by the second generation of 
Muslims (the Successors), and then by the third generation (Successors of the 
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Successors) and so on until they were finally written down in the hadith col-
lections compiled in the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries. By analysing 
these chains of oral transmission, along with the accompanying variations 
of the hadith’s text, scholars can get a better picture of the provenance of 
a particular hadith. At least, scholars can discover which transmitter likely 
introduced certain textual changes. The hadith that sheds light on Abū Bakra 
reads in its most basic form: ‘Whoever claims a false father, knowing that he 
is not his father, will have Heaven forbidden to him.’33 Of the twenty variants 
of this hadith, many present Abū Bakra as one of the Companion transmit-
ters, and a few make it clear that his association with this hadith is meant to 
condemn Ziyād for ‘adopting a false father’.
The hadith gains its initial sense of context through its Companion 
transmitter, the person who heard it directly from the Prophet. Almost all 
versions (nineteen out of twenty) are transmitted by the notable Companion 
and military hero Saʿd ibn Abī Waqqā‚. Saʿd had asked for the Prophet’s 
ruling in a paternity dispute involving his own brother, ʿUtba ibn Abī 
Waqqā‚; the primary context of the hadith thus seems to have concerned 
this case of contested paternity.34 While most versions of the hadith also 
contain Abū Bakra as a second Companion transmitter, it exists in two 
versions with Saʿd alone.35 One of these ‘Saʿd only’ accounts is transmitted 
exclusively by scholars from Kufa, while all the versions that also include 
Abū Bakra come from the rival town of Basra. This shred of evidence is by 
no means conclusive, but it indicates that the ideological importance of Abū 
Bakra’s mawlā status may have emerged in Basra, as was also indicated in 
Ibn Saʿd’s ˝abaqāt.
Although it is impossible to prove that the Kufan ‘Saʿd only’ account is 
the original version of the hadith, it at least hints that this hadith might not 
originally have been associated with Abū Bakra – scholars should be curious 
about Abū Bakra’s appearance in most other versions. His incorporation 
into the hadith begins subtly. In two versions, Saʿd ibn Abī Waqqā‚ reports 
the hadith as usual, and Abū Bakra chimes in at the end: ‘My two ears and 
my heart also heard [that] from Muªammad.’36 In twelve versions, Saʿd and 
Abū Bakra, ‘both of them’, are presented as the joint Companion transmit-
ters, sometimes with extra information describing Saʿd (he was the first to 
shoot an arrow in Islam) and Abū Bakra (he climbed down from the citadel 
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at Taif ).37 In all these cases, the text of the actual hadith remains essentially 
the same. It is only the Companion transmitter that changes, with the 
incorporation of Abū Bakra as the other Companion transmitter alongside 
Saʿd. Never is Ziyād ibn Abihi mentioned by name, although his contrast 
with Abū Bakra is quietly implied if one is already familiar with the brothers’ 
biographies.
Almost all the hadiths that include Abū Bakra have a second-generation 
transmitter named Abū ʿUthmān al-Nahdī (d. c. 94/714).38 Abū ʿUthmān 
was a friend of Abū Bakra’s in Basra, and he reportedly transmitted the fol-
lowing account: ‘Abū Bakra, the mawlā of the Messenger of God, said: “If 
the people insist on giving me a fatherly attribution, then let them call me 
Nufayʿ ibn Masrūª [the Abyssinian slave].”’39 This saying of Abū ʿUthmān’s 
indicates that the subtext of the above hadith is indeed Abū Bakra’s mawlā 
status, which serves as an understated condemnation of Ziyād and also bol-
sters Abū Bakra’s authority as a transmitter of the hadith by emphasising his 
closeness with the Prophet. Abū ʿUthmān himself may have been responsible 
for championing Abū Bakra’s mawlā identity, or it may have been the third-
generation transmitter of these hadiths, the Basran scholar ʿĀ‚im al-Aªwal 
(d. c. 758).40 In any case, taking ʿĀ‚im’s death date of 141/758 as a guide, 
it seems that the presence of Abū Bakra in this hadith probably emerged 
sometime in mid-to-late Umayyad Basra.
While the previous hadith variations are subtle and their polemical over-
tones are veiled, several versions of the hadith make the connection with 
Ziyād more explicit. Three hadiths read:
When Ziyād acknowledged [Abū Sufyān as his father], [Abū ʿUthmān 
al-Nahdī] met Abū Bakra and said: ‘What is this that you have done? For I 
heard Saʿd ibn Abī Waqqā‚ saying: “My ear heard from the Messenger of 
God: whoever claims a father in Islam that is not his father, knowing that 
he is not his father, the Garden will be forbidden to him.”’ Abū Bakra said, 
‘I heard [that] from the Messenger of God.’41
The obvious new element in this version is the setup story of Ziyād’s ‘adop-
tion’, the purported reason for Abū Bakra’s connection with this hadith. As 
for the chains of transmission, they all have the familiar second-generation 
transmitter, Abū ‘Uthmān al-Nahdī, but a new third-generation transmitter, 
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the Basran scholar Khālid al-Hadhdhā’ (d. c. 142/759).42 It thus seems to 
have been Khālid who was particularly interested in using Abū Bakra to 
condemn Ziyād, although it is difficult to pinpoint his motivation for doing 
so. Khālid was a student of al-Óasan al-Ba‚rī, another early Basran mawlā 
and ascetic who is occasionally associated with Abū Bakra.43 Moreover, 
H. P. Raddatz calls Khālid an early Muʿtazili,44 and Abū Bakra does exhibit 
the political neutrality characteristic of the earliest Muʿtazila.45 Perhaps it 
was an early ascetic, proto-Muʿtazili current within Basra that co-opted Abū 
Bakra for its own ideological needs.
A final version of the hadith can be easily dismissed as inauthentic,46 but 
it illustrates Abū Bakra’s ideological potential. It has a highly suspicious chain 
of transmitters47 – although once again all Basran – and its text has been made 
into a transparent vehicle for polemic:
Ziyād said to Abū Bakra: ‘Don’t you see that the Commander of Believers 
[Muʿāwiya] wants me for this and that [i.e. to adopt me]? I was born on 
the bed of ʿUbayd [the Byzantine slave] and so I attribute my paternity to 
him, for I know that the Messenger of God said: “Whoever claims a false 
father, let him occupy his seat in Hell.”’ Then the following year came, and 
he falsely adopted him.48
Not only are Ziyād and Abū Bakra shown having a face-to-face conversation 
that is presented in no other source, but Ziyād also incriminates himself by 
claiming to have heard the Prophetic hadith with his own ears. There is no 
mention of Saʿd ibn Abī Waqqā‚ at all. The entire context of the hadith 
has changed from Saʿd’s paternity question into a condemnation of Ziyād 
and the Umayyad manipulation of genealogy. The silent presence of Abū 
Bakra, the pious mawlā of the Prophet, highlights Ziyād’s hypocrisy and 
immorality.
Abū Bakra as the Arabian Tribesman, ‘Nufayʿ ibn al-Óārith, of Thaqīf’
Whereas most early Islamic authors view Abū Bakra as a mawlā, those 
scholars who specialised in the collection and study of hadith categorise Abū 
Bakra differently.49 Hadith compilers such as Ibn Abī Shayba (d. 234/848), 
Khalīfa ibn Khayyā† (d. 239/853), Aªmad ibn Óanbal (d. 240/854), 
al-Bukhārī (d. 255/869) and Muslim (d. 260/874) consider Abū Bakra 
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the son of his master al-Óārith ibn Kalada and therefore a member of the 
Arabian tribe of Thaqīf.50 They never explain their reasoning in the bio-
graphical dictionaries they wrote to supplement their hadith compilations; 
their presentation of Abū Bakra is characteristically terse and aims only to 
identify him as a hadith transmitter. Reading between the lines, however, it 
seems that they back projected a particular hadith on to Abū Bakra, a hadith 
about paternity that was later systematised into law. This hadith, known as 
‘the child belongs to the master of the bed’ dictum, states that in a case of 
disputed paternity, a child is automatically attributed to his mother’s legal 
husband or master.
This maxim is most famously associated with ʿUtba ibn Abī Waqqā‚ 
– the brother of Saʿd ibn Abī Waqqā‚ introduced above. ʿUtba claimed to 
have fathered a son by an enslaved woman who did not belong to him, but 
belonged to a now-deceased man named Zamʿa (father of the Prophet’s wife 
Sawda). The Prophet decided the boy’s legal paternity in favour of Zamʿa 
rather than ʿUtba, even though the child resembled ʿUtba. This decision 
meant that the child could legally inherit from his late father Zamʿa, rather 
than becoming ʿUtba’s heir.51 The Prophet’s reason for deciding the case in 
favour of Zamʿa was that ‘the child belongs to the master of the bed’, rather 
than whoever claims to be the child’s father or even whoever most closely 
resembles the child. Zamʿa was the enslaved woman’s legal owner, and thus 
he was her child’s legal father. In an age before paternity testing, this dictum 
provided a way to determine a child’s parentage and to confirm the child’s 
legal rights. The ‘child belongs’ dictum seems to have been most commonly 
applied to the offspring of female slaves – such as Sumayya, mother of Abū 
Bakra and Ziyād – who were assumed to have many sexual partners.52
Uri Rubin has shown how this hadith also became associated with Ziyād 
ibn Abīhi and was used to condemn Ziyād’s ‘adoption’ of Abū Sufyān.53 
According to this hadith, Ziyād should rightly be considered the son of 
ʿUbayd the Byzantine slave, who was the legal husband of Sumayya at the 
time of his birth. Given the close association between Abū Bakra and Ziyād, 
it thus seems probable that the hadith transmitters also applied this hadith 
to Abū Bakra. Because he was born ‘on the bed of’ his mother’s master 
al-Óārith ibn Kalada (Sumayya appears to have been unmarried at the time 
of Abū Bakra’s conception and birth), Abū Bakra should be reckoned ‘Nufayʿ 
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ibn al-Óārith of Thaqīf’. The application of this hadith inverts the usual view 
of Abū Bakra as a mawlā and Ziyād as an ‘Arab’, although it still presents the 
two brothers as polar opposites.
Together, the two hadiths, ‘Whoever claims a false father . . .’ and ‘The 
child belongs . . .’ create a one–two punch against the practice of diʿwa, or 
claiming paternity without legal basis.54 However, the difference between 
the two maxims is an important one: the ‘whoever claims a false father’ 
hadith merely condemns the practice of false adoption, while the ‘child 
belongs’ hadith provides a positive standard for determining identity. Many 
of the historical narratives about Abū Bakra focus on the first idea, the fact 
that Abū Bakra refused to claim a false father and instead revelled in his iden-
tity as a mawlā of the Prophet. The historians highlight Abū Bakra’s integrity 
and personal agency, his choice to be socially lowly but spiritually lofty. 
However, the hadith compilers seem to have focused on the second idea, the 
application of a standard legal identity to all Muslims. They used the ‘child 
belongs’ dictum to determine Ziyād’s and Abū Bakra’s (and everyone else’s) 
true identity. Despite the historical evidence that Abū Bakra did not know 
his father, always demurred when asked about it and refused to call himself 
an Arabian tribesman, these hadith scholars believed they knew better how to 
identify him.55 The ‘child belongs to the master of the bed’ maxim may have 
led hadith scholars to feel they had found a systematic, legal and thoroughly 
Islamic notion of identity, but it also erases the moral significance that most 
historians found in Abū Bakra. By viewing this significant difference in the 
way narrative historians and hadith compilers categorise him, Abū Bakra 
provides insight into the development of particular genres of Islamic writing, 
with their unique symbols, identity markers and value systems.
Why Does Anybody Listen to Abū Bakra?
The foregoing illustration of Abū Bakra as a foil to Ziyād helps explain Abū 
Bakra’s lasting authority as a hadith transmitter. The Moroccan feminist 
scholar Fatima Mernissi and the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) 
law professor Khaled Abou El Fadl have both wondered why Muslims have 
accepted Abū Bakra’s transmission of the misogynistic hadith, ‘Those who 
entrust their affairs to a woman will never know prosperity.’56 Both scholars 
point out that Abū Bakra was found guilty of slander (qadhf ) and refused 
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to repent of his crime. As an unrepentant sinner (fāsiq), Abū Bakra should 
have no reliability as a hadith transmitter. And yet, this infamous hadith has 
remained in circulation for centuries.
I suggest that the answer to this puzzle lies in the way early Islamic histo-
rians treat Abū Bakra’s slander case.57 I will focus on two different accounts 
of the episode, one from al-˝abarī’s Tārīkh al-Rusul wa-al-Mulūk (History 
of Apostles and Kings) and the other from al-Balādhurī’s Ansāb al-Ashrāf 
(Genealogies of the Notables). While these two sources treat Abū Bakra 
quite differently,58 both provide insight into his lasting religious authority. 
Al-˝abarī transmits one unusual account in which Abū Bakra is not found 
guilty of slander at all. This account raises questions about the historical 
accuracy of the other accounts, and it suggests that the slander episode should 
be read symbolically rather than literally. On the other hand, al-Balādhurī 
acknowledges the slander case, but he presents it from Abū Bakra’s perspec-
tive. Abū Bakra appears as a speaker of truth and selfless defender of the 
faith. He submits his body to physical punishment and allows his reputation 
to suffer, not because he is wicked, but precisely because he is humble and 
righteous. In either case, recognising the complexities and subtexts of the 
slander affair helps explain why a lowly pietist convicted of a major crime 
retained so much authority as a hadith transmitter.
In order to appreciate what different authors do with this slander episode, 
one must know its basic parameters. In 16/637, Abū Bakra witnessed the 
governor of Basra, al-Mughīra ibn Shuʿba, having intercourse with a woman 
other than his wife. In the classical Islamic legal tradition, four witnesses are 
needed to prove an accusation of adultery, so Abū Bakra summoned three 
of his half-brothers (including Ziyād) to witness the scandal for themselves. 
After confirming that they had seen the dirty deed, the four witnesses sped to 
Medina and brought their case before the caliph, ʿUmar ibn al-Kha††āb. At 
the last minute, Ziyād withdrew his testimony against al-Mughīra. Two other 
witnesses then rescinded their accusations and repented, but Abū Bakra stuck 
to his story. If someone makes an accusation of adultery but cannot produce 
the four necessary witnesses, he has committed the serious crime of slander, 
or false accusation of adultery (qadhf ). The Quran lays down the punishment 
for this offence: eighty lashes, plus a permanent rejection of that person’s 
veracity as a legal witness. By withdrawing his testimony against al-Mughīra, 
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Ziyād thus caused Abū Bakra to be found guilty of a grave crime and to be 
punished harshly for it.
It is worth noting that one feature of the slander affair, in its usual telling, 
already arouses a mild but nagging suspicion about the historical veracity of 
the episode. There is a striking intertextual resonance between Abū Bakra and 
the Prophet’s wife, ʿĀ’isha. ʿĀ’isha is the original impetus behind contempo-
rary scholars’ interest in Abū Bakra’s authority. It was to ʿĀ’isha’s face that 
Abū Bakra quoted the hadith, ‘Those who entrust their affairs to a woman 
will never know prosperity’, as an excuse for refusing to join her side in the 
First Civil War. According to the Islamic tradition, ʿĀ’isha was also accused 
of adultery by three people and was vindicated by the Quranic verse making 
four witnesses necessary – she is widely understood to be the person for 
whom that verse was revealed in the first place. It seems convenient that Abū 
Bakra now finds himself on the wrong end of an adultery accusation that falls 
one witness short. The slander affair could be meant as an ironic inversion of 
ʿĀ’isha’s and Abū Bakra’s positions. Perhaps some political faction, such as 
the Zubayrids,59 later disseminated this slander story to discredit those who 
refused to join their side, as Abū Bakra refused to join ʿĀ’isha’s side. While 
these speculations are tentative and the evidence scanty, it is simply worth 
noting this dubious aspect of Abū Bakra’s slander story.
More notably, al-˝abarī’s account suggests that the slander affair may not 
have happened in quite this way. He presents two wildly divergent versions of 
the slander episode, one of which follows the outline provided above, and one 
of which indicates that there was no actual slander in the so-called slander 
affair. The former version, transmitted by Sayf ibn ʿUmar (d. late second/
eighth century?), is full of dramatic conversations and colourful details – it 
makes a great story.60 The other and more interesting version, which does not 
contain any slander, is transmitted by al-Wāqidī. In this account, Abū Bakra 
simply witnesses al-Mughīra’s adultery and reports it to ʿUmar, who then 
sacks al-Mughīra. There is no mention of four witnesses, Ziyād’s retraction 
of his testimony, Abū Bakra’s refusal to repent or ʿUmar’s application of the 
Quranic punishment. The only upshot is that Umar fires the ‘horny old goat’ 
al-Mughīra.61
Al-˝abarī dismisses al-Wāqidī’s account as inaccurate, but historians 
should thank him for nevertheless preserving it. As with the †alīq allāh 
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accounts above, al-Wāqidī’s unusual report allows scholars to interrogate 
the usual version of events. Even if his narrative fails to provide conclusive 
answers, it raises the tantalising possibility that Abū Bakra never experi-
enced any legal trouble. Perhaps his accusation against al-Mughīra had no 
legal ramifications at all, but only the rather mild political ramification of 
al-Mughīra’s dismissal from office. Perhaps this affair even unfolded at a 
time before the four-witness criterion and qadhf punishment were regularly 
applied. After all, Islamic law did not spring out of the Quranic text fully 
formed, like Athena springing out of Zeus’s thigh. It went through a period 
of development, which may have lasted more than a century.62 But according 
to the traditional Islamic narrative, the caliph ʿUmar ibn al-Kha††āb was 
largely responsible for formulating Islamic law in its classical form. For later 
authors living under classical Islamic law – which includes the four-witnesses 
criterion and qadhf punishment – it would have been unthinkable for the 
righteous ʿUmar to have ignored the law in this case. To suggest that he 
never demanded four witnesses or punished Abū Bakra for failing to produce 
them would have seemed blasphemous. Thus, the slander element may have 
been fabricated to highlight ʿUmar as a righteous caliph, and to back project 
Islamic law as already perfectly formed and implemented by his time.
Even if the slander affair never really happened, it remains that many 
historical accounts mention it. It was clearly in the minds of scholars in 
the second/eighth and third/ninth century, which means that Abū Bakra 
still potentially had an authority problem. I suggest, however, that some 
historians use the slander affair not to highlight Abū Bakra’s iniquity, but 
rather his righteousness. If this slander affair is viewed as part of a wider 
saga of Abū Bakra versus Ziyād, it appears not as a clear-cut legal case, 
but a metaphor about piety and politics. This interpretation comes across 
most strongly in al-Balādhurī’s Ansāb al-Ashrāf. As briefly mentioned above, 
al-Balādhurī often presents Abū Bakra as a lowly mawlā of the Prophet who 
clashes with the opportunistic ‘Arab’ Ziyād. This contrast also underlies the 
slander affair, which al-Balādhurī presents in a way that vindicates Abū Bakra 
of wrongdoing. Al-Balādhurī begins his account of this episode by declar-
ing Abū Bakra to be one of ‘those who walk upon the earth in humility’ 
(alladhīna yamshūna ‘alā al-ar∂a hawnan, Q 24:62).63 Al-Balādhurī only 
quotes half of this Quranic verse, which in its entirety reads: ‘The servants 
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of the Merciful are those who walk upon the earth in humility, and when 
ignorant fools accost them, they say, “Peace”.’ The full verse reveals that the 
humility expressed here is not passive, but active; it is not solely an internal 
attitude or self-assessment strategy,64 but a value that entails both comport-
ment (walking upon the earth) and speech (saying ‘peace’). By beginning with 
this verse, al-Balādhurī signals that the bold speech and action Abū Bakra is 
about to exhibit fits an authoritative Quranic definition of humility.
The next exceptional moment occurs after caliph ʿUmar has found Abū 
Bakra guilty and has dealt him one round of lashes. When ʿUmar moves to 
beat the unapologetic Abū Bakra a second time, Abū Bakra yells: ‘I will not 
repent from the truth!’ (lā atūbu min al-ªaqq).65 This outburst radically chal-
lenges the usual representative of the truth in early Islamic narratives, caliph 
ʿUmar himself. Elsewhere, al-Balādhurī states that ‘God placed the truth in 
the mouth of ʿUmar’, and Ibn Saʿd also reports the Prophetic hadith: ‘The 
truth after me will be with ʿUmar, no matter what.’66 Abū Bakra now turns 
this familiar association on its head: it is he who stands up for the truth and 
is willing to sacrifice his body and his reputation for it, and it is ʿUmar who 
is trying to suppress the truth. ʿUmar is not completely discredited here, 
but he comes across as more of a ‘king’ than a caliph, an elite who prefers 
practical politics to the inconvenient religious ideals espoused by ordinary 
Muslims.
Immediately after Abū Bakra declares that he will not repent from the 
truth, ʿAlī ibn Abī ˝ālib unexpectedly steps in and asks ʿUmar to stop beat-
ing Abū Bakra. The surprising – and historically unlikely – entrance of ʿAlī 
further indicates that something symbolic rather than strictly factual is hap-
pening in al-Balādhurī’s account. As Tayeb El-Hibri has shown, ʿUmar often 
symbolically represents law, order, Arab mores and political pragmatism; 
ʿAlī represents non-Arabs, justice for the oppressed and a politically un-savvy 
sense of piety.67 Whether these images of ʿUmar and ʿAlī are historically 
accurate is beside the point – it is their symbolic significance that resonates 
with Abū Bakra’s image here, as a representative of non-elite folk oppressed 
by the powerful. The tragedy of Abū Bakra’s beating, and ʿAlī’s failure to 
prevent it, prefigures ʿAlī’s failure to keep the Islamic government together 
by sheer force of piety during the First Civil War. Abū Bakra emerges here as 
a tragic hero who teaches his audience how to resist oppression and speak for 
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justice, even if it entails tremendous personal sacrifice. Al-Balādhurī ends the 
episode with the pronouncement: ‘Abū Bakra was a righteous man.’
For al-Balādhurī, the slander episode reveals Abū Bakra’s integrity rather 
than his mendacity. It is Ziyād who is the antagonist in this account. In this 
way, the slander affair becomes a tale about how arrogant, power-hungry 
elites like Ziyād can destroy the standing of humble, honest everymen like 
Abū Bakra. From a moral standpoint, Abū Bakra retains his moral authority, 
even if from a legal standpoint he is now officially a sinner. This symbolic 
reading of Abū Bakra helps explain how he retained his authority as a hadith 
transmitter, even if he was actually found guilty of slander (which he may 
not have been). By exploring the slander affair from these many angles, it 
becomes clear that Islamic law and historiography have a complex relation-
ship, sometimes harmonious, sometimes contradictory, each always inform-
ing the other. The legal view of Abū Bakra is not the only view, or even 
necessarily the most accurate view. The legal and historical must be viewed 
together if scholars are to uncover the range of meanings imbedded in the 
early Islamic past.
Conclusion
By unpacking the tangled strands of Abū Bakra’s identity, we find this one 
obscure man can clarify both the first decades of Islamic history and the 
development of early Islamic historical writing. As a ‘freedman of God’ 
whose care fell collectively to the Islamic community, Abū Bakra provides 
insight into the organic way new members were incorporated into the umma. 
He appears to have been no one’s mawlā but instead belonged to the nascent 
community merely as a brother in faith whose freedom was ordained by 
God. His identity as a †alīq allāh thus resonates with the more egalitarian 
reading of the word mawālī in the Quran, as expored in the previous chapter. 
As a †alīq allāh, Abū Bakra also better equips scholars to understand the 
values and underlying assumptions of authors who view him instead as a 
mawlā or an Arabian tribesman from Thaqīf. His mawlā identity signifies 
the values of piety, humility and political neutrality; these values are erased 
when Abū Bakra is viewed as an Arab tribesman according to literalistic legal 
standards. Similarly, Abū Bakra’s lasting authority as a hadith transmitter is 
incomprehensible if the slander affair is viewed as a simple legal case. It is 
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only by viewing Abū Bakra’s legal case along with his mawlā morality tale 
that the complex relationship between law, historiography and social identity 
emerges.
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27. A poem by Khālid al-Najjārī, cited in al-Masʿūdī, Murūj al-Dhahab, 5:26.
28. This kind of genealogical manipulation is forbidden by the Quran, but in 
practice it persists even to this day. See, for instance, Szombathy, The Roots of 
Arabic Genealogy; and Conte, ‘Agnatic Illusions’.
29. In a different account from al-Balādhurī, Abū Bakra responds, ‘What in this 
world is graver than Ziyād’s appointing [my son] ʿUbaydallāh over Sijistan and 
the matter of the [Zoroastrian] fires?’ Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 0:585. 
Apparently Abū Bakra did not approve of ‘fire temple demolishing’ as a career 
for ʿUbaydallāh.
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Enslaved Prostitutes in Early Islamic History
This chapter treats enslaved prostitutes, who are mostly marginal in the historical sources and have received little scholarly attention.1 Upon 
closer analysis, enslaved prostitutes reveal many deep-seated thematic con-
nections to the other people studied in this monograph. First, both Abū 
Bakra and early Islamic prostitutes reveal tensions about the more egalitarian/
inclusive and the more hierarchical/exclusive interpretations of the Quran. 
Just as Abū Bakra reportedly invoked Q 33:5 to articulate his place in the 
early Islamic umma, so did two first-/seventh-century prostitutes apparently 
invoke Q 24:33 to seek inclusion in the earliest umma. The references to 
these women are as obscure and suggestive as Abū Bakra’s identity as a †aliq 
allāh, and likewise they are only recoverable through a careful combing of the 
sources. By the third/ninth century, Arabic-Islamic authors had downplayed 
or even plain forgotten the stories of these two prostitutes and had replaced 
them with narratives that made more sense in their own contexts. Like the 
saga of the heroic Abū Bakra versus the villainous Ziyād, these authors cre-
ated archetypes of the ‘good’ slave prostitute saved by Islam versus the ‘bad’ 
prostitute revelling in her debauchery. Thus, early Islamic slave prostitutes are 
illuminating case studies of liminal believers who navigated their belonging 
in the earliest umma, and whose identities were flattened by later authors who 
were not concerned with the inclusion of such outsiders.
Prostitutes are also connected to the coming chapters through their 
gender and status, that is, as enslaved women.2 The coming chapters will 
analyse two prominent types of enslaved women from Umayyad and early 
Abbasid society – the concubine-mother (umm walad ) and the courtesan 
(qayna). Both of these types of enslaved women play important roles in early 
Islamic history and literature, and, by contrast, they allow us to interrogate 
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the near absence of the more mundane prostitute. On the one hand, most of 
our source authors are urban elites (often associated with or at least paid by 
a royal court), and they accordingly pay more attention to high-class literary 
soirées than to the local bar-and-brothel scene. On the other hand, I suggest 
that the sources can afford to ignore prostitutes because they are so easily 
dismissed as ‘other’ – as foreign non-Muslims at the fringes of Islamic society, 
or as vestiges of pre-Islamic sexual ethics. As we shall see in later chapters, 
because courtesans and concbubines were ‘producing songs and sons’3 their 
liminality could not be so easily resolved, and they continued to exercise the 
pens and the imaginations of scholars well into the Abbasid period.
Why and How to do Feminist History for Early Islam
The methodologies used in this chapter are similar to those of the previ-
ous chapter: I scour various narrative sources from multiple genres, search-
ing for anomalous or surprising accounts that do not fit later ideological 
agendas. However, any scholar hoping to study women in early Islamic 
history is immediately faced with an additional problem: none of the early 
Arabic-Islamic narrative sources were written by women, and probably none 
of the early Islamic epigraphic, numismatic or archaeological sources were 
made by women.4 Scholars of early Islam have no accounts to rival those 
of medieval European scholars, who have Hildegard of Bingen’s Scivias, 
or those of Byzantininsts, who have Anna Komnena’s Alexiad. Even those 
Arabic-Islamic sources that purport to centre on women, such as al-I‚bahānī’s 
(d. c. 360/971) al-Imā’ al-Shawāʿir (Slave Poetesses) or Ibn al-Sāʿī’s 
(d. 674/1276) Nisā’ al-Khulafā’ (Consorts of the Caliphs), are still filtered 
through the worldview of slave-holding, elite, urban male authors. A naive 
approach to these sources – that is, treating these texts as objective and 
descriptive, rather than subjective and normative – will inevitably fail to 
understand the ways that women experienced and navigated early Islamic 
history. A descriptive approach is bound to simply sprinkle a few women into 
existing, hegemonic, male-dominated narratives about the past.5
How can scholars proceed with such problematic source material? One 
possibility is to give up trying to recover female experiences at all, and to 
focus instead only on mnemohistory (the study of collective memory) or 
gender history (the study of gendered norms and expectations, for both 
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men and women). However, mnemohistory and gender history often still 
reveal only what male authors remembered of famous women,6 or how 
male authors expressed and upheld gender norms.7 While such methods are 
incredibly valuable and shed new light on early Islamic historical sources, 
they ultimately provide insight into male perceptions of women. As medieval 
European historian Gisela Bock states more boldly, using male-authored texts 
to study women ‘must in fact be viewed as men’s history’.8
Feminist history provides another possibility. Feminist history challenges 
scholars not merely to fit women into already-existing historical categories, 
but to completely re-frame their understanding of the past to include female 
perspectives, experiences and interpretations. Feminist history insists that 
scholars must take seriously multiple perspectives if they are to uncover 
anything approximating the ‘truth’ of the historical past. It can be very dif-
ficult to challenge hegemonic male narratives about history, when the only 
sources we have are those very hegemonic narratives.9 And yet, I suggest it 
can be done; even if the answers are tentative and suggestive, I find that the 
endeavour itself is valuable. Accordingly, I derive the following methodo-
logical suggestions from models in Islamic history, from studies of women in 
medieval Europe and from feminist history theory more broadly.
First, feminist historians can simply ask new questions of the sources 
– questions that did not motivate the original authors, but questions to 
which the sources nevertheless provide an answer. This is at heart what all 
historians do; as Aziz Al-Azmeh says, ‘The main task of the historian [is] 
going beyond the limits of sources in an effort towards historical recon-
struction.’10 In order to avoid projecting anachronistic notions of feminism 
onto the texts, however, scholars should let feminist sensibilities guide their 
questions rather than dictate their answers. They should certainly not expect 
to find ‘feminists’ in the pages of medieval history, and they should avoid 
seeking evidence of loaded, modern concepts such as ‘oppression’. Instead of 
lamenting oppressed victims or trumpeting feminist heroes, 11 scholars should 
interrogate the intersection of power structures, social norms and individual 
agency. They should consider what choices were available to women in any 
given historical context, and what were the costs and benefits of making 
certain choices.
Second, Judith Bennett, a prominent historian of Medieval European 
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women’s history, suggests that scholars should do micro-historical case stud-
ies of individual women. She further suggests that it might be particularly 
useful to focus on women who lived during ‘times of crisis’; these moments 
of crisis help elucidate what forms of patriarchy certain women saw as intoler-
able, and which they saw as liveable or even desirable in certain contexts. In 
this chapter, I take Muªammad’s movement as just such a time of crisis.12 
Additionally, when analysing accounts about women, Ottoman historian 
Ehud Toledano has suggested that it is fruitful to analyse what women 
do (or fail to do) in these accounts, instead of accepting whatever motiva-
tion the authors ascribe to those actions.13 The historian and theorist Gisela 
Bock similarly suggests that, in analysing female actions, scholars can seek 
to recover the possible underlying female interpretations of texts or reac-
tions to patriarchal structures.14 Finally, prosopography – the study of groups 
using large data sets – has the power to reveal trends that go beyond the 
level of individual authors’ awareness. Arabic-Islamic genealogical material 
precisely lends itself to prosopographical analysis.15 I offer examples of these 
methodologies in this chapter (as well as the following chapters), to suggest 
how feminist history can enhance our understanding of the experiences of 
enslaved women in the early Islamic period.
A model of such a methodology for early Islamic history is Asma Sayeed’s 
study of the role of women in hadith transmission. Sayeed conducts a micro-
historical analysis of several female hadith transmitters from the first to ninth/
seventh to fifteenth centuries, as well as amassing data from thousands of 
isnāds. By doing so, she provides convincing explanations for the prominence 
of female transmitters of the Companion generation, the decline of female 
participation in hadith transmission in the second to fourth/eighth to tenth 
centuries, and the re-emergence of prominent female hadith scholars begin-
ning in the late fourth/tenth century. Her explanations have little to do with 
people’s misogyny on the one hand, or with individual women’s heroic fight 
to join the ranks of the hadith scholars on the other. Rather, she attributes 
women’s changing roles to wider social-historical developments, such as the 
canonisation of the major Sunni hadith collections and the acceptance of 
writing as a form of hadith transmission. She investigates a range of women’s 
activities in specific historical contexts, and she avoids reducing these activi-
ties to over-simplified, over-politicised binaries. For example, Sayeed finds 
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that, among the prophet Muªammad’s wives, ʿĀ’isha interpreted the idea of 
‘hijab’ more loosely than did Sawda, allowing ʿĀ’isha to play a greater and 
more active role in the life of the early umma. Sayeed warns that we should 
not view Sawda as ‘submitting to’ and ʿĀ’isha as ‘rebelling against’ the idea of 
seclusion. ‘On the contrary, this diversity of approaches highlights the right 
of interpretation that the wives exercised when confronted with what appears 
to us as a highly restrictive ruling.’16 I take Sayeed’s book as a model for how 
to do feminist history of the early Islamic period.
Transforming Arabian Society: Musayka and ‘Abat’ Seek Justice
Taking my inspiration from these feminist historical methodologies, I offer 
in this chapter a case study of two enslaved prostitutes from very early Islamic 
Arabia. One of these women was named Musayka, and she seems to have 
asked the community of Medina for help when her master was mistreating 
her. The second woman’s name has been lost, but for the sake of simplicity, I 
will call her ‘Abat’ or ‘she refused’ – for she apparently stood up to her own 
people (ahl ) and refused to continue working as a prostitute. During the time 
of crisis that Muªammad’s religious movement created for Arabian society, 
these women appear to have rejected the practice of prostitution (or perhaps 
even slave concubinage) as unjust and unacceptable. In rejecting prostitution, 
Musayka and Abat were not pushing for some twenty-first-century ideal of 
individual liberty or a free-love revolution. Rather, they seem to have been 
advocating for their ability to protect their chastity, likely in order to save 
their sexual activities for the more attractive patriarchal structure of marriage. 
Thus, I suggest that Musayka and Abat reveal brief flashes of the female inter-
pretation of Islam’s moral vision in general, and of Q 24:33 in particular.
It takes careful attention to genre, as well as careful literary analysis, to 
recover these women’s histories. First, Musayka and ‘Abat’ are absent from 
the genres of prophetic biography (sīra), historical report (tārīkh/akhbār) and 
biographical dictionary (†abaqāt). Their stories are only found in exegeses of 
the Quranic verse 24:33, in accounts known as asbāb al-nuzūl. Classically, 
asbāb al-nuzūl are the ‘occasions of revelation’, or explanations of the events 
that caused God to reveal particular Quranic verses; this chapter uses the term 
to describe any account that purports to set the Quranic revelation in his-
torical context.17 Second, even within the genre of asbāb al-nuzūl, Musayka’s 
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and Abat’s stories are hidden behind layers of literary polish. Most exegetes 
conflate or forget the women at the heart of the story, and many exegetes 
also include a character named Muʿādha, who is not to be understood as a 
historical figure, but as an ideological symbol of chastity and piety. I offer 
here an example of how feminist historical analysis helps scholars separate 
earlier, more historical asbāb material from later, more ideological material.
Exegetes associate Musayka and Abat with the clause in Q 24:33, ‘Do 
not force your young slave women into whoredom if they want to try to be 
chaste.’18 We have already seen this verse in Chapter 2, where I suggested 
that it reveals some of the questions enslaved women might have had about 
whether or not they could belong to the umma. I suggest that early exegeses – 
particularly those transmitted by the Arabian transmitters Jābir ibn ʿ Abdallāh 
(d. 78/697) and Mujāhid ibn Jabr (d. 104/722) – provide more details about 
how such women participated in the creation of the earliest umma. Especially, 
they help us see that slave prostitution was not a monolithic practice, but 
that two different women faced slightly different situations and chose slightly 
different solutions to their problems. In the sections that follow, I will begin 
by closely analysing the two accounts that I find authentic, before turning 
to the accounts that I suggest have been embellished for ideological reasons.
Jābir’s Tradition: Musayka’s Plea for Help
The first account that I find authentic is transmitted by the Companion of 
Muªammad, Jābir ibn ʿAbdallāh, on the authority of the hadith scholar 
Ibn Jurayj (d. 150/767).19 There are three slight variants of this tradition, 
recorded in the early exegeses of al-Nasā’ī (d. 303/915) and al-˝abarī 
(d. 310/923), as well as in the canonical hadith compilation of Abū Dā’ūd 
(d. 275/889):
1) ‘Musayka – the slave (ama) of one of the An‚ār – came and said: “My 
master forces me to whoredom (bighā’).” So God sent down this verse.’20
2) ‘Musayka went to one of the An‚ār and said: “My master compels me to 
forncation (zinā).” So this verse came down regarding that.’21
3) ‘A slave woman ( jāriya) came to one of the An‚ār and said, “My master 
forces me to whoredom (bighā).” So this verse came down.’22
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Several textual elements speak to these traditions’ authenticity. First, the char-
acters in these accounts are anonymous An‚ār – the Medinese ‘Helpers’ who 
accepted Islam and invited Muªammad to build his community in Medina. 
Many later exegeses replace the An‚ār with the more symbolically significant 
Prophet Muªammad.23 Second, the story focuses on the woman and her 
actions, not on how the men treat her or how Islam saves her (which will 
become prominent themes in later traditions). The woman’s name Musayka 
(‘little musky’) also seems like a typical slave name, unlike some of the other 
prostitute names analysed below.24 Third, in none of these variations does 
Musayka’s story operate as a true exegesis. The woman’s story seems some-
what unconnected to the event of Quranic revelation, which descends at the 
end almost as an afterthought.25
If these accounts are indeed historically authentic, they indicate first 
that Musayka may have been seeking recourse from concubinage, rather 
than prostitution per se. There are no overt references to any markers of 
prostitution, such as multiple sexual partners, or the exchange of money. 
Thus, hearkening back to my analysis of Q 24:33 in Chapter 2, it seems 
possible here that the problem was that Musayka’s master was forcing himself 
on her, when she wished to remain chaste. In any case, Musayka is presented 
as seeking help from the An‚ār. We can only infer why she turned to them, 
but perhaps it is because they had a reputation for righteousness, and she 
thought that she might find support among them. It is also possible that she 
had become a Believer by this point – perhaps attracted to a moral vision 
that frowned upon extra-marital sexual encounters – but the text makes no 
explicit statements about her religious status. The most we can say is that she, 
an individual suffering from perceived injustice, found recourse in a wider 
group or community that held a notion of sexual ethics that she found more 
agreeable. Finally, the picture it paints of early Islamic Medina is somewhat 
non-canonical; it seems more like a collaborative, ecumenical social experi-
ment than a centralised, stratified society. The An‚ār apparently felt justified 
intervening in other people’s extended households, in the name of helping 
the needy and reforming unethical practices.
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Mujāhid’s Tradition: Abat Refuses
The second tradition that rings historically true comes from the early Meccan 
exegete, Mujāhid ibn Jabr, as reported in al-˝abarī’s exegesis.26 Mujāhid’s 
account has two basic variants that, when viewed in tandem, provide tantalis-
ing glimmers of information about early Islamic prostitution:
1) They used to compel their female household slaves (walā’id ) to prostitu-
tion, so they (f.) did that, and they earned from it. ʿAbdallāh ibn Ubayy 
had a slave who did prostitution, but she did not like it, so she swore not 
to do it anymore. But her people (ahluhā) compelled her, so she went out 
and prostituted herself for a green garment, and she gave it to them. Then 
this verse came down.27
2) ʿAbdallāh ibn Ubayy ibn Salūl used to force his slave woman (ama) to 
fornication, and she brought him a dinar or a garment (Abu ʿĀ‚im is 
unsure), and she gave it to him, and he said: ‘Go back and keep doing 
zinā (fornication) with someone else.’ She said: ‘No I won’t go back.’ God 
forgives those who are forced to fornication.28
As with the Musayka story above, there are certain features that speak for this 
story’s basic authenticity. Once again, these accounts are barely exegetical, 
as the woman’s story exists as a coherent narrative without the revelation of 
the Quran. In fact, version 2 is not explicitly associated with the revelation 
of the verse at all, but is merely capped with a quote taken from the end of 
Q 24:33. Similarly, the woman is once again the protagonist of the account, 
and she is again not described as a Muslim – she simply ‘does not like’ working 
as a prostitute. Finally, like Musayka’s story, these accounts depict a society 
undergoing a radical change. In this case, a slave woman is able to stand up to 
her master and/or her ‘people’ (ahluhā) in the name of justice; she is challeng-
ing the usual authority of the male over the female, the master over the slave.
Both Mujāhid traditions do contain the highly symbolic, historically sus-
picious character ʿAbdallāh ibn Ubayy. However, the second account hints 
that ʿAbdallāh ibn Ubayy was added later. While this second tradition names 
Ibn Ubayy at the top of the account, it drops him at the end. Instead, at the 
end of the account, it is her people (ahl ) who forced her – meaning perhaps 
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her natal family or tribe, but more likely her master’s extended household. 
It also says she gave the cloak to ‘them’ (pl.) and not ‘him’, indicating that 
the original master in this tradition might not have been the individual Ibn 
Ubayy, but a collective household, family or tribe. This account also preserves 
the rather unusual term al-walāʾid, which describes females born into slavery 
in their master’s household.29 Later historical traditions are rife with stories 
about the slave trade and how masters would purchase slaves to use as con-
cubines and prostitutes. Here, however, the context appears not to be the 
slave trade, but the slave’s original birth household, which corresponds with 
the idea that it was her ahl who forced her. While the evidence is somewhat 
circumstantial, I suggest that there are enough threads of the original text 
showing through to detect Ibn Ubayy’s presence as an emendation.
If the extraneous and suspicious details are cut away, the combined texts 
tell the story of a slave woman whose master forced her to prostitution, but 
she refused to continue working as a prostitute. Unlike the Musayka accounts 
above, the Abat accounts are clearly about actual prostitution, not merely 
concubinage; the unique detail of the woman earning a cloak is perhaps 
an accurate description of pre-Islamic prostitution practices. Also, unlike 
Musayka, who appears as an exploited individual who sought help from a 
righteous community, Abat is exploited precisely as a member of a group 
(slave household, jāhiliyya tribe) and she seeks salvation in her individual 
morality. One can only speculate as to what made Abat feel justified in stand-
ing up to her household, but the mere fact that she did register her complaint 
once again indicates a society in the midst of a radical upheaval. Given that 
the women in these two accounts do such different things – Musayka seeks 
communal help, while Abat individually refuses her master – I take these 
stories to refer to two different historical women.
The fact that there were two different women who employed two dif-
ferent strategies to escape prostitution (or concubinage) gives us insight 
into the changes taking place in Medina when Islam first took root there. 
Their diverse actions challenge a dichotomous male-authored model of how 
‘good’ versus ‘bad’ slave prostitutes behaved. Instead, these women seem to 
have viewed prostitution unilaterally as a form of injustice, quite regardless 
of their own personal moral virtues or vices. They seem to have understood 
the ‘crisis’ of Muªammad’s reform movement as an opportunity to treat free 
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men as their moral equals – the same class of people who had owned, used 
and dominated them – by either seeking their help or standing up to them. 
We do not know what became of either woman, but given that their stories 
are associated with a verse prohibiting forced fornication, I like to imagine 
that their situations improved.
Good Prostitute, Bad Prostitute: The Symbolic Undertones of Muʿādha 
and Sumayya
Just as the sources mostly obscure Abū Bakra’s status as a ‘brother in religion’ 
and †alīq allāh, so the sources mostly obscure the radical actions of enslaved 
prostitutes such as Musayka and Abat. Instead, the Arabic-Islamic sources 
generally present one of two narratives about enslaved prostitutes, depend-
ing on genre. Quranic exegeses predominantly tell an uplifting tale about 
Muʿādha, a ‘reformed harlot’ character on the model of Mary Magdalene 
and familiar from Christian saints’ lives.30 Whether because she adopted 
Islam, or because Muªammad intervened to protect her, this woman was 
saved from the plight of prostitution. On the other hand, biographies and 
narrative histories never mention Muʿādha or any other ‘saved’ prostitute, 
but instead focus on the wicked deeds of infamous prostitutes such as Abū 
Bakra’s mother Sumayya. Neither genre begins to engage with the systematic 
problem of prostitution or tries to understand why women might remain 
prostitutes. Instead, both sources draw a black-and-white picture of female 
sexuality, and they use female sexuality as a symbol of Islamic values (or lack 
thereof). Somewhat surprisingly, both genres highlight the enslaved prosti-
tute’s agency and choice – either to choose chastity, or to revel in fornication. 
However, these sources put all the burden of agency on these individual 
women, not on the men who own them or use them, and certainly not on the 
wider system of prostitution and/or slavery that allows for their exploitation.
Moral Salvation and Male Intervention: The Case of the ‘Good’ Prostitute
While I argued above that Musayka and ‘Abat’ are historical women who 
inhabited early Islamic Medina, the exegetes mention a handful of other 
women whose historical existence is more questionable. Particularly, Iraqi 
transmitters such as al-Suddī (d. c. 127/745), Muqātil ibn Sulaymān 
(d. 150/767) and al-Maʿmar ibn Rāshid (d. 153/770) instead usually tell the 
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tale of a ‘reformed harlot’ named Muʿādha. Instead of recounting a brave 
slave woman’s resistance to injustice, these later narratives convey messages 
about Islam’s moral triumph and Muªammad’s protection of the powerless. 
The woman in the story becomes merely a symbol, a representation of any 
woman who finds justice and righteousness in Islam. There is still enormous 
value in these accounts, but they should not be used to understand the 
practice of slave prostitution in first-/seventh-century Medina. Instead, they 
should be used to understand the elaboration of Sunni exegetical strategies in 
the second/eighth and third/ninth centuries, especially in Iraq.
Al-Zuhrī’s Tradition: Muʿādha the Reformed Harlot
One of the most clearly ideological accounts about Muʿādha apparently 
originated with the Medinese scholar Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī (d. 124/742), and 
was transmitted by the Basran scholar Maʿmar ibn Rāshid:
A man from Quraysh was taken captive on the day of Badr, and he was 
held in captivity at ʿAbdallāh ibn Ubayy’s. ʿAbdallāh had a slave woman 
called Muʿādha, and the Qurashi captive wanted her for himself. But she 
was a Muslim, and she held back from him because of her Islam. Ibn Ubayy 
compelled her to do that, and he hit her, hoping that she would become 
pregnant by the Qurashi and he would pay the ransom money for his son. 
But God said [this verse].31
Many elements of this narrative indicate that it is symbolic rather than 
historical. First, ʿAbdallāh ibn Ubayy appears here as an arch-villain, the 
infamous ‘head of the hypocrites’ who hopes to cling to pre-Islamic practices 
despite claiming to be a Muslim. The Qurashi prisoner of war, dwelling at 
ʿAbdallāh ibn Ubayy’s house, represents the other antagonistic group from 
Muªammad’s career, the Meccan Qurashi polytheists. By colluding to abuse 
a helpless, disenfranchised Muslim woman, Ibn Ubayy and the Qurashi rep-
resent the moral dissipation of both the idolaters of Mecca and the hypocrites 
of Medina. Their physical violence is both a sign of their depravity and proof 
that Muʿādha was truly ‘compelled’ to fornicate.32 Second, the protagonist 
of this account is not Muʿādha, but rather God, who intervenes to protect 
an innocent Muslim from persecution. It is overtly Muʿādha’s Islam that 
causes her to shrink away from the Qurashi’s sexual desire. Even her name, 
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Muʿādha, ‘she who seeks refuge in God’, alludes to the final two Suras of the 
Quran and indicates that it is God and not she who is the hero. Muʿādha 
is not a slave prostitute from the early first/seventh century, but a classical 
Islamic symbol of piety and chastity, a recipient of God’s grace.
Al-Suddī’s Tradition: Sectarian Overtones
The second-/eighth-century Kufan storyteller al-Suddī presents an even more 
wildly unhistorical account. (I am not the first person to question al-Suddī’s 
reliability; even his contemporaries apparently thought his stories were pure 
fantasy.) Although his account is far from accurate history, it is narratively 
vivid and hints at the political disputes of al-Suddī’s own day. He says:
This verse came down regarding [ʿAbdallāh ibn Ubayy] Ibn Salūl, the Head 
of the Hypocrites, who had a slave named Muʿādha. Whenever a guest 
came to stay with him, he would send her to have sex with him, hoping for 
payment, and also as a way of honouring him. So the woman came to Abū 
Bakr and complained to him, and he told the Prophet, who ordered him to 
take custody of her. Ibn Salūl yelled: ‘Who will answer for Muªammad? He 
has taken our slave!’ So God revealed this verse.33
Al-Suddī’s account is full of juicy details that make for an entertaining story. 
His description of the supposed pre-Islamic practice of providing a slave 
girl to pleasure a guest is found in no other exegeses of this verse. There are 
several potential explanations of this description – it could be a gloss on 
the Lot story, a satirical twist on traditional Arab hospitality, or an accurate 
description of slavery practices current in al-Suddī’s day.34 Moreover, in this 
account, the Quranic verse does not come down as a result of the woman’s 
mistreatment per se. Rather, the verse comes as a response to ʿAbdallāh ibn 
Ubayy’s shouted question, ‘Who will answer for Muªammad?’ The verse 
comes as a dramatic, incontrovertible answer: God will justify Muªammad!
Even more surprisingly, al-Suddī presents the complaint recipient 
not as Muªammad, but as Abū Bakr, who then takes the complaint to 
Muªammad. As al-Suddī preached in the highly charged sectarian environ-
ment of Umayyad-era Kufa, this mention of Abū Bakr would probably not 
have gone unnoticed. Abū Bakr seems to be an overtly political, proto-Sunni 
addition. The account presents Abū Bakr as Muªammad’s deputy, the one 
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who follows the Prophet’s sunna and upholds his decrees; the caliph is the 
intermediary between the Prophet and the umma. By extension, al-Suddī 
is perhaps indicating that the Umayyad caliphs of his own day are the ones 
who uphold and protect the umma. Perhaps al-Suddī’s account was directed 
against the Shi’a, or it is also possible that it was directed against the proto-
Sunni ulamā’, who were beginning to challenge the Umayyad caliphs for the 
authority to interpret doctrine and dictate law. In any case, the inclusion of 
Abū Bakr here is the most strikingly sectarian rendering of this verse. Later 
exegetes mostly ignore al-Suddī’s melodrama and strip their traditions of any 
political overtones.
Muqātil’s Tradition: Combined and Conflated
A third and final version of the Muʿādha account is transmitted by the 
Kufan exegete and storyteller, Muqātil ibn Sulaymān. His account is widely 
transmitted by later scholars, indicating that it served an enduring ideological 
purpose. Muqātil says:
Do not compel your slave women (walāʾid ) to fornication. This came 
down regarding ʿAbdallāh ibn Ubayy the Hyprocrite and his slave woman 
Umayma, and ʿAbdallāh ibn Nātil the Hypocrite and his slave woman 
Musayka, who was the daughter of Umayma. Among them also were 
Muʿādha, Arwā, ʿAmrā, and Qutayla. Umayma and her daughter Musayka 
came to the Messenger of God (s.a.w.), and she said: ‘We are being com-
pelled to fornicate.’ So God Almighty revealed this verse.35
The most important new feature of Muqātil’s account is the addition of 
Umayma, as well as the other women mentioned as an afterthought, ‘also 
among them were Muʿādha, Arwā, ʿAmrā, and Qutayla’. Later exegetes 
often lump all six names into a simple list: ‘This verse came down regarding 
six slave women belonging to ʿAbdallāh ibn Ubayy: Muʿādha, Musayka, 
Umayma, Qutayla, ʿAmrā, and Arwā.’36 Muqātil seems to be responsible for 
introducing these extra names, as they appear in no other early sources. As for 
Umayma herself, her entire role in this story is as Musayka’s mother (even her 
name, Umayma, means ‘little mother’.) The mother–daughter story could 
serve one of several narrative purposes. Perhaps the audience is to understand 
that Umayma’s daughter, Musayka, was under-age and needed her mother’s 
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protection against the depredations of immoral men. Perhaps the audience 
is supposed to wonder how Umayma and Musayka became separated, for in 
Islamic law a slave mother may often not be sold away from her child, who is 
automatically free-born.37 In any case, Muqātil’s story appears to add nothing 
historically reliable to the core tradition about a woman named Musayka 
who complained to the An‚ār. Instead, it appears to combine several differ-
ent stories about several different women, conflating them all together. For 
Muqātil and those who transmit his account, it is the moral of the story, 
the symbolic upshot, that matters more than the individual identities of the 
women involved.
Bird’s Eye View: From Women’s Agency to Male Authority
If we turn away from close literary analysis and towards broad patterns of 
transmission, we can discern how different exegetes in different times and 
places conveyed different lessons in their accounts of the redeemed prostitute. 
For this analysis, I read twenty-one exegeses, in order to analyse which literary 
elements they highlight and which they downplay in their asbāb al-nuzūl 
for Q 24:33. In selecting these twenty-one exegeses, I was careful to include 
the earliest tafsīrs, such as those by ʿAbd al-Razzāq (d. 211/827), al-Qummī 
(fl. 3rd/9th c.), Hūd ibn Muªakkam (fl. 3rd/9th c.), al-Nasā’ī and al-˝abarī. 
I was also careful to include classics in the genre, such as those by al-W· āªidī 
(d. 468/1076), al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144), al-Qur†ubī (567/1172), 
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209), Ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1373) and al-Jalālayn 
(al-Maªallī, d. 864/1459; al-Suyū†ī, d. 911/1505). I then chose a sampling 
of other tafsīrs across time, place and sectarian affiliation, aiming for variety 
rather than comprehensiveness.38 I provide here a brief survey of trends in the 
tafsīrs of Q 24:33, which can reveal how exegesis subtly morphed to meet new 
needs and speak to new audiences, even while preserving many of the same 
stories and building on older traditions. Particularly, I found that the earlier 
traditions tend to focus on the redeemed prostitute’s individual agency, while 
later traditions tend to focus on how Muªammad, male Muslims or Islam 
itself ‘saves’ fallen women.
The first and most common trend, which occurs in 22/55 (40 per cent) 
of the asbāb al-nuzūl traditions, focuses on the enslaved prostitute’s personal 
agency. For instance, we saw in al-Zuhrī’s account of Muʿādha above that 
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Muʿādha ‘held back from him because of her Islam’. While sometimes the 
woman’s refusal is presented in this rather passive way, in many accounts 
the woman directly and flatly says no to her master, sometimes in the highly 
unlikely (but satisfyingly pithy) phrase: ‘If [prostitution] is good then I’ve 
done enough of it, and if it’s bad then it’s time for me to quit!’39 Whenever the 
woman stands up for herself and refuses to continue serving as a prostitute, 
she is almost never depicted as asking Muªammad or anyone else for help.40 
It is her decision to quit prostitution that matters and that is vindicated by 
the Quran. Perhaps more surprisingly, the woman in these accounts is only 
sometimes described as a Muslim. Her agency is not necessarily defined by 
her religion, as al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) explains: ‘This verse indicates that 
fornication is wrong in all religions.’41 Instead, many sources imply that the 
reformed prostitute has an innately moral nature. For instance, Ibn Kathīr 
describes the woman as having ‘no wrong in her’ (lā ba’sa bihā), which is 
more about her moral character than her religious belief.42 Al-Zamakhsharī 
likewise explains: ‘No hint of unusual perversion can be found in Muʿādha 
and Musayka, so God will forgive them . . .’43 This pronouncement is not 
about their Islam; it is about their sexual morality more broadly.
This highlighting of personal female agency is the most popular tactic 
overall, and it is especially the best-attested tactic among early, proto-Sunni 
transmitters of the second/eighth and third/ninth centuries (Mujāhid uses 
it in 1 out of 1 (1/1) of his traditions; ʿAbd al-Razzāq (3/3); and al-˝abarī 
(5/10).)44 Perhaps these exegetes were addressing a society that was still 
majority non-Muslim, trying to convince non-Muslim women – especially 
enslaved women – to find both spiritual and bodily salvation through con-
version. Perhaps these exegetes were subtly directing their words towards 
the elite courtesans of the Abbasid court, who were widely considered to be 
promiscuous. Or perhaps this version of Muʿādha is inspired by Christian 
stories of Mary Magdalene, proof that a fallen woman can be saved not just 
by Christianity but also by Islam. In any case, the woman in these accounts 
is anonymous and one-dimensional, and therefore flexible enough to stand 
in for any enslaved prostitute. If Muʿādha can choose chastity in her circum-
stances, then anyone can.
In the second most common trend, 17 out of 55 (31 per cent) of the 
accounts, the slave woman asks for help. We have already seen that in some 
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early exegeses (such as those of al-Nasā’ī and al-˝abarī) the woman seeks help 
from an anonymous An‚ārī, but in the vast majority of accounts she instead 
asks for help from Muªammad himself.45 In these accounts, the woman does 
not speak up for herself or refuse her master’s requests, and, once again, she is 
rarely identified as a Muslim. Perhaps she is simply assumed to be a Muslim, 
but ultimately it does not matter who she is – what matters is the position 
of Muªammad as the protector of his community, the arbiter of justice 
and the recipient of divine revelation. This trend became especially promi-
nent in the fifth–seventh/eleventh–thirteenth centuries: al-˝abarānī (2/2), 
al-Zamakhasharī (1/1), Fakhr al-Dīn (2/4), al-Qur†ubī (2/2) and al-Bay∂āwī 
(1/1) prefer this reading.46 Perhaps these exegetes focused on Muªammad’s 
role because the field of hadith study – the study of Muªammad’s words 
– had become a canonical, authoritative field of scholarship by the fifth/
eleventh century.47 Similarly, perhaps exegetes were now more careful to 
ensure that their asbāb al-nuzūl traditions directly explained how the Quranic 
revelation worked, rather than simply providing details about pre- and early 
Islamic society.
Finally, the third most common trend (16 out of 55, 29 per cent) excises 
the woman’s role almost entirely.48 These texts retain the basic narrative of 
ʿAbdallāh ibn Ubayy’s mistreating his slave, but they focus on the event of 
Quranic revelation instead of the woman’s plight. For example, al-Wāªidī 
says: ‘ʿAbdallāh ibn Ubayy said to a slave of his, “Go and earn something for 
us by prostitution.” So God revealed [this verse].’ This erasure of the woman’s 
story becomes common starting in the fourth–fifth/tenth–eleventh century. 
(Al-˝ūsī (1/1), al-Wāªidī (4/7), Ibn al-Jawzī (1/3), Ibn Kathīr (4/10), and 
Tafsīr al-Jalalayn (1/1) highlight this reading.) But the trend reaches its 
culmination in the eighth/fourteenth century with the Tafsīr of Ibn Kathīr, 
the most explicitly patriarchal of all the exegeses I surveyed. Ibn Kathīr glosses 
this verse in such a way as to give male Muslims the agency, as he explains: 
‘ʿAbdallāh ibn Ubayy had a slave woman ( jāriya) called Muʿādha, and he 
forced her to fornication. When Islam came, God forbade the male believers 
(al-mu’minūn) from that.’ Ibn Kathīr’s focus is not on the woman’s reaction 
to her unjust situation; it says nothing about what a slave woman should do 
if she was being prostituted against her will. Rather, it reminds male Muslims 
that they should not abuse their power over enslaved women. It seems that 
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Ibn Kathīr lived in a world where the patriarchal establishment regulated 
female sexual practices, such that he could not imagine that this verse should 
empower women instead of men.
Overall, it appears that the earlier exegetes focus more on the female char-
acters in the story, while the later exegetes focus more on the male characters 
in the story, or strip the storytelling elements away to focus on the verse’s legal 
core. These findings correspond with Asma Afsaruddin’s study of biographical 
accounts of ‘difficult’ early Islamic women.49 In her comparison of Ibn Saʿd’s 
(d. 230/845) and Ibn Óajar’s (d. 852/1449) biographies of Umm ʿUmara 
and Umm Waraqa, she finds that ‘societal conceptions of women’s agency 
and proper conduct in the public realm came to be progressively defined and 
restricted’ by Ibn Óajar’s time.50 She shows that these biographers do not 
express these changing social expectations by inventing wildly new traditions 
about these women, but, rather, by subtly shifting the narrative focus, by 
selectively highlighting and omitting certain aspects of their biographies. 
Something similar seems to have happened in the realm of exegesis. What 
apparently began as a story about a mouthy woman refusing her master 
becomes a story about a woman seeking a more ‘correct’ form of recourse 
by seeking the Prophet Muªammad’s help, and eventually becomes about 
Islam’s salvific power for women without acknowledging women’s choices or 
actions at all.51 No matter what lesson the exegetes highlight, however, they 
are never concerned to reconstruct first-/seventh-century history according to 
modern academic standards. Rather, they are concerned to present morality 
tales and edifying symbols of piety.
Moral Perversion and Victim Blaming: The Case of the ‘Bad’ Prostitute
On the one hand, it can be read as empowering that so many early exegetes 
highlight Muʿādha’s agency. In this uplifting version of the tradition, God 
vindicates a lowly enslaved woman in her attempt to assert some control over 
her own body. These traditions recognise a remarkable level of individual, 
moral agency on the part of the enslaved woman, marking her as a full human 
and spiritual equal. However, the problem with this reading is that it treats 
agency simply as an internal, individual issue; it does not consider wider 
social pressures, power discrepancies or unjust systems that encourage sexual 
violence. Such traditions put the burden entirely on the slave woman herself 
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to resist injustice, rather than exhorting free men to use their power to create 
more just systems.52 Thus, the exegetes do not single out slave prostitution 
per se as being an unjust practice; it only becomes unjust when the slave 
woman in question ‘desires chastity’. The implication is that any woman 
who continues as a prostitute must ‘want’ to be a prostitute and thus deserves 
whatever exploitation or injustice she experiences. Muʿādha might exhibit 
agency and morality, but she subtly condemns all other women who do not 
choose her path, no matter the injustice or violence of their social situations. 
And, indeed, we find precisely such a condemnation of ‘bad’ prostitutes in 
the historical and literary traditions, which completely ignore the figure of 
the reformed prostitute, and focus instead on the infamous, unredeemed, 
gleefully promiscuous reprobate.
These historical genres are not concerned with providing moral guidance 
for would-be Muslim women or explaining the ethical ramifications of the 
Quran. Rather, they are concerned with making sense of the early Islamic 
past by elaborating ‘sites of memory’ that give meaning to their own present 
identity as Muslims.53 They use stock characters like the ‘bad prostitute’ 
to fill out these narratives. For example, authors such as Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih 
(d. 328/940) tell the story of Êulayma, a pre-Islamic Arabian prostitute who 
reportedly liked fornicating so much that even after she became too old to 
ply her trade, she made her pet goats copulate so that she could enjoy the 
sounds of their heavy breathing. Êulayma, which means ‘the little unjust 
one’, thereby becomes a caricature of pre-Islamic mores, and she draws a 
stark boundary between pre-Islamic and Islamic sexual ethics. Some modern 
scholars have unfortunately accepted the caricature of Êulayma as historically 
accurate, instead of reading her as a symbol with a specific narrative role to 
play.54
Similarly, several sources present Sumayya, the mother of Abū Bakra and 
Ziyād ibn Abīhi, as promiscuous and disgusting. In a graphic account, the 
Shii-leaning historian al-Masʿūdī (d. 345/956) explains: ‘Abū Sufyān went 
to a wine-seller named Abū Maryam and asked for a prostitute. The wine 
seller said: “I have only Sumayya here.” Abū Sufyān said: “I will take her, 
despite her drooping breasts, the stink of her armpits and her belly, and the 
stench of her breath.”’55 Later, this wine seller would testify that Abū Sufyān 
visited Sumayya despite her foulness, and that she emerged from the meet-
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ing dripping with semen. As a Shii-leaning author, al-Masʿūdī has a vested 
interest in denigrating Sumayya, as an oblique way of denigrating her son, 
Ziyād ibn Abīhi. Ziyād ibn Abīhi worked for the Umayyads, the house that 
had famously fought against the first Shii Imam, ʿAlī ibn Abī ˝ālib. Even 
more scandalously, Ziyād’s son, ʿUbaydallāh, had orchestrated the slaughter 
of the third Shii Imam, al-Óusayn. Thus, Sumayya’s sexual promiscuity does 
not merely represent her own moral failing, but also that of her son and 
grandson. Sumayya’s real function in these sources is as a ‘your mother’ joke. 
She is not an individual in her own right, but a stand-in for the health of 
society, a barometer of injustice.
The sources barely speak about Sumayya as an individual, which makes it 
nigh impossible to reconstruct her history. However, when piecing together 
the tiny bits of her biography, it appears that the line between concubine 
and prostitute might have been quite thin for her. Al-Balūdhurī’s Ansāb 
al-Ashrāf implies that Sumayya began her career as the concubine of her 
master, al-Óārith ibn Kalada. When al-Óārith wondered whether he was 
really the father of Sumayya’s son Nufayʿ (Abū Bakra), an unnamed inform-
ant reportedly told him: ‘Your slave woman is a source of doubt: she does 
not repel a groper’s hand’ (inna jāriyataka dhāt rība: lā tadfa’u kaff lāmis).56 
It appears here that Sumayya was not yet a prostitute, for presumably neither 
al-Óārith nor this informant would expect a prostitute to refuse a ‘groper’s’ 
proposition. After Nufayʿ’s birth, it seems that al-Óārith made Sumayya 
work as a prostitute – whether as punishment for her transgression, or simply 
as a way of capitalising on her ‘skills’, one cannot know. However, it also 
seems that the difference between concubine and prostitute mattered very 
little to Sumayya, as an enslaved woman who had almost no sexual or bodily 
agency.57 Certainly, we never get her side of the story.
This euphemism, ‘She does not repel a groper’s hand’, is all too resonant 
in the twenty-first century; it is an underhanded, understated way to blame 
Sumayya for her own victimisation. And it shows the danger of speaking 
about slave prostitutes only in terms of individual agency. The ‘groper’ here 
is not blamed for groping. In fact, it almost seems assumed that the hand 
will grope, and that it is a woman’s responsibility to repel the ever-present 
fondler. While the informant in this account apparently expects Sumayya to 
reject sexual advances, he does not even begin to interrogate how difficult 
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it might have been for her to do so or to consider the costs she would have 
had to pay. Unlike Musayka and Abat, who experienced the radical trans-
formations of early Islamic Medina, Sumayya lived in no such remarkable 
context. She lived in al-Taif, where she was owned by a master who report-
edly impregnated her, married her off to another slave and pimped her out 
as a prostitute. The stakes for saying ‘no’ – especially to a powerful nobleman 
like Abū Sufyān – must have been high for a woman like Sumayya. There is 
a wider systematic injustice happening to Sumayya that the historians and 
exegetes ignore. Instead of praising good Muʿādhas and condemning bad 
Sumayyas, historians must unpack wider social contexts and seek examples of 
complex, dynamic women who navigated their situations to the best of their 
abilities.
Where are the Enslaved Prostitutes?
Scholars have previously noted that Arabic-Islamic sources discuss enslaved 
women more frequently than they do free women. These scholars have sug-
gested that free women were private and taboo, to be kept behind closed 
doors and not even exposed to the public gaze on the pages of texts. While 
this interpretation is likely valid, it does not explain why the sources speak so 
much more about many other kinds of enslaved women – concubines, cour-
tesans, chamberlains, even domestic servants – than they speak about prosti-
tutes. Prostitutes are marginal and fairly difficult to find in the sources; even 
using searchable databases such as al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr, the results are meagre.58 
This silence may partly be due to the ‘unseemly’ nature of prostitutes. But 
I suggest that prostitutes are also mostly ignored because they are so easily 
excluded as ‘other’; 59 this is in contrast to other types of slaves, particularly 
concubines and courtesans, who forced Muslim scholars to grapple with what 
it meant to be Arab and Muslim. Prostitutes caused no such hand-wringing 
from the scholars. Instead, the sources associate prostitutes with pre-Islamic 
Arabia, and with travel and warfare in foreign lands – prostitutes represent 
memories of the distant past, or transitional moments that breach normal 
expectations.60 Prostitutes were women to be decried, used or saved, but they 
did not challenge scholars’ sense of where the Islamic community’s boundary 
lay.
For instance, the geographer Yāqūt al-Óamawī (d. 626/1229) recounts 
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the story of ʿUqayshir (‘little scabby’), who was travelling to Syria to fight in 
the Second Civil War (60–73/680–92). On the way, ʿUqayshir stopped in 
an Iraqi village called Qubbīn and stayed with a Nabatean wine seller ‘whose 
wife traded in sex’ (tabdhulu zawjatuhu al-fujūr).61 In Qubbīn, he sold his 
riding beast and spent the money, presumably enjoying the Nabatean’s wife, 
until the army caught up with him. He later composed this poem:
I went out from the garrison, a disciple of his people,
  without intention of gain or pay,
to the army of the people of Syria. I was reluctantly
  equipped, foolishly without an iron sword or blade.
But there is a hopeless contradiction in a sword which
  has no feud, or a spear with a weak tip.
Al-Qubbāʿ’s injustice dragged me along with it,
  and I had to follow his orders and set out.
I set upon my course and became a warrior, and I gave
  the greeting of the warriors to my people.
My steed was a bent-backed donkey, bearing the
  marks of water-skins and ropes.
We visited Qubbīn day and night, like some prostitutes
  visiting a client.
ʿUqayshir, presumably reluctant to fight against his own umma during a 
time of devastating civil war, instead seeks refuge in a Nabatean village. The 
Nabatean barkeeper and his wife are almost certainly meant to be Christians. 
Thus, the prostitution of the Nabatean’s wife is not a Muslim problem – it is 
rather a moral failing of the Iraqi Christians. A Muslim would only encounter 
such a figure during times of fitna or while travelling in the countryside. In 
short, prostitution was a transitional, temporary practice that merited no 
great social attention.
However, their marginality should not lead us to believe that enslaved 
prostitutes were unimportant to early Islamic history. They did change soci-
ety in a way that apparently escaped the grasp of the exegetes, biographers 
and storytellers. They changed it obliquely through the act of motherhood. 
According to Uri Rubin, early Islamic lawyers adopted the ‘child belongs 
to the owner of the bed’ paternity dictum to accommodate the perceived 
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 promiscuity of enslaved women like Sumayya.62 It may even have been 
in response to Ziyād ibn Abīhi’s situation specifically that Islamic lawyers 
determined that a slave woman’s child should be attributed to her husband 
(if she had one) or her master. Thus, women like Sumayya helped shape 
Islamic society by impelling legal protections for the children of enslaved 
mothers.
Conclusion
Scholars today are not doing their job if they uncritically accept the medi-
eval sources’ dichotomy between good and bad slave prostitutes, or if they 
uncritically accept the idea that such women make a simple, individual 
choice between morality and immorality. Such ideas reflect the worldviews 
of the free, male authors who wrote our sources. These authors tended not to 
interrogate the unjust systems of their own making, and they instead passed 
the responsibility on to the enslaved women who participated in those sys-
tems. However, it is important to note that the earliest Islamic sources, when 
read carefully, appear to grapple with such tensions and to acknowledge the 
difficulties that enslaved prostitutes faced. These early accounts reveal a brief 
irruption of enslaved prostitutes’ voices in first-/seventh-century Medina; 
these voices do not present a dichotomy between ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ women, 
but rather offer different strategies for challenging unjust structures during 
a time of tremendous social upheaval. By interpreting Q 24:33 in ways that 
allowed them to escape prostitution and protect their own chastity, enslaved 
women helped negotiate the contours of the earliest umma.
Notes
 1. A few works of secondary scholarship mention prostitutes from early Islamic 
history, but none of them focus on the topic. See particularly Abdelwahab 
Bouhdiba, Sexuality in Islam, 187–195; Nadia M. El Cheikh, ‘Describing the 
Other to Get at the Self’, 239–250; Camilo Álvarez de Morales, ‘Transgresiones 
sexuales en el Islam medieval’; and most recently Gary Leiser, Prostitution in the 
Eastern Mediterranean World, especially chapter 2. I was excited to read a recent 
Arabic article on the topic, Salameh al-Naimat and Aysha al-Sweidat, ‘Al-Bighā’ 
ʿinda al-ʿArab qabla al-Islām’. However, this article is disappointingly descrip-
tive rather than analytical. It mines several Arabic primary sources, such as Ibn 
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ʿAbd Rabbih’s Al-Iqd al-Farīd, for references to prostitution, but it applies no 
critical apparatus to these sources.
 2. Baber Johansen has shown that Hanafi theorists treat female slaves as a separate 
genus of humanity, different from both free women and male slaves. The female 
slave’s raison d’être is ‘concubinage, and bearing children for their masters’. 
Johansen, ‘The Valorization of the Human Body’, 83–84.
 3. I take this felicitous turn of phrase from Matthew Gordon, ‘Introduction’, 1.
 4. Scholars of early Islam have access to a few papyri and other documents that 
mention women, but we do not have anything like the Cairo Geniza or the 
archives of Ottoman history.
 5. On the differences between women’s history and feminist history, see Jill 
Matthews, ‘Feminist History’. Unfortunately, some Arabic scholarship produced 
in the Middle East falls into the former category. See, for instance, Al-Naimat 
and al-Sweidat, ‘Al-Bighā’’, and the sources cited therein; see also Buthayna 
Bin Husayn, Nisā’ al-Khulafā’ al-Umawīyīn. Such sources tend more towards 
thorough description than critical analysis. While such works are still immensely 
valuable, their contribution would be even greater if they interrogated the narra-
tive strategies of their primary sources.
 6. See, for example, Denise A. Spellberg, Politics, Gender, and the Islamic Past, 
which suggests that scholars cannot hope to reconstruct an accurate, objective 
biography of the Prophet Muªammad’s wife ʿĀ’isha. Instead, Spellberg studies 
the shaping of ʿĀ’isha’s ‘legacy’ in later Sunni and Shii sources, who present 
ʿĀ’isha as a hero and a villain, respectively.
 7. For a foundational example of scholarship on early Islamic gender roles, see Julia 
Bray, ‘Men, Women and Slaves in Abbasid Society’. Bray has shown that the 
romantic trope of the enslaved courtesan who ‘enslaves’ her own master with 
infatuation is caught up in male authors’ changing notions of masculinity. In the 
Abbasid period, free Arab men felt both subordinated and feminised by working 
mundane government jobs for an autocratic caliph. To regain some sense of 
masculine individuality, Abbasid men fantasised about romantic love with slave 
poetesses. They also highlighted the trope of the slave woman enslaving her 
master to enact their own fantasy of turning the tables on the autocratic power 
structures that rendered them subservient. Bray thus reminds her readers that 
historical texts are not transparent or innocent; they must be read with careful 
attention to authorship and audience.
 8. Gisela Bock, ‘Women’s History and Gender History’, 17–18.
 9. Narrative shaping and hegemonic narratives are always problems for the 
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 historian. However, scholars of early Islamic history can interrogate and com-
pare sources that have, say, a Sunni bias versus a Shii bias, because we have 
representatives of both schools. Because we only have representatives of a ‘male’ 
school of historical thought, we cannot easily cross-reference our sources to 
discover other perspectives.
10. Aziz Al-Azmeh, Arabic Sources, 5.
11. As Judith Bennett says, ‘Women have always been both victims and agents’ 
(Judith Bennett, ‘Feminism and History’, 262). Bennett also reminds us that 
‘agency’ does not always mean to choose equality, freedom, or resistance – 
women often choose to participate in and support unequal power structures. 
(Saba Mahmood also reminds us of this fact in Politics of Piety, 5–10.)
12. Bennett, ‘Feminism and History’, 251–272.
13. Ehud R. Toledano, ‘Understanding Enslavement as a Human Bond’, Chapter 
1 in As if Silent and Absent: Bonds of Enslavement in the Islamic Middle East, 
35–36. As Toledano says, ‘“Actions speak louder than words” will be an essential 
concept and motto in our working space’ (ibid., 36).
14. Bock, ‘Women’s History and Gender History’.
15. I employ this methodology in the next chapter of this monograph.
16. Asma Sayeed, Women and the Transmission of Religious Knowledge in Islam, 43.
17. On the meaning and development of asbāb al-nuzūl, see Andrew Rippin, ‘The 
Exegetical Genre Asbāb Al-Nuzūl ’ and ‘The Function of Asbāb Al-Nuzūl in 
Qurʾānic Exegesis’; and Hans-Thomas Tillschneider, ‘Les Asbāb an-Nuzūl: 
Une Branche de La Tradition Prophétique’. This last article is a digest of 
Tillschneider’s German doctoral thesis.
18. See Chapter 2 of this monograph for a detailed analysis of this verse, and for an 
explanation of this translation.
19. I argue in more detail for the authenticity of this Ibn Jurayj transmission, as 
opposed to a more embellished tradition transmitted by al-Aʿmash, in Urban, 
‘A Tale of Two Prostitutes’, Arabica (forthcoming).
20. Al-Nasāʾī, Tafsīr al-Nasāʾī, 2:123–124; al-˝abarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 17:291; 
Sulaymān ibn al-Ashʿath al-Sijistānī Abū Dā’ūd, Sunan, 2:294.
21. Al-˝abarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 17:290.
22. Ibid., 17:291.
23. There are many versions of this Musayka tradition where ʿAbdallāh ibn Ubayy 
and Muªammad have been added. But the fact that it exists in three separate 
traditions without these suspicious names speaks for the authenticity of this 
pared-down version. It is worth mentioning that all three of these more authen-
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tic-seeming accounts are transmitted from Ibn Jurayj, from Abū al-Zubayr, 
from Jābir ibn ʿAbdallāh. Many of the more suspicious traditions have different 
chains of transmission, supposedly coming from people like ʿIkrima. For more 
details on the analyses of the different traditions with their different chains, see 
Urban, ‘A Tale of Two Prostitutes’.
24. Musayka’s name seems particularly authentic when compared to Muʿādha, 
whose name is Islamic and probably symbolic. See S. D. Goitein, ‘Slaves and 
Slavegirls in the Cairo Geniza Records’, for slave names in medieval Islamic 
history. Slave names are often either objects or physical descriptors – things like 
‘dinar’, ‘goldy’, ‘arsenic’, ‘happy’ and ‘bamboo’.
25. Tillschneider has suggested that when the asbāb al-nuzūl material stands alone 
with little narrative connection to the Quranic verse – that is, when the Quranic 
verse is tacked on at the end, essentially as an excuse for introducing the histori-
cal reference – the material is more likely to preserve early historical information. 
Tillschneider, ‘Les Asbāb al-Nuzūl ’, 177–178.
26. Mujāhid’s ‘tafsīr’ has been reconstructed based on the transmission of Mujāhid’s 
accounts in al-˝abarī’s Jāmiʿ al-Bayān. For a detailed analysis of Mujāhid’s 
exegetical style and the transmission of his ideas, see Claude Gilliot, 
‘Mujāhid’s Exegesis’.
27. Al-˝abarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 17:294.
28. Ibid., 17:293. ʿAbd al-Razzāq provides a similar account on the authority of 
the Kufan transmitter al-Shaʿbī, rather than Mujāhid: ‘ʿAbdallāh ibn Ubayy 
had Muʿādha and Musayka, and he sent one of them to prostitute herself. She 
earned a cloak, and he wanted her to do it again, but she refused. Forgiveness 
came down for them despite him.’ ʿAbd al-Razzāq, Tafsīr Al-Qur’ān, 22:59–60. 
I suggest elsewhere that ʿAbd al-Razzāq’s transmission from al-Shaʿbī is less 
likely to be authentic than al-˝abarī’s transmission from Mujāhid. See Urban, 
‘A Tale of Two Prostitutes’.
29. The gloss of ‘fatayāt’ as ‘walāʾid ’ is characteristic of Mujāhid’s paraphrastic style. 
See Claude Gilliot, ‘The Beginnings of Qur’anic Exegesis’, 13–14. While Gilliot 
argues that ‘pseudo-historical’ material was later added to this earliest paraphras-
tic core of exegesis (20–21), I find it telling that the historical material attached 
to Mujāhid’s account is substantially different from the narratives attached to 
later accounts (such as those of al-Zuhrī and Muqātil). That is, perhaps the 
material attached to this early, paraphrastic exegesis is not so ‘pseudo’ after all. 
Perhaps it is the later, more narrativizing exegetes, whose accounts are more 
historically suspect.
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30. See Leiser, Prostitution, Chapter 1. Leiser later states, ‘It is striking that there 
is nothing in early Arabic Muslim literature that is remotely comparable to the 
edifying Christian stories of holy harlots – or even tales of women who had com-
mitted “fornication,” seen the error of their ways and then had become virtuous 
examples to others’ (Leiser, Prostitution, 85). While this statement may hold 
true for most genres of Arabic-Islamic historical literature, it fails to take into 
account the asbāb al-nuzūl genre, which presents precisely such tales of reformed 
‘holy harlots’. Moreover, Rkia Cornell has argued that Rabiʿah al-ʿAdawiyyah 
functions precisely as such a ‘reformed harlot’ in many Sufi narratives of her life 
(Rkia Cornell, ‘Rabiʿah al-ʿAdawiyyah’, 292–298.)
31. ʿAbd al-Razzāq, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān, 2:59; al-˝abarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 17:292. A 
shorter variation of this account is also given in the tafsīr of the Ibadi exegete 
Hūd ibn Muªakkam al-Hawwārī: ‘This came down regarding the slave woman 
of ʿAbdallāh ibn Ubayy ibn Salūl whom he compelled to [have sex with] a man 
from Quraysh, hoping that she would bear his child and he would ransom his 
child’ (Hūd ibn Muªakkam Al-Hawwārī, Tafsīr Kitāb Allāh al-ʿAzīz, 3:179).
32. In my forthcoming ‘A Tale of Two Prostitutes’, I suggest that the original narra-
tive contains no element of violence. The reading ‘he hit her’ seems to stem from 
a mis-reading of the Arabic term ∂araba, which can mean ‘to hit’, but more 
likely in this context meant ‘to charge a fee’.
33. Al-Suddī, Tafsīr Al-Suddī Al-Kabīr, 361.
34. On the practice of providing slave women for guests to enjoy in Safavid Iran, 
see Rudi Matthee, ‘Prostitutes, Courtesans, and Dancing Girls: Women 
Entertainers in Safavid Iran’.
35. Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, Tafsīr Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, 3:198.
36. Abū al-Faraj ʿAbd al-Raªmān ibn ʿAlī Ibn al-Jawzī, Zād Al-Masīr, 5:381. See 
also al-Rāzī, Al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, 23:220; al-Zamakhsharī, Al-Kashshāf, 3:233; 
and al-˝abarānī, Al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, 4:432.
37. Islamic law has a special category for the slave woman who bears a child for her 
master. She becomes a ‘mother of a child’ (umm walad ), with the following 
general rights: 1) She cannot be sold away. 2) She is automatically freed upon 
the death of her master. 3) Her child is considered freeborn and legitimate. For 
more on this category, see Chapter 5.
38. In alphabetical order by author’s last name, the exegeses I consulted are: ʿAbd 
al-Razzāq’s Tafsīr; al-Bay∂āwī’s Tafsīr; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr; 
Hawwārī’s Tafsīr; Ibn al-Jawzī’s Zād Al-Masīr; Ibn Kathīr’s Tafsīr; al-Maªallī 
and al-Suyū†ī’s Tafsīr al-Jalālayn; Makkī ibn Abī ˝ālib’s Tafsīr; al-Māturīdī’s 
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Tafsīr; Mujāhid ibn Jabr’s Tafsīr; Muqātil ibn Sulaymān’s Tafsīr Muqātil ibn 
Sulaymān; al-Nasā’is Tafsīr; al-Qummī’s Tafsīr Al-Qummī; al-Qur†ubī’s Al-Jāmiʿ 
Li-Aªkām Al-Qur’ān; al-Shawkānī’s Fatª al-Qadīr; al-Suddī’s Tafsīr Al-Suddī 
Al-Kabīr; al-˝abarānī’s Al-Tafsīr Al-Kabīr; al-˝abarī’s Jāmiʿ al-Bayān; al-˝ūsī’s 
al-Tibyān; al-Wāªidī’s Asbāb al-Nuzūl; and al-Zamakhsharī’s al-Kashshāf. I also 
consulted several other exegeses that did not contain any further information on 
this passage of Q 24:33, which I have left off this list.
39. ʿAbd al-Razzāq, Tafsīr, 22:59–60; al-˝abarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 17:291; 
al-˝abarānī, Al-Tafsīr Al-Kabīr, 4:432; al-Wāªidī, Asbāb Al-Nuzūl, 220; Ibn 
al-Jawzī, Zād Al-Masīr, 5:381.
40. There is only one exception to this rule, a wildly composite account found 
in al-Wāªidī’s Asbāb al-Nuzūl (and erroneously attributed to Muqātil ibn 
Sulaymān) that compiles as many names and themes as possible into one 
account: ‘This verse came down regarding six slaves of ʿAbdallāh ibn Ubayy’s, 
whom he used to force to fornicate and took their wages. They were Muʿādha, 
Musayka, Umayma, ʿAmrā, ʿArwā and Qutayla. One of them came that day 
with a dinar and another came with a cloak. He said to them, go back and 
fornicate some more. They said, “By God, we won’t do it. God has brought us 
Islam and made fornication unlawful.” So they came to the Messenger of God 
(s.a.w.) and complained to him, and God revealed this verse.’ Al-Wāªidī, Asbāb 
Al-Nuzūl, 220.
41. Al-Māturīdī, Tafsīr Al-Qur’ān Al-ʿAÕīm, Al-Musammá, Ta’wīlāt Ahl Al-Sunna, 
3:461–462.
42. Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr Al-Qurʾān Al-ʿAÕīm, 10:232.
43. Al-Zamakhsharī, al-Kashshāf, 3:233.
44. The trend continues into the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries with 
al-˝abarānī 1/2; Makkī ibn Abī ˝ālib 1/1; Ibn al-Jawzī 1/3; Fakhr al-Dīn 1/3; 
Ibn Kathīr 4/10.
45. The only exegete after al-˝abarī who presents an account where the woman 
complains to ‘someone’ instead of Muªammad is Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Al-Tafsīr 
al-Kabīr, 23:220.
46. Although this reading was always popular: al-Suddī 1/1; Muqātil 1/1; al-Nasā’ī 
1/1; al-˝abarī 3/10; Fakhr al-Dīn 1/3.
47. On the canonisation of al-Bukhārī’s and Muslim’s Íaªīªayn in the fourth/tenth 
century, see Jonathan Brown, The Canonization of Al-Bukhari and Muslim.
48. Anyone keeping track of the numbers will realise that there are three texts 
left unaccounted for. The remaining three texts are vague descriptions of the 
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jāhiliyya period, found usually in non-Sunni texts. For instance, the Ibadi Hūd 
ibn al-Muªakkam writes: ‘Men used to force their slave woman (mamlūka) to 
prostitution in order to increase her children.’ Likewise, the Shii al-Qummī 
writes, ‘In the jāhiliyya they used to force their slave women to fornication, 
and they took their wages, so God revealed [this verse].’ These accounts do not 
contain stories about individual enslaved prostitutes at all.
49. Asma Afsaruddin, ‘Literature, Scholarship, and Piety’.
50. Ibid., 117.
51. It is important to note here that Asma Sayeed has found an opposite trend 
in hadith transmission – women are cut out in the third/ninth century, but 
play huge role by the eighth/fourteenth (Sayeed, Women and the Transmission 
of Religious Knowledge). These exegeses do not tell us the entire story about 
women’s participation or women’s roles in Islamic society on a grand scale. The 
restriction of women’s stories happening in my exegetical accounts particularly 
concerns women as arbiters of their own sexual ethics, and their ability to boldly 
stand up to their own oppressors – they tell us nothing about whether women 
can be hadith transmitters or contribute to society in other ways.
52. Ibn Kathīr’s reading seems to exhort men to uphold justice; however, the flip 
side is that he does not seem to recognise female agency.
53. On the concept of ‘sites of memory’, see Pierre Nora, Les Lieux De Mémoire. 
This concept has been adopted with great effect into the study of early Islamic 
historical narratives. See Antoine Borrut, Entre mémoire et pouvoir; and Sarah 
Bowen Savant, The New Muslims of Post-Conquest Iran.
54. Ibn ʿ Abd Rabbih, Al-ʿIqd al-Farīd, 3:71–72. The uncritical portrayal of Êulayma 
is one of the many problems with Al-Naimat and Al-Sweidat’s ‘Al-Bighā’’.
55. Al-Masʿūdi, Murūj al-Dhahab, ed. Charles Pellat, 3:193. The seventh-/thirteeth-
-century Shii author Ibn ˝iq†aqā repeats this story (Muªammad ibn ʿAlī Ibn 
˝iq†aqā, Al-Fakhrī fī al-Ādāb al-Sul†āniyya wa-l-Duwal al-Islāmiyya, 109–110).
56. Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 1:580. According to a hadith found in the Sunans 
of al-Nasā’ī and Abū Dā’ūd (but denounced by Aªmad ibn Óanbal as weak), a 
man reportedly came to Muªammad to complain that his wife ‘does not repel 
a groper’s hand’. Muªammad first advised him to divorce her, but upon the 
man’s protestation that he would miss her, the prophet then reportedly told him 
that he could continue to enjoy his wife, despite her promiscuity. (Abū Dāʾūd, 
Sunan, 2:220 (hadith #2,049); al-Nasā’ī, Sunan, 4:257 (hadith #3,494).)
57. The difference may also have mattered little to the qiyān.
58. For example, the search term ‘baghāya’ (prostitutes) results in twenty-one hits 
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in History works, and fourteen hits in Biography. By way of comparison, the 
term ‘jawārī’ (slave girls) results in 234 hits in History and 316 in Biography; 
the term ‘qiyān’ (courtesans) results in thirty-two hits in History and eighty-
four in Biography (and the singular qayna produces a few hundred more hits). 
The algorithm is not able to do a multi-term search for ‘umm walad’, but my 
own human brain calculates that the results are in the several hundreds, if not 
thousands.
59. El-Cheikh, ‘Describing the Other to Get at the Self’ likewise finds that Arab-
Muslim sources treat prostitution as a Christian problem.
60. Gary Leiser, Prostitution, also argues that prostitution was associated with travel-
ling merchants and soldiers garrisoned away from home.
61. Yāqūt ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Óamawī, Muʿjam al-Buldān, 4:309.
62. Rubin, ‘Al-walad li-l-firāsh’.
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began to attain adulthood and to make a marked impact on early Islamic 
society. Scholars have long noted that the Marwanid caliph ʿAbd al-Malik 
(r. 65–86/685–705) instituted many centralising, empire-building reforms 
that strongly defined the caliphate as Arab and Muslim. Scholars have viewed 
these reforms as ʿAbd al-Malik’s attempt to gain control after the Great 
Fitna (60–72/680–692), to bolster the religious legitimacy of the Umayyad 
caliphs, and to distinguish the conqueror-elites from the conquered popula-
tions (especially Christians). However, it is also during this time of contrac-
tion, of more strictly defining and controlling the boundaries of the Islamic 
polity, that some people seemed to have questioned the place of concubines’ 
children. These questions about the status of concubines’ children should not 
be viewed as prejudice against non-Arabs or Arab chauvinism, but simply as 
grappling with the grey areas and fuzzy boundaries of a community that was 
seeking to define itself more clearly. In order to be embraced as full insiders, 
concubines’ children first had to demonstrate that they were true Muslims, 
loyal to the Islamic empire and knowledgeable in religious lore. Next, in 
order to gain political power as caliphs, concubines’ children had to re-define 
themselves as full ‘Arabs’. To do so, they dismissed their mothers as essentially 
inconsequential, and they justified this dismissal by invoking paradigmatic 
examples of enslaved mothers from the Islamic religious tradition. Their lan-
guage captures a pivotal moment in Islamic history, when concubine-mothers 
became intimately entwined in rhetoric about political legitimacy and Arab 
lineage. By viewing how powerful men spoke about their enslaved mothers, 
we discover that women not only shaped early Islamic political institutions, 
but also affected the very ideologies that underlay those institutions.
Part One: Prosopography of Early Islamic Concubinage
As discussed in the previous chapter, one way to overcome the difficulties 
of the early Islamic source material is to engage in prosopography – to trace 
trends in groups by amassing large data sets, rather than focusing on indi-
vidual narrative accounts.2 Prosopography is valuable because it can reveal 
historical trends that run deeper than the level of an individual text, author 
or school of thought. It provides a big-picture, trans-historical overview of 
the ‘slow simmer’ of social change, against which to contextualise narrative 
accounts about specific people or events of early Islamic history.3
5
Concubines and their Sons: 
The Changing Political Notion of Arabness
Unlike prostitutes, who are mostly marginalised in the source material, concubine-mothers (umm walads) are ubiquitous; they lurk behind the 
scenes as nameless mothers and take centre stage as queens. The sources had to 
acknowledge concubines because they were contributing so much to Islamic 
society – in this case, they were contributing children, and particularly sons.1 
Concubine-mothers and their sons must be viewed together, for questions 
regarding the son’s position in society are tied to the mother’s identity, and 
the mother herself gains a special status by bearing children. Mothers and 
sons are also connected in terms of changing political ideologies: the rise of 
the concubine-born caliph in the mid-second/eighth century is soon accom-
panied by the rise of the powerful concubine-queen. Thus, in this chapter, 
I analyse enslaved mothers and their sons together in order to elucidate 
how social identities and political ideologies were changing in the Umayyad 
period. First, I trace changing rates of concubinage and concubines’ birth-
rates across a large data set, in order to reveal the underlying demographic 
trends that were impelling social and political change. Second, I closely read 
historical narratives that first highlight the liminality or questionable status of 
‘mixed-breed’ children born to enslaved mothers, and then resolve this ten-
sion by championing such children as true Muslims and full Arabs.
Based on these two forms of analysis, I argue that questions about 
the identity of concubine-born men only arose in the Marwanid period 
(64–132/684–749), not earlier. Muslim men had used concubines from the 
first decades of Islam and showed no concern to keep their bloodlines ‘pure’. 
It was not until the Marwanid period that large numbers of these children 
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began to attain adulthood and to make a marked impact on early Islamic 
society. Scholars have long noted that the Marwanid caliph ʿAbd al-Malik 
(r. 65–86/685–705) instituted many centralising, empire-building reforms 
that strongly defined the caliphate as Arab and Muslim. Scholars have viewed 
these reforms as ʿAbd al-Malik’s attempt to gain control after the Great 
Fitna (60–72/680–692), to bolster the religious legitimacy of the Umayyad 
caliphs, and to distinguish the conqueror-elites from the conquered popula-
tions (especially Christians). However, it is also during this time of contrac-
tion, of more strictly defining and controlling the boundaries of the Islamic 
polity, that some people seemed to have questioned the place of concubines’ 
children. These questions about the status of concubines’ children should not 
be viewed as prejudice against non-Arabs or Arab chauvinism, but simply as 
grappling with the grey areas and fuzzy boundaries of a community that was 
seeking to define itself more clearly. In order to be embraced as full insiders, 
concubines’ children first had to demonstrate that they were true Muslims, 
loyal to the Islamic empire and knowledgeable in religious lore. Next, in 
order to gain political power as caliphs, concubines’ children had to re-define 
themselves as full ‘Arabs’. To do so, they dismissed their mothers as essentially 
inconsequential, and they justified this dismissal by invoking paradigmatic 
examples of enslaved mothers from the Islamic religious tradition. Their lan-
guage captures a pivotal moment in Islamic history, when concubine-mothers 
became intimately entwined in rhetoric about political legitimacy and Arab 
lineage. By viewing how powerful men spoke about their enslaved mothers, 
we discover that women not only shaped early Islamic political institutions, 
but also affected the very ideologies that underlay those institutions.
Part One: Prosopography of Early Islamic Concubinage
As discussed in the previous chapter, one way to overcome the difficulties 
of the early Islamic source material is to engage in prosopography – to trace 
trends in groups by amassing large data sets, rather than focusing on indi-
vidual narrative accounts.2 Prosopography is valuable because it can reveal 
historical trends that run deeper than the level of an individual text, author 
or school of thought. It provides a big-picture, trans-historical overview of 
the ‘slow simmer’ of social change, against which to contextualise narrative 
accounts about specific people or events of early Islamic history.3
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Two recent works of prosopography have particularly inspired this chap-
ter. Asad Q. Ahmed’s analysis of five elite families of the early Islamic Hijaz 
reveals how important cognate (maternal) tribal ties were to early Islamic 
politics.4 Ahmed also shows that these cognate ties not only linked people 
with their own mothers’ clans, but also with the clans of their maternal 
grandmothers, as well as with their uterine brothers (half-siblings through 
the mother) and their mother’s clans. That is, cognate ties did not form a 
single, straight branch of a family tree, but a dense shrubbery of connections. 
Additionally, Majied Robinson has analysed al-Zubayrī’s (d. ca. 235/850) 
Nasab Quraysh (The Genealogy of Quraysh) to reveal trends in early Islamic 
concubinage.5 He shows that Muslims – including the Umayyads – practised 
concubinage from the very beginning of the Islamic conquests, and that there 
was no apparent prejudice against bearing children from enslaved women. 
He likewise finds that the ‘late emergence of the concubine-born caliph was 
not a result of discrimination, but a consequence of structural changes to the 
network of relationships which constituted the Muslim polity’.6
In this section, I complement Ahmed’s and Robinson’s prosopographi-
cal analyses by exploring concubinage practices in Ibn Saʿd’s (d. 230/845) 
Al-˝abaqāt al-Kubrā. I find that the height of concubinage occurs in the 
fourth generation of Muslims, or roughly the late Marwanid period. I also 
find that concubinage is a more dynamic practice than marriage – more 
liable to fluctuate depending on historical circumstances. Finally, I find that 
the Hāshim clan of Quraysh relied the most heavily on concubinage, and 
it appears to have embraced the practice of concubinage earlier than other 
clans. The following analysis draws out the ramifications of these findings for 
early Islamic society, politics and law.
The Source: Ibn Saʿd’s ˝abaqāt
Several criteria recommend Ibn Saʿd’s al-˝abaqāt al-Kubrā for prosopographi-
cal research.7 First, it was penned sometime in the early third/ninth century, 
making it a relatively early source. Second, its roughly chronological organisa-
tion into †abaqat, or generations, makes it convenient for historical analysis. 
It is easier to trace change over time in Ibn Saʿd’s ˝abaqāt than, for instance, 
al-Balādhurī’s (d. 278/892) massive, mostly tribally organised Ansāb al-Ashrāf. 
Third, it provides fairly extensive genealogical information for many of its 
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entries. Unlike Ibn al-Kalbī’s (d. 204/819) Jamharat al-Nasab (Compendium 
of Genealogy), for instance, which often only lists people’s prominent male 
offspring, Ibn Saʿd lists all known offspring. Finally, unlike works that only 
trace the genealogies of Quraysh, such as al-Zubayrī’s Nasab Quraysh, Ibn Saʿd 
also traces the lineages of the An‚ār, and a few tribes allied with Quraysh or the 
An‚ār. As such, his work allows for at least some comparison of tribal practice.
However, Ibn Saʿd’s ˝abaqāt is not a perfect source. Despite its wide 
geographical coverage, it unfortunately only provides complete genealogical 
information for people who lived in Medina.8 Additionally, it only mentions 
genealogical information for Quraysh and the An‚ār, making it impossible to 
extend the analysis to other Arabian tribes. Finally, Ibn Saʿd focuses almost 
entirely on hadith transmitters and legal scholars, excluding the genealogies 
of more secular warriors, aristocrats and politicians.9 His work does not paint 
a sharp image of all Muslims in the early Islamic empire, but an incomplete 
and impressionistic image of the religio-tribal elites of Medina. Nevertheless, 
these impressionistic insights help scholars better understand the deep cur-
rents of social change that underlie early Islamic history.
Structuring the Data
Ibn Saʿd organises his work around ‘generations’, which are technically levels 
of hadith transmission. Generation one comprises the Íaªābīs (Companions) 
who knew Muªammad. Generation two includes people who transmit-
ted from one of Muªammad’s oldest Companions, and generation three 
includes people who transmitted from a younger Companion or child of a 
Companion.10 Generations four, five and six include people who transmit-
ted from the previous generations. However, the exact chronology of these 
generations is unclear. For instance, someone from the first generation of 
Companions might have been ten years old, or seventy years old, when 
Muªammad began his career. Likewise, Ibn Saʿd does not provide death 
dates for many of his entries, making it impossible to provide clear param-
eters for the beginning and end of each generation. In order to make the 
chronological analysis possible, I have delineated each generation using a 
representative range of death dates (see Table 5.1).11 These generations have 
porous boundaries and overlap to some degree, and this scheme should be 
taken as a general guideline rather than a perfectly accurate chronometer.
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For each of Ibn Saʿd’s entries on the people of Medina, I entered the 
following information into a database (see Table 5.2).12 To help illustrate 
this method, I provide here a typical example of an Ibn Saʿd entry, translated 
into a database entry (see Table 5.3). I have added bold font to guide the 
reader.
#662: Saʿīd ibn Saʿd ibn ʿUbāda ibn Dulaym ibn Óāritha ibn Abī 
Óazīma ibn Thaʿlaba ibn ˝arīf ibn al-Khazraj ibn Sāʿida ibn Kaʿb ibn 
Khazraj. His mother is Ghuzayya bint Saʿd ibn Khalīfa ibn al-Ashraf 
ibn Abī Óazīma ibn Thaʿlaba ibn ˝arīf ibn al-Khazraj ibn Sāʿida ibn Kaʿb 
ibn Khazraj. Saʿīd ibn Saʿd bore Shuraªbīl, Khālid, Ismāʿīl, Zakariyyā’, 
Muªammad, ʿAbd al-Raªmān, Óaf‚a, and ʿĀ’isha – their mother is 
Buthayna bint Abī al-Dardā’ ʿUwaymir ibn Zayd ibn Qays ibn ʿĀ’isha 
ibn Umayya ibn Mālik ibn ʿĀmir ibn ʿAdī ibn Kaʿb ibn al-Khazraj ibn 
al-Óārith ibn al-Khazraj. [Saʿīd ibn Saʿd also bore] Yūsuf – his mother 
is Umm Yūsuf Bint Hammām from the Banī Na‚r ibn Muʿāwiya of 
Hawzān. [Saʿīd ibn Saʿd also bore] Yaªyā, ʿUthmān, Ghuzayya, ʿAbd 
al-ʿAzīz, Umm Abān, and Umm al-Banīn, to various umm walads.13
Many entries (including this one) indicate that a man’s children were born 
to ‘various umm walads’. In such a case, I always take the fewest number of 
umm walads to be three, since the Arabic plural indicates at least this number. 
I take the greatest number of umm walads to be the total number of children 
born to these ‘various umm walads’, as each of these children might have been 
born to a different umm walad. In Saʿīd ibn Saʿd’s case, that number is six. 
Averaging these minimum (3) and maximum (6) numbers gives the result 
of 4.5.
The Chronological View: Change over Time
After compiling this database, perhaps the simplest snapshot of a changing 
early Islamic society comes from the percentage of children born to umm 
walads in each generation (see Figure 5.1). As Majied Robinson has also 
shown, the first generation of Muslims used umm walads to bear children 
(I find 16 per cent total, while Robinson finds 12 per cent). This finding 
challenges those scholars who have claimed that procreation with concu-
bines was abhorrent to the early generations of Muslims.14 The percentage 
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then doubles between the first and second generations, and it continues 
to grow until it reaches its height of 44 per cent in generation four (which 
corresponds roughly to the late Marwanid period, 720–740 CE).15 The expla-
nation for this growing percentage is fairly straightforward: the Islamic 
conquests brought in huge numbers of concubines who bore children for 
their conqueror-masters.
More intriguing is the precipitous drop in generation five, which roughly 
corresponds to the period of the Abbasid revolution. Perhaps the late-
Umayyad tribal breakdown, the turmoil of the Third Fitna and the Abbasid 
revolution simply caused widespread social disruption – for there is also a 
drop in the number of wives and children at this time. However, the fact that 
the percentage of concubines’ children remains relatively low in generation 
six perhaps hints at a more lasting social change rather than a revolutionary 
disruption. It seems likely that, as the major conquests of the Umayyad ‘jihad 
state’ ended with Hishām’s reign around generation four, men simply had 
access to fewer umm walads in the early Abbasid polity.16 There was probably 
a shift away from taking huge numbers of prisoners of war as concubines, and 
towards the more routinised slave trade of the Abbasid period.17 Umm walads 
still existed as a prominent part of elite society, but they were not as prevalent 
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Figure 5.1 Percentage of children born of umm walads (UWs)
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In addition to tracing overall rates of concubinage, one of the goals 
of this research was to determine whether marriage and concubinage were 
complementary or competing practices. To answer this question, I calculated 
the overall numbers of free wives and concubines in every generation, and I 
then adjusted these total numbers to account for sample size.18 What these 
adjusted numbers show in a practical sense is how many children, wives and 
concubines any individual man had, on average (see Figure 5.2):
According to this data, marriage and concubinage were independent 
reproductive strategies; they did not compete with each other. There is no 
indication that as the number of wives goes up, the number of concubines 
goes down, or vice versa. In fact, with the exception of generation two, 
marital practice generally holds quite steady. If one removes generation two 
as an anomalous data point (analysed further below), the wife data appears 
as a simple, slightly downward curve. It is the concubinage rate, not the 
marriage rate, which fluctuates wildly, leaping from small to large, large to 
small. It thus seems that marriage was a fairly stable practice – people always 
married fairly frequently and had children with those wives. On the other 
hand, concubinage was a more dynamic practice; it seems to have depended 
on a wider range of factors, such as availability of prisoners of war, or general 
political stability.
Additionally, the data indicate that marriage was usually the primary 
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Figure 5.2 Average number of free wives (FWs) and umm walads (UWs) per man
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man almost always had more wives than concubines – the notable exception 
is again generation four, when the number of concubines remarkably exceeds 
the number of wives. (This finding falls in line with the previous discussion of 
the high concubinage rates in generation four.) The primacy of marriage over 
concubinage is particularly conspicuous in generation five, when the average 
number of concubines plummets compared to the number of wives. It is 
possible that this drastic drop in concubinage in generation five represents a 
reaction to the high rate of concubinage in generation four. That is, perhaps 
widespread concubinage proved disruptive to marriage alliances and tribal 
ties in generation four, and, as a corrective measure, men in generation five 
made comparatively more marriages to try to repair weakened tribal alliances. 
Or, perhaps, this plummet merely indicates the end of the expansive conquest 
state and an end to the flood of prisoners of war, as previously discussed.
It is also worth noting that the data indicate a general reproductive boom 
in generation two (approximately 680–700 ce): the number of concubines 
leaps up, but so does the number of wives and children.19 (In generation 
one, the average man has 4.13 children; in generation two, the number more 
than doubles to 8.93 children per man.) The increasing number of wives per-
haps points to the new prestige of the Muslim conquerors, who likely made 
widespread, exogamous marriages with local elites in order to solidify their 
tribal networks and their political authority. Perhaps the Muslims were also 
trying to be fruitful and multiply, in order to gain some demographic ground 
on the vast conquered population. In any case, marriage and concubinage 
were complementary, not competing, strategies in this period of rampant 
reproduction.
The data also illuminate childbirth rates from the perspective of the wives 
and concubines themselves (see Figure 5.3). Throughout the generations, the 
average number of children per free wife is always higher than that of concu-
bines. The trend holds true even when men use large numbers of concubines 
and have many children from concubines, as in generation four.20
This finding indicates that during the first few generations of Islamic his-
tory, reproduction was one of the main goals of marriage, but reproduction 
was not one of the main goals of concubinage. Put more bluntly, concubines 
were used first and foremost for sexual pleasure, not reproduction. Men were 
likely practising coitus interruptus with their concubines, but not with their 
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free wives.21 This finding also hints that men had many more concubines than 
the data allow us to see – a concubine only appears in the data when she bears 
a child, which was probably often accidental. The other concubines who did 
not become accidentally pregnant by their masters are simply invisible, and 
we can only guess at their numbers.
Finally, it is worth noting that concubine birth rates rise above two 
children per concubine only in generations five and six (although they never 
overtake the free wives’ rates). We have already seen that a man’s average 
number of concubines also drops quite a bit in these generations (see Figure 
5.2). Put in narrative terms, in generations five and six, men have fewer 
concubines on the whole, but each individual concubine is producing slightly 
more children. It is possible that this indicates a slight shift in concubinage 
practice in early Abbasid history, a shift towards using slave concubines for 
child-bearing purposes – as something like a replacement for a wife, or a 
supplement to a wife – and not merely for sexual enjoyment purposes. Such 
a change in reproductive practice would make sense in a post-conquest world 
where concubines were not pouring in as war booty, but where each man only 
had one or two concubines throughout their entire lives who were more fully 
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QurayashFigure 5.3 Birth rates of free wives (FWs) vs umm walads (UWs)
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Tribal Practice
In addition to tracing change over time, I analysed tribal practice by breaking 
Ibn Saʿd’s data into the following categories: Hāshim of Quraysh, ʿAbd 
Shams of Quraysh, Other Quraysh (including prominent clans such as 
Zuhra, Asad and Makhzūm), Aws of the An‚ār and Khazraj of the An‚ār. In 
terms of both percentage of children born to concubines (see Figure 5.4) and 
sheer numbers of concubines (see Figure 5.5), the Hāshim clan stands out.
Overall, Hāshim has the highest percentage of concubines’ children, 
and it is the only clan to have more concubines than free wives on aver-
age. Perhaps more remarkably, Hāshim has a high concubine rate from the 
very beginning of Islamic history. Already in generation one, 27 per cent of 
Hāshim’s children come from concubines. (The next highest rate is the other 
clans of Quraysh at 14 per cent, and recall from Figure 5.1 above that the 
average rate overall from this generation is 16 per cent.) Similarly, in genera-
tion one, Hāshim has almost as many concubines as wives (1.31 wives per 
one concubine), while the other tribes in this generation have from four to 
ten times as many wives as concubines.
Hāshim’s early adoption of concubinage raises questions about the 
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Figure 5.4 Percentage of children born to umm walads according to tribe
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scholars have shown, Shii law treats the umm walad essentially as a slave – she 
may be sold, she is not automatically freed upon her master’s death, she may 
be inherited as part of her master’s estate. On the other hand, Sunni law 
treats the umm walad as inhabiting a more special and protected status – she 
may not be sold, she is automatically freed upon her master’s death and in 
some law schools she has more comforts and less menial labour.22 Did the 
Hāshim clan take many concubines during this first generation because they 
considered them to be essentially slaves? Or, conversely, did Shii law treat 
concubines essentially as slaves because this clan was making such heavy use 
of concubines? The latter seems more likely to me, working from the assump-
tion that law derives from practice. In either case, it seems to have been in the 
Hāshimīs’ vested interest to limit the concubine’s status and to maintain the 
master’s full rights over his concubinal property.
Finally, the data indicates that Quraysh had many more concubines 
overall, and many more children from concubines, than did the An‚ār. In 
the absence of other data, this finding suggests that concubinage was an elite 
political practice, with the day’s political contenders also having access to the 
most concubines. This makes sense in terms of sheer power and resources 
– the political contenders are the ones who have the most wealth and the 
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Figure 5.5 Adjusted numbers of free wives and umm walads according to tribe
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political marital alliances. Compared to the main Qurashi political families, 
who could consolidate their power by using concubines (thus excluding rival 
clans from marrying into their family and sharing their power), the relatively 
disenfranchised Aws and Kharaj needed to make strategic marital alliances in 
order to retain a modicum of political clout. Even if they could monetarily 
afford to purchase more concubines, they could not politically afford to dis-
sipate their local alliances by relying too heavily on concubinage.23
Ultimately, the demographic data indicate that concubinage is not a 
static, ‘one-size-fits-all’ practice. Rather, it is a dynamic practice that changes 
over time and across different demographics; as such, it requires dynamic, 
complex explanations, not simplistic ones. Certainly, the assertion that the 
Umayyads were Arab chauvinists who despised the children of concubines 
is overly simplistic – the Umayyad clan of ʿAbd Shams used concubines 
heavily, along with the rest of Quraysh. While the demographic data do not 
tell us much about the concubines themselves or the children they bore, 
they do provide a backdrop against which to better understand the changes 
happening in early Islamic society. Indeed, the narrative sources make it clear 
that the widespread practice of concubinage had an impact on the ideologies 
and institutions of the early Islamic period. Particularly, the narrative sources 
indicate that the children of slave mothers inhabited the liminal position of 
hajīn or ‘mixed breed’ for much of the early Islamic period; however, by the 
late Marwanid period, these children of concubines had articulated their 
belonging to the conquering elite as good Muslims and full-blooded Arabs.
Part Two: Close Narrative Analysis
While I suggest that Arab chauvinism is an overly simplistic explanation for 
the position of slave-born children in the Umayyad period, it is clear that 
some people in early Islamic society had questions about the identity and 
belonging of the children of concubines. I find that these questions (and 
their eventual resolutions) fall into three categories. First, there are legal 
questions about what practices were allowed and who could become an umm 
walad. I find evidence that early Islamic men sometimes took their wives’ 
slaves as umm walads, which would violate the later, classical Islamic defini-
tion of the umm walad. Second, there are community-defining questions 
about whether concubines’ children truly belonged to the Islamic polity, or 
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whether they instead belonged to the communities of their foreign mothers. 
I find that people first started questioning the place of umm walads’ children 
in the mid-Umayyad period, and they eventually resolved these questions 
by vindicating concubines’ children as devoted, knowledgeable and loyal 
Muslims. Finally, there are political questions about whether concubines’ 
children could become caliphs. Scholars have sometimes argued that, from 
the beginning of the Umayyad period, the Umayyads deliberately and con-
sistently barred concubines’ children from attaining the caliphate. However, 
I find that the eligibility of the concubine-born caliph is a novel question that 
arises for the first time in the Marwanid period. Moreover, the controversy 
does not divide neatly into chauvinist Umayyads versus their cosmopolitan 
opponents; the Óusaynids, Óasanids, Abbasids and Umayyads all tried out a 
variety of answers to this novel question. Eventually, late-Umayyad and early 
Abbasid actors resolved this controversy by articulating a notion of purely 
patrilineal descent, which redefined concubines’ children as full ‘Arabs’ and 
thus fully deserving of the caliphate.
Legal Theory and Historical Practice
Previous studies of umm walads have almost always focused on Islamic law.24 
Legal works are incredibly useful, but it is often difficult to know whether 
they are normative or descriptive. Thus, it is useful to find historical examples 
of practices that do not quite fit the legal mould, in order to judge how closely 
legal theory and historical practice coincide. For instance, legal sources on 
the umm walad always start from the premise that the umm walad is a female 
slave who becomes impregnated by her own master.25 However, I have found 
some historical evidence suggesting that early Islamic men sometimes took 
their wives’ slaves as their own umm walads. For example, according to Ibn 
al-Kalbī’s Jamharat al-Nasab, ʿAnbasa ibn Saʿīd ibn al-ʿĀ‚ (d. early second/
eighth century?) was born to an umm walad called ʿA‚mā’. ʿA‚mā’ belonged 
to Bint Jarīr ibn ʿAbdallāh, Saʿīd ibn al-ʿĀ‚’s wife. And yet, ʿA‚mā’ became 
Saʿīd ibn al-ʿĀ‚’s umm walad and ʿAnbasa became the legitimate, freeborn 
son of Saʿīd ibn al-ʿĀ‚ (and not a slave belonging to the estate of Bint Jarīr 
ibn ʿAbdallāh). 26
Al-Balādhurī’s Ansāb al-Ashrāf presents another, more controversial case 
involving the nobleman ʿAbdallāh ibn Khālid ibn Usayd ibn Abī al-‘Ā‚ in 
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the early Umayyad period. ʿAbdallāh ibn Khālid was married to a wealthy 
woman, Umm Óujr, who lent him a black Qazāniyya slave woman to accom-
pany him on a long journey to visit Muʿāwiya in Syria.27 When ʿAbdallāh 
and the enslaved woman returned from their journey, the woman revealed 
that she was pregnant and told Umm Óujr that the baby was ʿAbdallāh’s. 
Confronted with the accusation, ʿAbdallāh said, ‘By God, I did not sleep 
with her at all. Does someone like me sleep with someone like her?’28 The 
child, named Rashīd, was raised as Umm Óujr’s slave. The exact reason for 
ʿAbdallāh’s protestation is unclear, for he had seven other children from umm 
walads. The source hints that he was dismissive of the woman’s colour or 
place of origin, or perhaps of her menial status as a domestic labourer.29 But 
more importantly for the purposes of this chapter, the drama of the account 
revolves around the question of whether ʿAbdallāh fathered this woman’s 
child, not the fact that she belonged to Umm Óujr in the first place. The 
implication seems to be that, if he had acknowledged the child as his own, the 
slave woman would have become his umm walad and the child would have 
been known as his son (as Rashīd himself always claimed to be). While this 
practice of taking one’s wife’s slave as an umm walad does not correspond to 
classical Islamic law, it does correspond to the paradigmatic religious figure 
of Hagar, who did not actually belong to Abraham, but to Abraham’s wife 
Sarah. Hagar will appear below as a paradigmatic example of slave mother-
hood in the Islamic tradition.
Concubines’ Children as Good Muslims: Warriors and Scholars
The more pressing questions raised in the historical narratives are not about 
legal rules, but about identity and belonging. There originally seems to have 
been some confusion about how concubines’ children fit into Islamic society 
and how they contributed to its success.30 For example, al-˝abarī transmits 
an apocalyptic tradition that associates the children of slave mothers with the 
dissolution of the Umayyad caliphate. In this historically suspect account, 
the third caliph ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān sends a letter to the people, warning 
them: ‘This community will fall into innovation when three things happen: 
complete material prosperity, the attainment of adulthood by the children 
of concubines, and the recitation of the Quran by both Arabs and non-
Arabs.’31 As ʿUthmān is the ancestor of the Umayyad house and should 
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perhaps be considered the first Umayyad caliph, this account likely alludes 
to the downfall of the Umayyads. ʿUthmān presents concubines’ children 
and non-Arabs as two direct causes of this downfall – as two liminal groups 
that represent the same fear of social change or religious ‘innovation’ brought 
about by the successful conquests.32 However, non-Arabs and the children of 
concubines present slightly different problems in this account. The problem 
with the non-Arabs is that they try to read the Quran, which they apparently 
mangle with their bad pronunciations or translate into their native languages. 
The problem with the sons of concubines is not that they read the Quran 
– presumably their Arabic is good and they can recite the words correctly 
– but simply that they ‘attain adulthood’.33 Perhaps these adult concubines’ 
children cause problems by rebelling, claiming the caliphate or taking other 
political actions; but perhaps they simply cause a problem by existing, and 
thereby blurring the edges of the Islamic community.
This late-Umayyad-era worry about what would happen when the chil-
dren of concubines attained adulthood seems to reflect demographic trends 
in Ibn Saʿd’s ˝abaqāt. Ibn Saʿd provides no biographical entries in genera-
tions one or two for men who were unequivocally born of concubines.34 We 
have already seen that some men were bearing children with concubines 
from the earliest decades of Islamic history, and therefore we might expect at 
least some children of concubines to attain prominence in the first genera-
tions of Ibn Saʿd’s text. However, Ibn Saʿd also makes it clear that many 
of the children born during any generation died young, before they could 
either transmit hadiths or produce children of their own. The number of 
times Ibn Saʿd uses the phrases ‘died young’ (daraja) and ‘has no progeny’ 
(laysa lahu ʿaqb) throughout his work makes it clear that many children did 
not reach maturity. Thus, if only a minority of children in generation one 
were born of umm walads, and a high percentage of children were not living 
into adulthood, it makes sense that few or no concubine-born children 
would survive to make their marks on generation two. As the percentage of 
concubine-born children begins to skyrocket in generations two, three and 
especially four, it becomes more likely that these children would live into 
adulthood and contribute to Islamic society (and thus get their own indi-
vidual entries in Ibn Saʿd’s ˝abaqāt). I thus find it telling that ʿUthmān’s 
dire pronouncement singles out the children of concubines not as political 
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rivals or religious heretics, but simply as ‘adults’. Demographic change lies 
at the heart of this fear.
While ʿUthmān’s account identifies concubines’ children as a problem for 
Islamic society, other accounts suggest solutions to this problem. For instance, a 
previously under-appreciated apocalyptic account raises the possibility that con-
cubines’ children were suspicious outsiders with possible ties to the Byzantine 
enemy; however, this account ultimately vindicates these ‘half-bloods’ (hujanā’) 
as valuable contributors to Islamic society. This account comes from the Kitāb 
al-Fitan (Book of Tribulations) by Nuʿaym ibn Óammād (d. 228/843), which 
contains valuable apocalyptic material from early Islamic Syria. Nuʿaym’s 
account describes a mythical, ultimate showdown between the Byzantines and 
the Muslims. The two sides reach a stalemate, at which point the Byzantines 
and Muslims exchange the following words:
The Byzantines will say: ‘Leave our land to us, and return to us every 
“red” (ªamrā’) and half-blood (hajīn) among you, as well as the children 
of concubines (banū sarārī).’ The Muslims will say: ‘Whoever wants to will 
join you and whoever wants to will defend his religion and himself.’ The 
half-bloods and concubines’ children and ‘reds’ will become angry, and they 
will give the banner [of leadership] to one of the ‘reds’ – he is the author-
ity which Abraham and Isaac promised would be brought at the end of 
time. They will pledge allegiance to him, then they will fight the Byzantines 
alone, and they will defeat the Byzantines. The settled Arabs and their 
hypocrites will fly away to the Byzantines when they see the victory of the 
mawālī over the Byzantines . . .35
While apocalyptic material should not be taken as strictly historical, it nev-
ertheless reveals the attitudes of its transmitters and its intended audience. 
This account uses shifting vocabulary to describe the groups involved in the 
battle: ‘reds’,36 half-bloods and children of concubines at the beginning of 
the account, and mawālī at the end of the account. In other versions of this 
account, the Byzantines instead ask the Muslims to return their non-Arabs 
(ʿajam),37 ‘those other than you’ (ghayrakum)38 and ‘those whose origins are 
among us [Byzantines] (alladhīna a‚luhum minnā)’.39 This semantic slippage 
indicates that the status of the concubines’ children was initially just as 
unclear and liminal as the status of foreigners and mawālī.
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The ‘Muslims’ in this account (presumably meaning Syrian/Arabian 
tribesmen) seem perfectly willing to let their liminal brethren return to the 
Byzantine side. In one variant account, the Muslims even explicitly command 
the liminal members to ‘join the Byzantines’.40 The question at the heart of 
this apocalyptic drama is not whether the children of concubines are good, 
noble or capable. Rather, the question is whether the ‘half-bloods’ and con-
cubines’ children are truly loyal to the Islamic empire. The accusation seems 
to be that half-bloods might actually belong to the Byzantines – that their 
mothers are Byzantine Christians, and that the half-bloods may be unduly 
influenced by Greek and/or Christian ideas. Moreover, as Asad Q. Ahmed 
has shown that motherhood ties were important and that ‘cognate pull’ was 
strong among the early Muslim elite, it makes sense that Arabian tribesmen 
would assume a concubine’s son might want to move to his motherland or 
might find a natural set of allies among his maternal kin.
In Nuʿaym’s account, the liminal Muslims themselves insist that their 
religion trumps their ethnic origins, mother’s identities or previous cultural 
traditions. In fact, the half-bloods turn the tide of battle in the Muslims’ 
favour; the concubines’ children are the saviours of Islam. The moral of the 
story is that the children of concubines truly belong to the Islamic world, as 
committed Muslims and loyal soldiers of the Islamic empire. Perhaps the 
‘leader of the reds’ in this account is even meant to be Maslama ibn ʿAbd 
al-Malik, the famously brilliant concubine-born general who waged success-
ful military campaigns against the Byzantines in 88–95/707–714 and even 
laid siege to Constantinople in 98–99/717–718.41 In any case, this account 
appears to be a late-Umayyad tale, and it makes sense that such questions 
were arising during this period, when the children of concubines were attain-
ing maturity.
In addition to proving themselves in battle, the Umayyad-era hujanā’ 
could apparently prove themselves through scholarship. The Syrian historian 
Ibn ʿAsākir transmits the following account on the authority of Abū al-Zinād 
(d. 130/747–748):
The people of Medina used to be reluctant to take umm walads, until there 
grew up among them the Quran-reciting gentlemen: ʿAlī ibn al-Óusayn 
ibn ʿAlī ibn Abī ˝ālib [d. 95/713], al-Qāsim ibn Muªammad ibn Abī 
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Bakr al-Íiddīq [d. ca. 102/720], and Sālim ibn ʿAbdallāh ibn ʿUmar ibn 
al-Kha††āb [d. ca. 106/725], the jurisprudents. They surpassed the people of 
Medina in knowledge, godliness, worship, and piety. Thereafter, the people 
wanted concubines (al-sarārī).42
The three men named in this account are grandchildren of three so-called 
‘Rightly Guided’ caliphs of the Sunni tradition (ʿAlī, Abū Bakr and ʿUmar, 
respectively), who had been some of the Prophet Muªammad’s closest com-
panions and supporters. Moreover, these grandchildren all lived in Medina 
in the late first/seventh and early second/eighth century (that is, the early 
Marwanid period), which is presented here as the historical turning point in 
people’s attitudes towards slave mothers.43 Finally, all three of these men are 
most famous in the Sunni tradition for their great Islamic knowledge, their 
transmission of hadiths and their mastery of jurisprudence. This account 
therefore highlights the egalitarian teachings of Islam as the great social 
equaliser that changed the status of slave mothers and their children in the 
Umayyad period.
Nuʿaym and Ibn ʿAsākir both present something like a ‘Great Man’ 
model of social change. According to this model, early Islamic society was 
widely prejudiced against the ‘mixed-breed’ children of enslaved concubines, 
until great warriors and scholars emerged to challenge those beliefs. Until the 
mid-twentieth century, researchers often accepted such a ‘great man’ model 
of social change at face value, rather than as a particular narrative strategy. 
However, the authors of our Arabic-Islamic source material had a vested 
interest in presenting great individuals as the source of historical change. 
These authors were the ‘great men’ of their own societies, and they had little 
incentive to consider seriously the indirect influence of women and slaves. 
Talented men may indeed have been important in changing Umayyad-era 
attitudes, but great men do not emerge from nowhere, and they only become 
‘great’ if wider social and political systems allow them to be considered as 
such. I suggest that a more compelling explanation for the changing status of 
the hujanā’ emerges from Ibn Saʿd’s prosopographical data, which indicates 
that the appearance of concubine-born men such as Maslama ibn ʿAbd 
al-Malik and these ‘Quran-reciting gentlemen’ is an effect of already-rising 
concubine rates, not a cause of rising concubine rates. Ultimately, these ques-
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tions about the role of concubines’ children only come into sharp focus in 
the Marwanid period because it is only then that enough concubine-born 
children are actually surviving into adulthood to have an impact on Islamic 
society and politics.
Concubine-born Caliphs
Scholars have long noted that the political fortunes of slave-born men 
increased between the Umayyad and Abbasid periods. All the so-called 
‘Rightly Guided’ caliphs and almost all the Umayyad caliphs were born of 
free Arabian mothers; conversely, the last three Umayyad caliphs and the vast 
majority of the Abbasid caliphs were born of slave concubines. For many 
decades, scholars explained this change by claiming that the Umayyads were 
Arab chauvinists who despised ignoble ‘half-bloods’, while the Abbasids were 
cosmopolitan thinkers who embraced the egalitarian teachings of Islam.44 
However, more recently, scholars such as Majied Robinson have convinc-
ingly challenged this view. It is clear that members of the Umayyad family 
used concubines widely from the first decades of Islamic history; moreover, 
Umayyad concubines’ children could become famous scholars, generals and 
governors, and they could also make marriages with freeborn noblewomen.45 
It is not as though concubine-born children were being kept in ashamed 
seclusion. Rather, it is only the caliphate itself that the children of enslaved 
mothers did not achieve until the 120s/740s. Finally, even when concubine-
born men did begin claiming the caliphate, it was not only certain Umayyads 
who protested their claims, but also certain Óasanids. Thus, it is clear that 
a more comprehensive and satisfactory explanation is needed for the rise of 
the concubine-born caliph at the end of the Umayyad period than Umayyad 
chauvinism.
I suggest there are two possible, related, explanations for the late appear-
ance of the concubine-born caliph. One explanation, championed by Majied 
Robinson, involves the changing system of tribal politics in the late-Umayyad 
empire.46 The sources indicate that, as long as Umayyad politics was based on 
complex tribal networks, the children of slave mothers were never considered 
suitable caliphal candidates. This was not necessarily because they were con-
sidered genetically inferior to their ‘pure blood’ siblings,47 but because they 
lacked the maternal kinship ties needed in a tribal system.48 For example, the 
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sources highlight this aspect of tribal politics during the reign of the second 
Umayyad caliph, Yazīd I ibn Muʿāwiya (r. 60–64/680–683). His own mother 
was from the powerful tribe of Kalb, granting him important maternal kin-
ship ties that might explain why he was nominated for the caliphate over 
his older half-brother, whose mother was from Quraysh. When Yazīd died 
and the Umayyad family fought over who should become the next caliph, 
a powerful leader of the Kinda tribe urged his kinsmen to support Yazīd’s 
young son Khālid: ‘Come, let us pledge allegiance to this young man whose 
father we begat, for he is descended from one of our women . . . Accept the 
authority of Khālid, the descendent of a woman of your own tribe.’49
However, as the Arabian tribesmen gradually migrated to the garrison 
towns and frontiers – away from their wives, mothers, other kin groups – 
these tribal ties ceased to operate and were replaced by other types of political 
networks, most notably military factionalism.50 This factionalism was not 
based on tribal kinship ties, but on the ideology of shared descent through 
the paternal line from one of two distant ancestors: Qaª†ān for the Southern 
faction, ʿAdnān for the Northern faction. The sources imply that it was a great 
political detriment to have a father from one faction and a mother from the 
other faction, for one’s allegiance would become hopelessly split. For instance, 
when the slave-born revolutionary Yazīd III ibn al-Walīd (r. 126/744) seised 
the caliphate, he imprisoned two of his young cousins and political rivals. One 
of these cousins, al-Óakam ibn al-Walīd II (d. 126/744), whose mother was a 
free Arabian tribeswoman, composed these bitter lines in prison:
Did you renounce your pledge of allegiance to me because of my mother?
You have sooner pledged allegiance to a half-blood.
Would that my maternal uncles were not from Kalb
And had been born to some other tribe.51
Most of Yazīd III’s supporters came from the Southern factions of Kalb and 
Yaman, while the supporters of the deposed caliph al-Walīd II (and his son 
al-Óakam here) were predominantly from the Northern factions of Qays 
and Mu∂ar.52 It seems that these Northerners were reluctant to throw their 
full support behind a young man whose mother was from the rival faction 
of Kalb. They would rather pledge allegiance to a concubine’s son than to a 
man with ties to the wrong faction. In this new factional context, the sources 
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indicate that being the child of a slave mother could prove a political boon 
rather than a burden.
This factional explanation for the increasing political prospects of slave-
born men raises the ‘chicken and the egg’ question: did the increasing power 
of slave mothers’ children give rise to factionalism, or did factionalism lead to 
the increasing power of slave mothers’ children? I suggest that both processes 
worked together as a kind of political feedback loop. Demographic changes 
(including the influx of female slaves into the Islamic polity) were likely the 
root cause of tribal breakdown and the rise of factionalism. But, in turn, the 
system of political factionalism created new opportunities for the children 
of slave mothers, who no longer relied on tribal ties for their power. This 
feedback loop skewed the political system ever more in favour of the children 
of slave mothers, creating a system in which they could not only reign as 
caliphs, but were eventually preferred as caliphal candidates.53
Another explanation for the rise of the slave-born caliph involves chang-
ing imperial marriage practices. Scholars who study other pre-modern con-
texts have shown that, as leading families amass political power, they change 
their marital practices. When they begin as petty regional kings, these families 
marry widely in order to cement their alliances and gain political support. 
For instance, the Spanish Umayyads married with local Christians, the early 
Ottomans married with local tribes and the Sufyanids married widely with 
Kalb.54 However, as such leading families gain more power relative to other 
noble families, they begin to practise more endogamy –  marrying their own 
relatives, especially cousins. This practice prevents competing clans from 
hijacking the leading family’s power through claims of marriage and/or 
motherhood ties. For instance, Ahmed has shown that in the later Umayyad 
and early Abbasid period, elite families of Medina (particularly the Óasanids) 
increasingly practised endogamy.55 Likewise, Robinson has shown that the 
Umayyads followed this pattern of increasingly endogamous reproductive 
politics.56 Finally, as leading families transition into a truly centralised, abso-
lutist imperial dynasty, they sometimes transition away even from endogamy 
and instead rely heavily on concubinage for their reproductive politics. 
Concubinage solidifies political power not only within one clan or extended 
family, but even more tightly within one line of patrilineal descent. Such a 
reliance on concubinage is familiar from Abbasid, Spanish Umayyad and 
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Ottoman history.57 This changing reproductive practice also helps explain the 
rise of the concubine-queen herself, who gains power in the context of a cen-
tralised, bureucratic harem based on proximity to the autocratic monarch.58
No matter how this change happened, it remains that concubines’ chil-
dren rose to political prominence in the mid-second/eighth century. The 
political ascendancy of the children of slave mothers to the caliphate was 
accompanied by rhetoric about the nature of motherhood and the nature 
of lineage. For example, the first slave-born caliph, Yazīd III, exalted the 
lineage of his own enslaved mother, claiming that she was a foreign princess 
descended from great kings.59 He boasted of his doubly royal ancestry: ‘I 
am the son of Kisrā [Khusraw]; my father is Marwān. One grandfather is a 
Caesar, the other a Khāqān.’60 But I focus here on a more novel, and more 
lasting, strategy that uses two paradigmatic slave mothers from the Islamic 
religious tradition to justify the political ambitions of slave-born caliphs. 
These slave mothers are Hagar and Māriya, the enslaved concubines of the 
prophets Abraham and Muªammad, respectively.
The first man to call upon this religious model of slave motherhood is 
the revolutionary Zayd ibn ʿAlī (d. 122/740), the eponymous founder of 
the Zaydiyya sect of Shiism. Zayd might have invoked the model of Hagar 
against his own Óasanid cousin, al-Óasan ibn al-Óasan, in order to claim 
his right to the custody of ʿAlī’s estate.61 More commonly, however, Zayd is 
presented as using this rhetoric when he revolted against the Umayyad state 
in 122/740. The Umayyad caliph Hishām reportedly scoffed, ‘You claim the 
imamate [that is the caliphate] when your mother is a slave? The imamate 
is not suitable for the children of slave women.’62 The sources record several 
variations of Zayd’s reply to Hishām, but he always reminds Hishām that 
Ishmael was born of a slave woman (Hagar), and that God chose Ishmael as 
both a Prophet and the ancestor of Muªammad. For instance, in al-Yaʿqūbī’s 
(d. ca. 292/905) Tārīkh (History), Zayd says:
Woe to you! The status of my mother puts me in [a good] position. By 
God, Isaac was the son of a free woman while Ishmael was the son of a slave 
woman, and God Almighty singled out the descendants of Ishmael and 
made the Arabs come from them, and that continued until the Messenger 
of God came from them. Fear God, O Hishām!63
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On its most basic level, Zayd simply invokes Ishmael and Hagar in order to 
justify his own claim to the caliphate – if God chose the slave-born Ishmael 
as a prophet, why should God not choose the slave-born Zayd as a caliph? 
But by claiming Ishmael as the ancestor of both Muªammad and ‘the Arabs’, 
Zayd is also asserting that his own slave ancestress does not dilute his Arab 
lineage – Zayd is just as much of an ‘Arab’ as Hishām. Thus, this invocation 
of Hagar does not merely elaborate the concept of prophethood, but it also 
subtly advocates a new definition of lineage that only accounts for the father, 
discounting the mother.
Some versions of Zayd’s reply to Hishām make it clear that, while this 
invocation of Hagar may have begun as a political strategy, it had broader 
ramifications for society. For instance, in al-Balādhurī’s account, Zayd 
bluntly adds: ‘Mothers serve no purpose for men other than to reach the 
goal [of bearing children].’64 Ibn ʿAsākir’s Syrian source, ʿAbd al-Aʿlā ibn 
ʿAbdallāh al-Shāmī, likewise concludes, ‘If there were some deficiency in 
umm walads, then God would not have sent Ishmael as a prophet while his 
mother was Hagar.’65 Here, mothers appear as nothing more than a means 
to an end, namely the passing along of the paternal lineage. Hagar was 
simply an instrument that God gave Abraham to provide him with a son. By 
implication, mothers do not affect caliphal lineage, Arab lineage or any kind 
of lineage whatsoever. Thus, Hagar becomes a figure that any concubine-born 
man could use to defend his lineage and define himself as a ‘pure’ Arab. Ibn 
Qutayba (d. 276/889) indicates as much when he defends Hagar – as the 
mother of the Arabs – from the insults of Persian ‘bigots’ and ‘apostates’. 66 
Ibn Qutayba’s defence of Hagar is divorced from its original political context 
of debates about the caliphate, and it has been extended into the notion that 
‘Arabs’ can be born of concubines and still be noble and pure.
Although Zayd’s revolt of 122/740 failed, the question of whether a 
slave-born man could legitimately hold the caliphate remained open. 
Twenty years later, the second Abbasid caliph Abū Jaʿfar al-Man‚ūr (r. 136–
158/754–775) also defended his right to rule as the son of a slave woman. 
In this case, the Óasanid revolutionary Muªammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya (‘The 
Pure Soul’, d. 145/762) challenged al-Man‚ūr’s right to rule and claimed his 
own political authority. Al-Nafs al-Zakiyya bragged that he was ‘the centre 
of the Hāshimites in terms of genealogy’, and he added, ‘I am the purest of 
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both mother and father – the non-Arabs have put down no roots in me.’67 
Al-Man‚ūr, whose own mother was an umm walad, responded by calling 
upon the family of the Prophet Muªammad:
You are proud that the non-Arabs never bore you, meaning that you have 
no blood from umm walads. But you have boasted over someone who is 
better than you in genealogy from beginning to end: Ibrāhīm [Abraham], 
the son of the Messenger of God (peace be upon him), whose mother was 
Māriya the Copt.68
Al-Man‚ūr goes on to claim that the concubine-born ʿAlī Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn 
(d. ca. 95/713) was the best of all the Alids, and he finishes by refuting 
the Shiite doctrine of descent through Fā†ima. By invoking Māriya and 
her son Ibrāhīm, al-Man‚ūr condemns al-Nafs al-Zakiyya’s concern about 
‘non-Arab blood’ and his pride in his ‘purest’ Arabic lineage as insults to 
the Prophet Muªammad’s family. Once again, it is Ibrāhīm’s identity as 
Muªammad’s son, not as Māriya’s son, which matters – only patrilineage 
counts. Al-Man‚ūr’s invocation of Māriya likewise expands the notion of 
Arab to include anyone who was descended through the male line from an 
Arab ancestor, and this patrilineal notion of Arabness is given an Islamic 
justification – it was the Prophet’s sunna.
These invocations of Hagar and Māriya create a complex identity for 
the slave mother herself. On the one hand, Hagar and Māriya are positive 
models of slave motherhood, for they are remembered as pious and beloved 
women; perhaps such exalted models even encouraged some slave mothers to 
convert to Islam. However, the deeper effect of these invocations is to reduce 
mothers to the role of mere vessels of the male seed. Zayd and al-Man‚ūr 
highlight paradigmatic slave mothers precisely so that they can demonstrate 
that ‘mothers serve no purpose other than to reach the goal’. Thus, what 
some scholars have regarded as the Abbasids’ ‘egalitarian’ acceptance of 
concubines’ children only occurs alongside a highly un-egalitarian dismissal 
of women’s identities as inconsequential. Moreover, far from celebrating 
their foreign mothers as evidence of their cosmopolitanism, the Óusaynid 
contender Zayd ibn ʿAlī and the Abbasid caliph Abū Jaʿfar al-Man‚ūr took 
great pains to re-define themselves as true Arabs. From my perspective, this 
novel rhetorical strategy does not look like egalitarianism, but rather a re-
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articulation of patriarchal and hierarchical structures to fit a new historical 
setting.
Conclusion
Enslaved women are often overlooked as agents of historical change. 
Especially given that the Arabic-Islamic source material often mutes or 
silences slave women’s voices, it can be easy to dismiss their contributions to 
early Islamic history. However, this chapter has suggested the many ways that 
enslaved women influenced early Islamic history through the act of mother-
hood. Most directly, these women changed the demographic make-up of the 
Islamic polity. According to Ibn Saʿd’s account, by the mid-Umayyad period, 
more than one-third of all children born to Arabian noblemen were born to 
enslaved concubines. These children apparently began as liminal members 
of the Islamic community, disconnected from maternal tribal networks and 
potentially harbouring ties to the non-Muslim world through their mothers. 
They had one foot in the land of the conquerors, and one foot in the land of 
the conquered. Such liminal Muslims could demonstrate their true belonging 
to the umma either by fighting for it, or by producing Arabic-Islamic scholar-
ship. By the late second/eighth century, the sons of enslaved concubines no 
longer had to prove that they belonged to the umma or the empire, for they 
had attained the caliphate itself. In doing so, they articulated a new notion of 
Arab identity that was based entirely on patrilineage. They invoked paradig-
matic mothers from the Islamic religious tradition – Hagar and Māriya – in 
order to demonstrate that enslaved mothers were no barrier to prophethood 
or power. While the models of Hagar and Māriya tell us little about the lives, 
experiences, hopes or fears of Umayyad-era concubines, they do demonstrate 
the enormous (if indirect) impact that enslaved women had on early Islamic 
institutions and ideologies.
Notes
 1. The genealogical sources do mention the female children born to concubine 
mothers, but, unfortunately, the narrative histories do not tell us very much 
about them. More research is needed to investigate the biographies (if they 
exist) of the daughters of concubines in narratives of Umayyad history. For the 
Abbasid period, Matthew Gordon has found that fathers sometimes deliberately 
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refused to acknowledge the daughters they had with concubines, or sometimes 
even revoked their acknowledgment of paternity after initially giving it (personal 
communication with Matthew Gordon). They did this because there was a 
lucrative trade in elite, educated, enslaved women – the courtesans or qiyān 
– and these fathers thought they would do better to raise their daughters as 
enslaved qiyān than as free women.
 2. Previous scholars have fruitfully used prosopgraphy to study a number of groups 
from early Islamic history. See, for instance, Richard Bulliet, Conversion to Islam 
in the Medieval Period; Patricia Crone, Slaves on Horses; Fred Donner, ‘Tribal 
Settlement in Basra during the First Century A.H’; and Monique Bernards and 
John Nawas, ‘A Preliminary Report of the Netherlands Ulama Project (NUP)’.
 3. I take this felicitous turn of phrase from Asad Q. Ahmed, who writes: ‘[Early 
Islamic historiography] paid undue attention to even the most mundane details 
of certain events of mythological proportions . . . at the cost of our knowledge 
of the slow simmer of local histories that were the impetus behind them.’ Asad 
Q. Ahmed, The Religious Elite of the Early Islamic Óijāz, 3.
 4. Ahmed finds that ‘cognate links were at least as important as agnatic relations 
for sociopolitics on the ground’. Ahmed, Religious Elite, 13. Óayāt Qa††ā† has 
also shown how crucial matrilineal ties were in early Islamic society and politics, 
even if the Abbasid-era genealogies obscure the importance of such ties (al-’Arab 
fi al-Jāhiliyya al-Akhīra wa-al-Islām al-Mubakkir).
 5. Majied Robinson, ‘Statistical Approaches’.
 6. Majied Robinson, ‘Statistical Approaches’, 14.
 7. The best edition of this work remains the Sachau edition: Ibn Saad: Biographien 
Muhammeds, seiner Gefährten und der späteren Träger des Islams bis zum Jahre 
230 der Flucht (Leiden: Brill, 1904–1940). However, for ease of use (particu-
larly, the numbered entries), I relied on the Muªammad ʿAbd al-Qadīr ʿA†ā’ 
edition: Ibn Saʿd, Al-˝abaqāt al-Kubrā, ed. Muªammad ʿAbd al-Qadīr ʿA†ā 
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-’Ilmiyya, 1990). When faced with a textual question or 
problem, I cross-checked with the Sachau edition, but all page numbers refer to 
the ʿA†ā’ edition.
 8. I was initially excited to compare the generations from Medina, Basra, Kufa, 
Syria and Egypt. However, Ibn Saʿd rarely provides even the identity of people’s 
mothers for these entries, much less their marriages and children.
 9. For instance, Ibn Saʿd lists no progeny in the entry of the famous (and famously 
procreative) Makhzumi warrior, Khālid ibn al-Walīd. There is no entry at all for 
the Umayyad caliph Hishām ibn ʿAbd al-Malik.
 concubines and their sons  | 133
10. For example, people from generation two transmitted from the likes of Abū 
Bakr, ʿUmar, ʿUthmān, ʿAlī, al-Zubayr and Talªa. People from generation 
three transmitted from people such as ʿĀ’isha, ʿAbdallāh ibn ʿUmar and Usāma 
ibn Zayd.
11. Robinson uses a different method for defining generations, based on levels of 
descent from a common ancestor within Quraysh (see Robinson, ‘Statistical 
Approaches’, 14.) Our generations nevertheless appear to correspond nicely, 
with my generation one matching up with his generation five, my generation 
two with his generation six and so forth.
12. I also included children’s names, wives’ names and tribes, and umm walads’ 
names and/or descriptors (when given). However, I include here only the perti-
nent information used in the data analysis.
13. Ibn Saʿd, ˝abaqāt, 5:59–60.
14. For example, take Athamina’s unequivocal and largely unsupportable state-
ments that ‘the Arab aristocracy was appalled at the idea of their daughters’ 
marrying princes born to mothers who were umm walad ’, and ‘[the sons of 
concubines] were not accepted by the Arab society’. Khalil Athamina, ‘How 
did Islam Contribute’, 195–196. Robinson provides an admirable review and 
critique of the previous literature expounding Umayyad prejudice against umm 
walads and their children, ‘Statistical Approaches’, 12–14.
15. Similarly, Robinson finds a peak of 42.41 per cent concubines’ children in this 
generation (which is his generation eight). Robinson, ‘Statistical Approaches’, 
18.
16. I take this phrase from Khalid Yahya Blankinship, The End of the Jihād State.
17. On slavery and the slave trade in the Abbasid period, see Matthew Gordon, 
‘Introduction’, 4–6 and ‘Preliminary Remarks on Slaves and Slave Labor’; Fuad 
Matthew Caswell, The Slave Girls of Baghdad; and Julia Bray, ‘Men, Women and 
Slaves in Abbasid Society’.
18. The sample sizes for each generation are as follows: generation one (171), gen-
eration two (71), generation three (100), generation four (51), generation five 
(84) and generation six (35). When presented in absolute terms, these numbers 
can be misleading; for instance, it might appear that there was a massive drop in 
concubinage in generation two, when in fact there was merely a drop in the total 
number of entries.
19. This reproductive boom does not necessarily indicate overall population growth, 
as the sample size for generation two is much smaller than generation one.
20. There are of course individual exceptions to this rule, such as ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd 
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al-ʿAzīz, who reportedly had nine children from a single concubine. However, 
the data bears out the general rule that an individual wife had more children, on 
average, than an individual umm walad.
21. Free wives had a legal right to procreative sex; their husbands could only perform 
coitus interruptus or use other forms of birth control with their wives’ permission. 
Men needed no such permission from their concubines, who had no legal right 
to procreative sex. See Kecia Ali, Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam, 166; and 
Basim Musallam, Sex and Society in Islam, especially Chapter 2, ‘Contraception 
and the Rights of Women’.
22. On the law of the umm walad, see most recently Younus Mirza, ‘Remembering 
the Umm al-Walad ’, 297–323; and Marion Katz, ‘Concubinage, in Islamic 
Law’, Encyclopedia of Islam THREE, accessed online 18 April 2019. See also 
J. Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, 264–266 and ‘Umm 
al-Walad’, EI2; Shaun Marmon, ‘Concubinage, Islamic’, Dictionary of the 
Middle Ages, 3:527–29; Baber Johansen, ‘The Valorization of the Human Body’, 
71–112; Brockopp, Early Mālikī Law; and Ali, Marriage and Slavery in Early 
Islam.
  It is worth noting that there is no clear legal precedent on the umm walad in 
the Quranic text or Prophetic practice. Legal views on the umm walad probably 
developed relatively late, in response to the Islamic conquests and their influx of 
concubines (see Brockopp, Early Mālikī Law, 155). Even after the law schools 
began to crystallise, there was never a clear consensus about the umm walad ’s 
legal status, and jurists practised their ijtihād or independent reasoning on the 
matter (see Mirza, ‘Remembering the Umm al-Walad ’).
23. The role of marriage and concubinage in reproductive politics will be discussed 
further below.
24. See the references listed above in Note 22 of this chapter.
25. An enslaved woman could not be married to her own master; if the master 
wished to marry her, he had to manumit her first. An enslaved woman could be 
married to another man (most likely another slave), but if she bore that husband 
a child, the child was legally the slave of her master. Only a child born of the 
master’s own unmarried concubine, and acknowledged by the master as his 
child, was considered freeborn. On the case of the married enslaved woman, see 
particularly Ali, Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam, Chapter 2.
26. Muªammad Ibn al-Kalbī, Jamharat Al-Nasab, 128. ʿAnbasa also appears in 
generation three of Ibn Saʿd’s ˝abaqāt, but Ibn Saʿd merely describes ʿAnbasa’s 
mother as an umm walad. Ibn Saʿd, ˝abaqāt, 5:185.
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27. Qazān is a place in Iran. The identity of this slave woman is quite unclear, for 
this account describes her alternately as black, Abyssinian, Qazaniyya, a jāriya 
(slave girl) and a qayna (a more elite form of singing slave).
28. Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5:55.
29. As Ibn Qutayba says, ‘menial servants who look after camels, gather firewood, 
draw water, do the milking, and perform similar chores’ are considered unclean. 
Ibn Qutayba, The Excellence of the Arabs, 20 (Arabic), 21 (English translation).
30. The children of concubines also appear to have had a liminal status in pre-
Islamic Arabia. There is a healthy corpus of Arabic poetry lambasting and lam-
pooning the ‘half-blood’ (hajīn) offspring of slave women, who were considered 
inferior to their ‘pure-blood’ siblings. See B. Lewis, Race and Slavery, 39–40. 
(Lewis’s discussion of the ‘half-breeds’ is provocative but not always thoroughly 
convincing.)
31. Al-˝abarī, Tārīkh, I:2,803–2,804.
32. Goldziher long ago noticed the similarity between mawālī and hujāna’ 
as subalterns or disenfranchised groups (Muslim Studies, 121 ff.) Following 
him, scholars such as Bernard Lewis, Jamal Juda and Patricia Crone have also 
noted this similarity between the two groups, although they have not deeply 
interrogated it. For instance, Crone mentions that pre-Islamic Arabian tribes-
men distinguished between full or noble (‚amīm/‚arīª) members of a tribe, 
and ‘resident protegés’ or dependent members of the tribe (often termed 
mawālī). Pre- and early-Islamic poetry suggests that anyone with servile 
origins, including the hajīn, was considered a mere ‘follower’ to an Arabian 
tribe, rather than a full tribesman (Crone, Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law, 
59–60).
33. Another account does mention specifically the Umayyads’ supposed attitude 
towards the caliphate. Ibn ʿAsākir transmits: ‘The Umayyads thought that they 
would be divested of the caliphate when the son of an umm walad ruled over 
them, so they would not give the pledge of allegiance to anyone but the son 
of a pure Arab woman (ibn ‚arīªa), until Marwān ibn Muªammad took the 
caliphate by force (ʿanwatan) – he was the son of an umm walad. Then the 
Abbasids killed him and took the caliphate from him.’ Ibn ʿAsākir, Tārīkh 
Madīnat Dimashq, 57:330. This account seems concerned only with the issue of 
imperial rule, while the ʿUthmān account cited above cites concubines’ children 
as a source of widespread ‘innovation’.
34. In my database, I only counted someone as born from an umm walad when 
Ibn Saʿd uses that specific phrase to describe their mothers. There are many 
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people whose mothers are not mentioned, or whose mothers receive unclear 
descriptions, such as ‘a woman from the Banū Taghlib’ or ‘a Roman (Rūmiyya) 
woman’. In these cases, I did not count the mother as an umm walad or as a 
free wife, but as unknown. Thus, the total number of children in my database 
is sometimes greater than the sum of free wives’ children and umm walads’ 
children. A famous example of such a case is Muªammad ibn al-Hanafiyya, 
whose mother seems to have been a prisoner of war from the Banū Hanīfa. 
Further investigation is required to figure out whether such tribal women, taken 
as prisoners of war during the first waves of conquest in Arabia, provided their 
children with cognate links into their original tribes, or whether on the other 
hand they were natally alienated from their original through enslavement.
35. Nuʿaym ibn Óammād al-Marwazī, Kitāb al-Fitan, 274–275.
36. On ‘reds’ (ªamrā’) see Lewis, Race and Slavery, 63, where he says this term 
was ‘commonly applied by the Arabs to the Iranians and later extended to 
their Central Asian neighbors’. There was also an early Islamic military corps 
known as the Óamrā’, which should not be confused with the term as it is 
used here (see, for instance, Crone, Roman Provincial and Islamic Law, 54 and 
89). In Nuʿaym’s account, aªmar/ªamrā’ seems to be used as a synonym for 
concubine’s child and half-blood – it seems to be a physical descriptor, perhaps 
referring to a child with red hair or ruddy cheeks.
37. Nuʿaym ibn Óammād al-Marwazī, Kitāb al-Fitan, 262–263.
38. Ibid., 299.
39. Ibid., 281, 290.
40. Ibid., 290.
41. On Maslama’s legacy in the Arabic-Islamic sources, see Borrut, Entre mémoire et 
pouvoir, especially Chapter 5.
42. Ibn ʿAsākir, Tārīkh Madīnat Dimashq, 20:57. A similar account in ibid., 
41:375, reads: ‘Quraysh began to prefer umm walads and to make use of them, 
after having been abstinent from them, when ʿAlī ibn al-Óusayn was born, and 
al-Qāsim ibn Muªammad ibn Abī Bakr, and Sālim ibn ʿAbdallāh ibn ʿUmar.’
43. Khalil Athamina also notes this point in his article, ‘How did Islam Contribute’, 
396.
44. The fact that authors such as Goldziher saw the widespread use of concubinage 
as more ‘egalitarian’ than relying on free marriages for procreation indicates that 
people have different definitions of ‘egalitarian’.
45. For example, Muªammad ibn Marwān married two noblewomen (one from 
ʿAbd Shams, one from ʿAdī ibn Kaʿb); ʿUbaydallāh ibn ʿAbdallāh ibn ʿUmar 
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married two Taymi noblewomen; ʿAnbasa ibn Saʿīd ibn al-ʿĀ‚ married widely 
and exogamously. These examples all contravene Athamina’s claim that the 
aristocracy would have recoiled in horror at such unions; see Note 14 of this 
chapter.
46. As noted above, see Note 6 of this chapter.
47. Although, this viewpoint was certainly advanced in certain Arabic poetry of the 
pre-Islamic and early Islamic period.
48. Natal alienation, or an absence of family ties, is one of the hallmarks of slavery 
across societies; see Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death, 7–8. Even 
though William Robertson Smith views marriage in Arabia as tantamount to 
slavery, he nevertheless admits that the difference between true slavery and 
marriage is that a wife ‘continued to have a claim on the help and protec-
tion of her own people’. Robertson Smith, Kinship and Marriage, 122, 129. 
For a discussion of the importance of maternal kinship ties in tribal systems, 
see Ahmed, Religious Elite; Conte, ‘Agnatic Illusions’; Juda, ‘Die sozialen und 
wirtschaftlichen Aspekte der Mawālī’, 175.
49. Al-˝abarī, Tārīkh, II:475.
50. Robertson Smith, Kinship and Marriage, 130, points out that if a free woman’s 
kinship networks are important for the proper functioning of the tribal system, 
then moving her out away from the main area of her kinsmen – out to Khurasan, 
for instance – would effectively nullify the political and social benefits of her 
kinship groups for her and her husband alike.
51. Al-˝abarī, Tārīkh, II:1,892.
52. See G. R. Hawting, First Dynasty, 93.
53. For example, in the Abbasid system, almost all the caliphs were the sons of con-
cubines. Leslie Peirce has also investigated the transition in Ottoman dynastic 
politics from free wives to slave concubines (Peirce, Imperial Harem, 28–56).
54. Moreover, all five families that Ahmed studied in his Religious Elite married 
exogamously in their first generation and moved gradually towards endogamy 
over time.
55. On Óasanid endogamy, see Ahmed, Religious Elite, Chapter 5 (particularly 
pages 148–166).
56. Robinson, ‘Statistical Approaches’, 19–20.
57. On the Spanish Umayyads’ transition from exogamy to endogamy to concubi-
nage, see Simon Barton, Conquerors, Brides, and Concubines, Chapter 1; on the 
same pattern in the Ottoman world, see Peirce, Imperial Harem, Chapter 2.
58. For more on the harem system, particularly Peirce, Imperial Harem. See also 
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Chapter 6 of this book; and Urban, ‘Gender and Slavery in Islamic Political 
Thought’, and the sources cited therein.
59. This rhetorical technique was also applied, probably some time later, to the 
fourth Shii imam, ʿAlī ibn al-Óusayn Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn. On this phenomenon, 
see Amir-Moezzi, ‘Šahrbanu’, Encyclopaedia Iranica, an excellent article that 
focuses on the Persian legend of Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn’s mother. Because of the 
unknown provenance of most captive women and slaves, some concubines in 
history have been recast as ‘secret princesses’. A famous example of this phenom-
enon is Nakhshidil (d. 1817 CE), the concubine queen mother of the Ottoman 
Sultan Mahmud II; according to legend, Nakshidil was actually Aimée du Buc, 
a French heiress and cousin of Empress Josephine who had been captured as a 
young girl by Barbary Pirates. See Isom-Verhaaren, ‘Royal French Women in 
the Ottoman Sultans’ Harem’.
60. Al-˝abarī, Tārīkh II:1,874. Moreover, when the man who bought her asked 
whether any child of hers would be half-blooded, the surrounding people 
answered him: ‘Yes, he will be half-blooded through his father.’ Al-˝abarī, 
Tārīkh, II:1,247.
61. Al-˝abarī, Tārīkh, II:1,672. It is worth remembering that it was not only the 
Umayyads who seem to have excluded concubine-born men from the highest 
echelons of power. The Óasanids seem to have believed that, in order to be 
considered ‘noble’, a man’s mother and the father had to be highborn; it is 
unclear whether this was because they were a tribal aristocracy, or because 
their own claim to religio-political authority rested on the identity of a mother 
(Fā†ima). In any case, al-Óasan ibn al-Óasan’s son, Muªammad al-Nafs al-
Zakiyya, would soon make a bit for power in his own right.
62. Ibn ʿAsākir, Tārīkh Madīnat Dimashq, 19:368. ‘Imamate’ refers to the office 
combining religious and political authority over the Muslim community; in this 
context, it is synonymous with caliphate.
63. Al-Yaʿqūbī, Tārīkh, 2:390. Al-˝abarī’s account is quite similar, although it 
emphasises a bit more strongly that God preferred the slave-born Ishmael to 
the free-born Isaac – and, by implication, that God preferred Zayd to Hishām 
(al-˝abarī, Tārīkh, II:1,676.) Al-˝abarī’s account does not have a proper isnād, 
but is introduced by the vague phrase, ‘it is said’.
64. The rest of his account says, ‘The mother of Ismāʿīl was a slave, and that did not 
prevent God from sending him as a prophet, or from making him the father of 
the Arabs, or from sending out Muªammad from his loins.’ Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb 
al-Ashrāf, 7:363–364.
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65. Ibn ʿAsākir, Tārīkh Madinat Dimashq, 19:471.
66. Ibn Qutayba, The Excellence of the Arabs, 20 (Arabic), 21 (English translation).
67. Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 2:419–421; Al-˝abarī, Tārīkh, III:211–213.
68. Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 2:422; Al-˝abarī, Tārīkh, III:212–213.
140 | conquered populations in early islam
140
6
Singers and Scribes: 
The Limits of Language and Power
While the previous chapter discussed demographic changes and the impact of enslaved concubines on early Islamic ideologies, this 
chapter traces how enslaved and unfree persons accessed political power in 
the Umayyad empire. Particularly, it interrogates the ways that two unfree 
groups – courtesans and scribes – used their education, training and lin-
guistic expertise to participate in Umayyad politics. When viewed together, 
these two groups indicate that the increasing centralisation of the Umayyad 
ruling household during the Marwanid period (64–132/684–749) provided 
increased opportunities for educated slaves and freedmen to exercise political 
power. However, these subaltern groups were always in a precarious position, 
for they had to use their linguistic mastery in ways that pleased their imperial 
masters. If they did something to upset the balance of power, they could be 
dismissed or even killed without a second thought.
This chapter also analyses the complex, contested development of the 
term ‘Arab’ as it was slowly crystallising during the late Umayyad period.1 
Like the ‘mixed-breeds’ studied in the previous chapter, these courtesans 
and scribes seem to have inhabited a liminal position. But unlike the ‘mixed 
breeds’, the tensions that the courtesans and scribes raised were not so much 
about lineage – the question was not necessarily whether they had ‘non-Arab 
blood’. Rather, courtesans and scribes seem to have raised questions about 
the meaning of linguistic and cultural attributes, about the ‘cultural stuff’ 
that people use to express ethnic identity.2 These subaltern groups’ entire job 
was to master Arabic language and learning and to produce Arabic culture. 
As such, concubines and scribes represent a somewhat open, cosmopolitan 
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definition of ‘Arabness’, based on language mastery and accessible to anyone 
steeped in Arabic lore. I suggest that many Arabic-Islamic authors spill much 
ink trying to resolve the question of whether such linguistic and cultural mas-
ters are truly ‘Arabs’, although they are never able to fully resolve the issue.
Courtesans and Scribes: Two Sides of the Same Coin
Many previous scholars have separately studied either the courtesans (qiyān) 
or the secretaries (kuttāb), but I suggest that both groups can fruitfully be 
viewed together in order to illuminate these questions of language, power 
and cultural definitions of ‘Arabness’. The qiyān were enslaved women, raised 
in Arabian cultural centres such as Mecca and Medina, and trained from an 
early age to master the arts of music, dance, witty banter and Arabic poetry. 
The qiyān may have been beautiful and sexually alluring, but their real power 
lay in their language expertise. Even a physically blemished qayna could gain 
attention and win a patron through her poetic and musical skill.3 The heyday 
of the qiyān was in third–fourth/ninth–tenth century Baghdad, where they 
would perform at literary soirées attended by the notables of the day. At these 
soirées, qiyān could earn money for their performances, and they could also 
gain the favour and patronage of the powerful men (including caliphs) in 
attendance. The most talented Abbasid-era qiyān could become great celebri-
ties, such as Inān, Fa∂l and ʿArīb, the divas of their day. As for the kuttāb, 
they were bureaucrats in charge of many of the daily functions of the early 
Islamic empire, including collecting taxes and writing official correspond-
ence. Kuttāb worked on all levels of politics; they can be found serving local 
notables, regional governors and caliphs.4 By the mid-second/eighth century, 
freedmen and the descendants of freedmen (mawālī) had come to domi-
nate the bureaucracy, and two of these mawlā-secretaries – ʿAbd al-Óamīd 
al-Kātib (d. 132/750) and Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (d. 139/756) – are remembered 
as the founders of Arabic prose.
There are several important differences between the qiyān and the kuttāb that 
must be acknowledged. For instance, the qiyān were women, while most kuttāb 
were men; the qiyān were typically enslaved, while the kuttāb were  typically 
freed persons; the qiyān used the oral medium of poetry, while the kuttāb used 
the written medium of prose.5 However, both the qiyān and the kuttāb were 
essentially subaltern groups whose entire careers depended on the mastery of 
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Arabic. This linguistic expertise was a double-edged sword for both the kuttāb 
and the qiyān; while it allowed them a certain degree of social advancement and 
prestige, it also placed them in a constantly precarious position. If the kuttāb 
were suspected of using their language to challenge existing power structures, 
they were scapegoated or cast out as corrupters of society. Likewise, qiyān were 
damned to moral condemnation and ignominy if they composed provocative 
poems, and damned to poverty and obscurity if they did not. To toe this fine 
line, the language of both groups was mired in ambiguity; they relied heavily on 
allusions, stories and double entendres. Political theorist Jennifer London has 
shown how the secretary Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ translated animal fables and ancient 
wisdom in order to indirectly advise his ruler.6 Likewise, historians Hilary 
Kilpatrick and Matthew Gordon have analysed the ways qiyān used poetry to 
express their emotions and voice their desires.7 Such ambiguous speech may 
have been a way for the qiyān and kuttāb to communicate without attracting 
scrutiny or reproach, allowing them to balance oppression and expression.
Another similarity between the qiyān and the kuttāb is that modern 
scholars have typically treated both groups as ‘foreigners’ or ‘non-Arabs’.8 
However, I suggest that the ethnic identity of both groups is more com-
plicated. First, I find little or no evidence that the original Arabic-Islamic 
sources describe the qiyān as foreign. As Matthew Gordon has suggested, the 
term most often used to describe the qiyān is ‘muwalladāt’ – women born 
into slavery in an Arabian household.9 The early Arabic sources use ethnic 
markers to describe other kinds of female slaves, particularly the umm walads 
of notable men. Ibn Saʿd’s ̋ abaqāt very occasionally provides ethnic markers 
for umm walads who bore famous members of the religio-political elite; for 
example, he notes that Salama ibn Abī Salama’s daughter, Amat al-Wāªid, 
was born of a Berber umm walad.10 Ethnicity or place of origin seems to have 
been more of an issue for people grappling with the role of motherhood than 
with the notion of cultural production.11 Even sources that do highlight the 
ethnicity of enslaved women, such as Ibn Bu†lān’s (d. 458/1066) Manual for 
the Purchase and Training of Slaves, indicate that qiyān were procured at a 
young age and trained in Arabian centres such as Medina specifically so that 
they would not have foreign accents. In short, the qiyān appear to be Arabian 
natives in terms of birth, language and culture, even if they perhaps have 
foreign mothers or foreign ‘blood’.12
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As for the kuttāb, the issue of foreignness is more complicated. As the 
conclusion chapter will discuss in more detail, ‘non-Arab’ is a common 
definition for mawlā, but one which erases many historical complexities of 
the term. All mawālī are not the same, and they seem to have held different 
views about their own foreignness. Take ʿAbd al-Óamīd al-Kātib, for exam-
ple. ʿAbd al-Óamīd was a third-generation Muslim for whom Arabic was a 
native language.13 Wadad Kadi has argued that ʿAbd al-Óamīd wanted to 
de-emphasise his identity as a ‘mawlā’ (which had connotations of inferiority) 
and instead to create for himself and his cohort a professional identity as 
‘scribes’, valued for their particular skills and training.14 Likewise, London has 
argued that ʿAbd al-Óamīd advocated for the supposedly ‘Arab-chauvinist’ 
Umayyad dynasty and warned against the dangers of Persian heretics who 
were corrupting Islam. He highlighted that the bureaucratic skills the secre-
taries adopted from the old Persian-Sasanian dynasty were valuable because 
they served the Islamic empire, not because they were ‘Persian’ per se.15 In 
short, ʿAbd al-Óamīd took great pains to identify himself with his service to 
the Arabic-Islamic empire of the Umayyads, and he might be dismayed that 
scholars today continue to identify him as a ‘non-Arab’ secretary.
Similarly, many early-Abbasid-era scholars were technically mawālī, but 
these scholars appear to have not identified themselves as non-Arabs or to 
have championed their own ‘mawlā’ identity. Rather, mawlā-scholars such 
as Ibn Isªāq and Ibn Saʿd presented themselves first and foremost as good 
Muslims whose authority came from their expertise in early Arabic-Islamic 
history. To focus on the foreign ancestors of such scholars, or to define them 
as ‘non-Arabs’, is to focus on lineage-based forms of identity and to treat 
such identities as somehow natural or obvious, rather than as historically 
contingent and in need of deep analysis.16 Lineage is only one, rather limited, 
way of reckoning ethnic identity; linguistic mastery and cultural production 
are more inclusive ways of reckoning identity which allow people to ‘become’ 
Arabs by choice, even if they are not Arabs by lineage.
To complicate matters, some early Islamic kuttāb do appear to have iden-
tified themselves with non-Arab cultural traditions, even as they translated 
such traditions into Arabic. For example, the late-Umayyad/early-Abbasid 
secretary, Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, seems to have advocated forcefully for the value 
of his Persian heritage. Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ was a first-generation Muslim 
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who seems to have styled himself as a bridge between Arabic-Islamic and 
Persian-Zoroastrian cultures. He translated Persian literature into Arabic, 
and he urged his caliph to adopt implicitly Persian notions of justice and 
good governance.17 And yet, even Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ’s case is complicated. 
Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ is remembered still today as one of the founders of Arabic 
prose style. He notoriously loved to correct Arab-Muslim leaders’ grammar 
and vocabulary, in some sense ‘out-Arabing’ the native-born Arabs.18 Should 
Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ be considered a Persian, an Arab, neither, or both? Such 
questions are not easy to answer, but qiyān and kuttāb challenge current 
scholars to carefully analyse Umayyad-era notions of ethnicity, and to avoid 
unthinkingly applying over-simplified, nationalistic notions of identity to the 
sources as a matter of course. The sources debate these issues precisely because 
they are blurry, complex, and difficult.
In order to investigate this complex intersection of language mastery, 
cultural identity, and political power in the Umayyad period, this chapter 
focuses on two case studies of Umayyad-era qiyān and kuttāb. The first sec-
tion of the chapter analyses the career of Óabāba (d. 105/724), an Umayyad-
era courtesan. Óabāba is a transitional figure who allows us to interrogate 
the way political structures were changing in late-Umayyad history, and to 
better understand the ways enslaved women could exercise political power 
in an increasingly centralised harem system. She also allows us to analyse the 
forms of power qiyān harnessed through their linguistic expertise, as well as 
the limits on this kind of linguistic power. While her linguistic expertise gave 
Óabāba some sway over the caliph Yazīd II ibn ʿAbd al-Malik (d. 105/724), 
her power was spontaneous and precarious; it was based entirely on the 
careful management of individual, personal relationships, rather than being a 
systematised and routinised part of the political structure.
The second section mines an individual text, al-Jahshiyārī’s Kitāb 
al-Wuzarā’ wa-al-Kuttāb (Book of Secretaries and Scribes), to trace the 
development of scribal practice throughout the Umayyad period. First, a 
brief prosopographical analysis of the scribes mentioned in al-Jahshiyārī’s 
work suggests that there were debates in the late-Umayyad period about 
the advisability of using mawālī as secretaries. This finding complicates the 
usual narrative that mawālī slowly but surely came to dominate scribal prac-
tice during the period of ‘Arabisation’ (approximately 60–100/680–720). 
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Second,  individual stories about mawālī scribes in al-Jahshiyārī’s text cor-
roborate this notion of contested scribal practices. Mawālī secretaries appear 
to have gone through a difficult learning period before they finally mastered 
the craft of Arabic prose. I suggest that they eventually emerged as the domi-
nant scribal class not merely because of their bilingualism, but also because 
their linguistic power was tempered by their subaltern status. By looking at 
these two case studies together, we get a better picture of how the increasingly 
centralised Umayyad caliphate offered new opportunities for enslaved groups 
to participate in politics, and also the limits of their political participation.
Óabāba, the Qayna-Queen
Óabāba was a courtesan who reportedly ‘completely dominated’ the late-
Umayyad caliph Yazīd II; Yazīd reportedly even offered to let her run 
the caliphate in his absence. While scholars such as Pellat and Lammens/
Blankenship have noted that the descriptions of Óabāba’s power are likely 
overblown, no one has done a careful, source-critical analysis of Óabāba’s 
biography.19 Upon closer inspection, it appears that Óabāba is in many ways 
a typical qayna – she sings, dances, plays the lute, is a local celebrity, seduces 
a caliph, and amasses wealth. However, Óabāba is remarkable in that she also 
appears to have wielded a considerable degree of political power, something 
later Abbasid qiyān are not known for doing. Instead, in her exercise of 
power, Óabāba resembles later concubine-queens such as al-Khayzurān and 
Shaghab, who gained their power not as qiyān but as queen mothers within 
a centralised harem system. As someone who bridges the roles of qayna 
and concubine-queen, Óabāba captures a transitional moment when slave 
women were beginning to exercise certain forms of power in an increasingly 
centralised Umayyad polity, but before that exercise of power had become 
fully routinised.
Many Arabic-Islamic narrative sources tell the tale of Óabāba, including 
I‚bahānī’s Kitāb al-Aghānī (Book of Songs), al-Masʿūdī’s Murūj al-Dhahab 
(Meadows of Gold), and al-Balādhurī’s Ansāb al-Ashrāf (Genealogies of 
the Notables).20 These sources provide many alternative versions of specific 
episodes in Óabāba’s life, but they generally agree on the basic outlines. 
Óabāba’s original name was al-ʿĀliya, and she was born into slavery as a 
muwallada in Medina. The exact identity of her owner is contested, but 
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whoever he was, he seems to have taken a vested interest in her education; 
she reportedly trained with famous Medinese singers such as Ibn Surayj and 
Jamīla. Óabāba appears to have been a minor celebrity in the Hijaz, and 
her prospects skyrocketed when she attracted the attention of the young 
Umayyad prince, Yazīd ibn ʿAbd al-Malik, who was on his way to Mecca 
to perform the Hajj. Prince Yazīd bought al-ʿĀliya for a high price, but he 
appears soon to have doubted the wisdom of the purchase. Either his older 
brother – the reigning caliph Sulaymān – or his own doubts convinced him 
to sell al-ʿĀliya to a new owner, who took her to Egypt or North Africa. 
When Yazīd II finally became caliph in 101/720, he expressed the wish to re-
unite with al-ʿĀliya. A female member of his household (usually presented as 
one of his wives) tracked down al-ʿĀliya, bought her, and gifted her to Yazīd. 
Yazīd re-named her Óabāba, ‘Beloved’, and thereafter enjoyed spending most 
of his time with her. She reportedly exerted much power and influence in his 
court. She died of a sudden illness in 105/724, and Yazīd himself died shortly 
thereafter, apparently of a broken heart.
Literary Analysis
While there appears nothing overtly suspicious about this basic biography, a 
closer examination of the accounts reveals the clear polemical and symbolic 
undertones of Óabāba’s biography. The sources use Óabāba to represent 
Yazīd’s poor rulership, his moral corruption, and the downward spiral of the 
late Umayyad caliphate. Two examples clearly illustrate this phenomenon. 
First, Yazīd reportedly tried to quit visiting Óabāba in order to emulate 
his famously pious predecessor and cousin, ʿUmar II ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz 
(d. 101/720). ʿ Umar II had reportedly enjoyed no courtesans, and he remark-
ably had only one umm walad before he attained the caliphate (and took no 
new concubines during his caliphate).21 In the most common version of this 
account, Yazīd’s older half-brother, Maslama ibn ʿAbd al-Malik, accosts him 
and accuses him of squandering Umar’s legacy.22 A repentant Yazīd decides 
to stop visiting Óabāba, who becomes troubled by her master’s changed 
behaviour. She commissions the poet al-Aªwa‚ to compose an alluring poem 
to win back Yazīd’s affections. In some versions, al-Aªwa‚ recites the poem 
to Yazīd, who rushes to reunite with Óabāba, while, in others, it is Óabāba 
who sways Yazīd by singing the poem to him.23 Regardless, the lovers are 
 s ingers and scribes  | 147
reunited, and Yazīd returns to his inattentive and pleasure-loving ways. In 
another highly suspect story, a likely inebriated Yazīd declares that he wants 
to fly away. In one version, he declares, ‘I want to fly away – so let me fly away 
to the curse of God and the most grievous punishment!’24 In another version, 
Óabāba asks, ‘To whom will you entrust the umma [if you fly away]?’ and 
Yazīd responds, ‘To you, by God!’25
Neither of these accounts should be taken at face value, as objective 
descriptions of Yazīd and Óabāba. The first account clearly serves to demon-
strate that Yazīd did not deserve to hold the caliphate, and that his rule fell 
short of the Islamic ideal in terms of both moral vision and practical adminis-
tration. In this account, Maslama challenges Yazīd in the name of ʿUmar II; 
as Antoine Borrut has shown, Maslama and ʿUmar II are the twin symbols 
of Umayyad legitimacy, respectively representing heroic jihad and moral 
rectitude.26 Against the images of the world-conquering military hero and 
the world-renouncing caliph-saint,27 Yazīd appears as nothing more than an 
easily distracted libertine. In one account, Yazīd even orders Maslama to lead 
the prayer while he runs off to dally with Óabāba, implying that Maslama 
himself should have been the leader of the umma, or that Maslama was more 
legitimate as the empire’s ‘quasi-caliph’ than Yazīd was as its actual caliph.28 If 
the Maslama/ʿUmar dyad is presented as the angel sitting on Yazīd’s shoulder 
urging him to righteousness, Óabāba plays the role of the devil whispering 
words of temptation in his other ear.
The account about Yazīd’s desire to fly serves much the same purpose, 
although instead of hearkening back to the romanticised reign of ʿUmar II, 
it prefigures the disastrous reign of Yazīd’s son, al-Walīd II (d. 126/744). 
Al-Walīd is notorious in the Arabic-Islamic sources for drinking and carous-
ing, for sleeping with his father’s umm walads, and for sending a disguised 
concubine to lead the Friday prayer when he was too drunk to lead it himself. 
The ‘flying Yazīd’ account implies that it is a short and slippery slope from 
Yazīd II’s fanciful promise to put a singing-girl in charge of the umma, to 
al-Walīd’s allowing a singing-girl to perform the most important symbolic 
act of religious leadership. What is important here is not whether Yazīd or 
al-Walīd actually put slave women in charge of the umma, but the way these 
accounts use slave women to symbolise the degradation of the caliphate. The 
sources present the slave-concubine as the last person who should ever lead 
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the umma – she represents an ironic inversion of power structures, like the 
clown who has become king for a day.
These accounts are likely examples of Abbasid-era recollections and 
reconfigurations of Umayyad history. As Tayeb El-Hibri has shown, Abbasid-
era historians resuscitated select moments and figures from Umayyad history, 
in order to bolster the proto-Sunni claim that there had been a continuous 
legitimate chain of succession leading directly from the Muªammad to the 
Abbasids.29 Abbasid scholars could not completely denigrate the Umayyads 
without opening room for Alid counter-claims to the caliphate. Thus, they 
pointed to a few bright lights of morality and propriety shining in the 
Umayyad darkness, leading the way to the Abbasid golden age. Maslama 
and ʿUmar II serve as those bright spots in the accounts analysed above. (It 
is worth noting that Abbasid-era authors had a vested interest in treating the 
slave-born Maslama as the rightful caliph, for most Abbasid rulers were born 
of slave women.) However, these accounts also seem to indirectly critique 
the roles that women played in the Abbasid polity by denouncing Yazīd II’s 
relationship with Óabāba. Hārūn al-Rashīd’s mother was al-Khayzurān, a 
famously powerful concubine-queen who intervened in Abbasid politics, and 
whom the sources usually portray as a conniving villain. The accounts about 
Yazīd and Óabāba make it perfectly clear that slave women should have no 
role in politics. Thus, while these accounts about Yazīd are ‘sites of memory’ 
that bolster the legitimacy of the Abbasid dynasty as the heirs of Maslama 
and ʿUmar II, they also indirectly criticise certain aspects of Abbasid imperial 
practice.
Political Analysis
Unpacking the symbolic resonances of Óabāba’s story helps us better analyse 
the actual historical context of her life. For example, we do not have to 
accept that Óabāba was the ‘bad’ influence while Maslama was the ‘good’ 
one, but it does seem that they accurately represent two different avenues to 
power, one more public and based on military might, and one more private 
and based on the centralised palace complex. The fact that Óabāba appar-
ently won Yazīd’s heart in the end might simply indicate a shift away from 
the military-oriented, conquest polity of the earlier Umayyads and towards 
the more sedentarised, palace-based polity that would emerge under the 
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Abbasids. As Peirce and others have already shown, such a shift away from a 
mobile conquest polity and towards a centralised, bureaucratised polity can 
provide ample opportunities for women and enslaved persons to access politi-
cal power.30 Óabāba appears to capture this transitional moment towards the 
classical Abbasid harem-based polity.
Óabāba initially seems to have gained her power as a qayna. In this, she 
seems to have wielded forms of power familiar from other qiyān; she was sexy, 
alluring and educated, and she attracted the interests of the literary caliph, 
Yazīd II. As a qayna, Óabāba was also allowed access to the male sphere, from 
which many free females and even umm walads would have been excluded, 
and she seems to have had a fair degree of physical mobility.31 Even though 
she often appears behind screens or in tents, she seems to have travelled fairly 
widely within the Hijaz, even after she entered Yazīd’s service. For example, a 
group of travellers reportedly encountered her on the road from Medina to the 
nearby Dhū Khashab.32 A shaykh of Dhū Khashab said, ‘We set out heading 
for Dhū Khashab – we were walking – and there we saw a dome in which there 
was a slave ( jāriya). She was singing: “They went into the interior of Māªi‚ 
and then left, returning. / They brought down upon me, when they left, deep 
sadness and sighing.”’33 Later, they would learn that the jāriya in question was 
Óabāba, and that she had requested that Yazīd send each of the travellers one 
thousand dinars. Óabāba was also apparently familiar with the famous singers 
not only of her hometown of Medina, but also of Mecca. When Yazīd wanted 
a particular poem made into a song, she informed him that only a certain al-
Aªwal al-Makkī sang the poem, but that perhaps Fulān ibn Abī Lahab could 
also sing it.34 While this account has its suspicious elements – Fulān ibn Abī 
Lahab is the grandson of the arch-villain of early Islamic history, Abū Lahab 
– it appears to signal that Óabāba maintained a wide network in the Hijaz. 
These porous gender boundaries allowed her to learn new poems and styles of 
singing, and possibly to maintain alliances outside the harem.
However, her education and mobility could only take Óabāba so far, for 
she had to ensure that she used her skills only to please Yazīd. If she began to 
please others with her skills, she could arouse the caliph’s jealousy; indeed, her 
reputation in the Hijaz seems to have possibly caused Yazīd to sell her away 
to North Africa.35 Renown was a double-edged sword: a qayna needed just 
enough of it to attract her master’s attention, but not so much of it to arouse 
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his suspicion. Her individual literary skill alone was not enough to give her a 
prominent position in Umayyad politics – it was too precarious, too personal, 
too dependent on the whims of the caliph. Instead, it was the intervention of 
some of the free women of Yazīd’s household that secured a more permanent 
position for Óabāba in Yazīd’s harem, indicating the increasingly prominent 
role of women (both enslaved and freeborn) in a slowly emerging harem 
system. While these accounts may be meant to blame some woman – and 
thus to absolve Yazīd – for introducing Óabāba into Umayyad politics, the 
accounts seem to accurately depict a complex relationship of cooperation and 
competition among the women of the harem. The most common account 
asserts that Yazīd’s wife, Suʿdā bint ʿAbdallāh al-ʿUthmāniyya, bought 
Óabāba for him, in order to curry his favour. According to Al-I‚bahānī, ‘It is 
said that [Suʿdā] had begun, before she gave [Óabāba] to him, to prepare her 
son by him to become the crown prince; and [after she bought Óabāba for 
him], he gave her everything she wanted.’36 However, this explanation seems 
to confuse some transmitters of this story, for Suʿdā’s unnamed son did not 
actually become the crown prince; instead, the crown prince was al-Walīd II, 
whose mother was Umm al-Óajjāj. Perhaps to account for this discrepancy, 
al-I‚bahānī also reports that ‘it is said’ that Umm al-Óajjāj bought Óabāba 
for Yazīd, and that Óabāba was thus beholden to Umm al-Óajjāj for her 
position in Yazīd’s palace.37 Alternatively, al-Masʿūdī indicates that it was 
Yazīd’s grandmother, Umm Saʿīd al-ʿUthmāniyya, who bought Óabāba for 
him. This account would make sense in the light of later harem contexts, 
wherein the older women of the harem were allowed or even expected to 
decide the younger generation’s sexual partners. However, I suggest that 
here in this early harem context, it rings true that one of Yazīd’s free wives 
might have bought Óabāba for him, attempting to secure the caliphate for 
her own son. Neither Suʿdā nor Umm al-Óajjāj seems to have appreciated 
that Óabāba might have actually posed a political threat to them or their sons 
– the harem system was only just emerging, and these free wives could not 
foresee the opportunities that the centralised harem would afford to intimate 
slaves like Óabāba. The idea that the caliph’s wives were beginning to push 
for their own sons as crown princes, instead of consulting the wider Umayyad 
family or leading tribal notables, also speaks for the increasing centralisation 
of the caliphate.38
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Regardless of which free woman bought Óabāba for Yazīd, Óabāba seems 
soon to have created her own retinue of personal slaves and servants. Some 
of her female servants ( jawārī) may themselves have been qiyān-in-training; 
when Óabāba died, a distraught Yazīd surrounded himself with her jawārī, 
who reminisced with him about Óabāba’s life and sang him sad songs.39 
Al-I‚bahānī also provides an account (on the authority of al-Madā’inī) in 
which Óabāba uses her slaves as her political agents. In this account, Yazīd 
approaches Khālid ibn ʿAbdallāh – the brother of his wife, Suʿdā – because 
of hopes to marry one of Khālid’s nieces. Khālid reportedly mutters, ‘It 
isn’t enough that he has Suʿdā, that how he has to have one of my nieces?’ 
Somehow, Yazīd hears about Khālid’s facetious retort, and he banishes 
Khālid to his tent. While Khālid is sulking in his camp, Óabāba sends one of 
her female slaves to bring Khālid a message: ‘I [Óabāba] have spoken to the 
Commander of the Faithful, and he is pleased with you.’ The sources do not 
state outright the implications of this message, but Óabāba seems to be offer-
ing Khālid some kind of political deal – Óabāba is offering to return Khālid 
to Yazīd’s good graces, and, in return, Khālid will owe Óabāba some kind of 
favour or loyalty. Khālid does not like the deal, and he tells the slave girl to 
reply to Óabāba, ‘My favour in the caliph’s eyes is none of your business.’ 
Shortly thereafter, Óabāba’s jāriya messenger returns with a band of servants 
who tear down Khālid’s tent while he and his companions are still inside it. 
When he asks what has happened, they reply: ‘Messengers of Óabāba. This 
is what you have done to yourself.’40 If Khālid will not accept Óabāba as his 
patron and lifeline to the caliph, he will have no access to the caliph at all.
Óabāba’s reach apparently extended beyond her enslaved retinue. The 
above account hints that Óabāba was trying to build her own political net-
work. While her efforts failed with Khālid, they appear to have worked with 
ʿUmar ibn Hubayra (fl. 97–105/713–724), a late-Umayyad governor of 
Iraq.41 According to al-I‚bahānī (once again drawing upon al-Madā’inī): 
‘Óabāba dominated Yazīd. ʿUmar ibn Hubayra became her protégé and his 
position increased, such that he could enter into Yazīd’s presence whenever 
he wanted . . . Ibn Hubayra worked in the governorship of Iraq because of 
(min qibal ) Óabāba – she worked for him to get that.’ One of Ibn Hubayra’s 
rivals, al-Qaʿqāʿ ibn Khālid, reportedly learned that Ibn Hubayra’s star was 
rising, and he asked who was empowering his opponent. An anonymous 
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interlocutor answered: ‘Óabāba by night, and her gifts by day.’ It is unclear 
whether the implications of ‘Óabāba by night’ are that she was sleeping with 
Ibn Hubayra, or rather that she sang Ibn Hubayra’s praises to the caliph 
Yazīd when they were alone together. In either case, Óabāba could appar-
ently intervene politically on several levels: she could provide access to the 
caliph’s inner circle, financially back her favourites and ultimately win high 
political positions for those who accepted her patronage.
Finally, the sources provide one last tantalising hint that Óabāba might 
have been on the cusp of securing political power as queen mother. In 
the account mentioned above, wherein Óabāba has her agents tear down 
the tent of Khālid bin ʿAbdallāh, the jāriya messenger announces that her 
message is from ‘Umm Dāwūd’. When Khālid asks who Umm Dāwūd is, 
the jāriya responds, ‘She is Óabāba.’ The sources provide no other hints than 
this matronymic, but Óabāba may have tried to position herself not only as 
Yazīd’s ‘favourite’, but also as the mother of the crown prince. We shall never 
know if Óabāba might have emerged as the first concubine-queen of Islamic 
history, however, for she pre-deceased Yazīd, and we hear no more of her son 
Dāwūd.42
Ultimately, Óabāba reveals both the power of the late-Umayyad qiyān 
and the limits of that power. Her education, skills and intelligence allowed 
her access to the caliph’s inner circle – and, yet, these gifts did not prevent 
her from being bought and sold, from being reviled by her enemies and 
spurned by her caliph-lover, or from being remembered in Islamic history 
as a meddling villain. While the sources maintain that ‘Óabāba dominated 
Yazīd’ – invoking the tried-and-true trope of the slave girl who enslaves her 
master – it is clear upon further analysis that she only had certain, rather 
unstable forms of power in Yazīd’s harem.43 She began to exhibit some of 
the forms of power that later Abbasid queen-mothers would have, including 
having direct, intimate access to the caliph, dispersing wealth and building 
patronage networks. But we can also see that Óabāba did not yet have access 
to some of the later forms of power that concubine-queens exercised, such as 
funding public works, influencing court cases and managing the reproductive 
politics of the harem. Perhaps these forms of power were not open to her 
because she was not a queen mother, but merely a ‘favourite’ – in this, she 
appears to somewhat resemble the Abbassid al-Khayzurān or the Ottoman 
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Hurrem Sultan during the first stages of their careers, before they became 
queen-mothers. Óabāba thus captures a transitional moment in the develop-
ment of the imperial harem; she lived at a time when the Umayyad empire 
was moving away from an expansive jihad state and towards a sedentary, 
centralised system that would allow for women and enslaved persons to have 
greater access to political power.
A final lesson that Óabāba conveys, which I suggest also applies to other 
qiyān of the Abbasid period, is that writers treat her as a liminal figure not 
because of her ethnicity but because of her behaviour. Writers do not worry 
that she is a ‘foreigner’ introducing foreign mores – they treat her as a native 
Hijazi and a monolingual Arabic speaker – but rather that she is an unsuitable 
representative of Arabic-Islamic culture. She seduces, distracts, cajoles and 
bullies in ways unbecoming of a ‘good’ Arab-Muslim woman. I suggest that 
authors spend so much time discussing and debating the role of qiyān such 
as Óabāba precisely because they defy easy categorisation, and they challenge 
author’s conceptions of who counts as a ‘true Arab’ not in terms of lineage, 
but in terms of cultural production and moral comportment.
Mawālī Scribes
Just as Óabāba helps us discern changes in the structure of the late-Umayyad 
caliphate, kuttāb help us discern changes in wider Umayyad imperial prac-
tice. There are several Abbasid-era works that describe scribal practice in the 
early Islamic period, but this analysis focuses on only al-Jahshiyārī’s Kitāb 
al-Wuzarā’ wa-al-Kuttāb. This book is unique in the genre of secretarial 
writing, which mostly comprises style manuals and anthologies of eloquent 
scribal prose.44 Al-Jahshiyārī (d. 331/942) instead tells a history of the Islamic 
community through scribes. He lists the scribes who worked for each caliph 
and governor, tells dramatic anecdotes about these scribes’ relationships with 
their patrons, provides hints of developments in scribal practice and includes 
the texts of a few short letters. Some of this information can also be found 
scattered throughout other historical works, such as al-˝abarī’s Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa-al-Mulūk (History of Prophets and Kings) and the historical section 
of Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih’s Al-ʿIqd al-Farid (The Unique Necklace), but only 
al-Jahshiyārī collects it all in one location and connects it entirely by the 
thread of scribal practice.45 I focus on this unique historical work because 
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it can provide a clear and coherent (if incomplete) snapshot of how scribal 
practice and social identity relate to each other. However, like all other works 
of early Islamic history, al-Jahshiyārī’s text should not be taken as objective or 
unproblematic – his accounts need to be analysed using the critical methods 
outlined in other chapters.
The Bigger Picture: Prosopography
First, prosopography reveals some of the broader trends of Umayyad scribal 
practice, at least according to al-Jahshiyārī. To conduct this analysis, I com-
piled a list of all the secretaries al-Jahshiyārī mentions in the period spanning 
from the Prophet Muªammad to the fall of the Umayyad caliphate – a data 
set comprising 117 entries. I then used other sources (such as al-˝abarī’s 
Tārīkh, al-Balādhurī’s Ansāb al-Ashrāf and Ibn ʿAsākir’s Tārīkh) to further 
identify these scribes. I particularly focused on their tribal, religious and 
ethnic identities, as indicated by the sources. The sources usually describe 
the secretaries in one of the following terms: Qurashī, other (non-Qurashī) 
Arabian tribesman, mawlā, Christian/Nabatean and Persian. When the 
sources do not provide further information on these figures, I tried to identify 
them based on naming practices; for instance, if a scribe is named ‘ʿAbdallāh 
ibn Muslim’, with no other tribal identifier, I tentatively assume this person 
is a mawlā.46 This method is not perfect, and I invite other scholars to con-
tribute their own analysis and interpretation of the data.
Once thus compiled, the data can be broken down to analyse how 
tribal practice changed over time, as well as how it varied according to 
place and specific occupation. In terms of change over time, I find that the 
mawālī’s domination of the imperial bureaucracy reached a height in the 
mid-Marwanid period but actually experienced a decline in the late Umayyad 
period. In terms of geography, it appears that Iraq had only marginally more 
mawālī scribes than did Syria, and that both Iraq and Syria employed many 
more mawālī scribes than did Khurasan. Finally, it appears that mawālī 
participated prominently in the epistle-writing bureau (dīwān al-rasā’il ), the 
official-seal bureau (dīwān al-khātim) and the tax-collecting bureau (dīwān 
al-kharāj), but that they did not play as prominent a role in bureaus that 
provided direct access to the caliph (dīwān al-khā‚‚) or that allowed them 
to make on-the-ground decisions about provincial administration. That is, 
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mawālī scribes appear to be underlings following orders, not directly advising 
the caliph or making administrative decisions.
Change over Time
Al-Jahshiyārī organises his text roughly chronologically, as he moves caliph-
by-caliph and explains which scribes worked for each caliph and his sub-
governors. Like the Ibn Saʿd data set examined in Chapter 5, al-Jahshiyārī’s 
chronology is imperfect, as he rarely provides specific dates for specific scribes 
or even specific sub-governors. I have once again placed a somewhat artificial 
chronological framework atop the data, seeking to compare time periods that 
are roughly the same size, and that also include roughly comparable sample 
sizes.47 Finally, note that the timeline used in this chapter does not line up 
perfectly with that use in Chapter 5 for concubinage practice; the timeline 
in this chapter traces a political history of dynastic change, while the former 
traced a social history across generations of Muslims. However, with these 
caveats in mind, al-Jahshiyārī’s text provides a rough picture of changing 
scribal practice throughout early Islamic history, which I provide here both in 
table form (see Table 6.1) and graph form (see Figure 6.1) for ease of analysis:
Certain of these findings are unremarkable. For example, Quraysh 
played a prominent scribal role under Muªammad and his immediate suc-
cessors, but they slowly declined until they became completely absent from 
scribal practice. This decline can perhaps be attributed to a growing sense 
that Quraysh were military elites who should not have to perform mun-
dane bureaucratic jobs – or perhaps the Umayyad government increasingly 
excluded rival Qurashis from access to government posts, thus consolidating 
the government in the hands of the Umayyad house. Likewise, scholars have 
previously noted the large role that Syrian Christians played in the early 
Umayyad (Sufyanid) government,48 as well as the increasing prevalence of 
mawālī in the Umayyad bureaucracy.
However, some of the findings are more surprising. First, during the 
final decades of the Marwanid period (roughly 725–745 CE), freeborn 
Arab-Muslim tribesmen experience a resurgence as scribes, while the mawālī 
experience a slight decline. Only a small majority of scribes are mawālī 
in this period, while mawālī had completely dominated the craft in the 
previous period. This finding suggests that Umayyad scribal practice was not 
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 characterised by a simple, linear trajectory of mawālī success; rather, scribal 
practice appears to have been a somewhat contested issue. This reaction 
roughly corresponds to a similar trend we saw in Chapter 5: after concubi-
nage reached a height in generation four (c. 720–740 CE), it experienced a 
downturn in generation five (c. 740–760 CE). This slight pushback against 
the mawālī appears to have happened slightly earlier than the pushback 
against concubines, but it appears to capture a similar dialectic concerning 
the position of enslaved or unfree people in Islamic society. Perhaps the 
resurgence of Arab scribes was a ramification of the ‘Arabisation’ of the gov-
ernment; that is, perhaps the earlier Marwanids used mawālī as a temporary 
stopgap measure, to translate the bureaucracies into Arabic and provide some 
training on previous bureaucratic practice, so that Arabs could take over the 
bureaucracy for themselves. Or perhaps in the factionalised milieu of the late 
Umayyad period, caliphs were appointing Arabs from different tribal factions 
to bureaucratic positions in order to balance the factions, giving out political 
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Figure 6.1 Changing percentages of scribal practice according to identity
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to have been some  fluctuation in the late Umayyad period in the employment 
of mawālī secretaries.
The other remarkable trend in this chart is that scribes explicitly identi-
fied as Persian never appear to play a prominent role in any of these periods. 
Persian scribes reach their greatest extent (of only 11 per cent of all scribes) 
during ʿAbd al-Malik’s period, indicating that Persian scribes played a role 
in Arabising the bureaucracy and translating previous Sasanian bureaucratic 
practice. This low incidence of Persian scribes perhaps complicates Paul 
Heck’s assertion that al-Jahshiyārī’s purpose in writing his text was to dress 
up in Islamic clothing what was essentially Sasanian bureaucratic practice.49 
At least according to this prosopographical analysis, al-Jahshiyārī presents 
very few ‘Persian’ scribes as participating in Umayyad bureaucracy. Perhaps 
al-Jahshiyārī attempted to remove references to sustained Persian, Sasanian 
or Zoroastrian influence, in order to present the story as more Islamic. Or 
perhaps it simply tells us that the people who were translating these govern-
ment documents were identified not by their ethnic or cultural heritage, but 
by their status as subaltern or mawlā. Many mawālī may in fact have been 
of Persian origins, but our authors do not identify them as such, and it is 
dangerous to make such ethnic assumptions in the absence of more explicit 
evidence.
Analyses according to Place and Occupation
In addition to allowing for chronological analysis, al-Jahshiyārī’s text also 
allows for geographic analysis (see Table 6.2 and Figure 6.2). Once again, 
some of this data is fairly expected, like the dominance of Arabian tribesmen 
and Quraysh in Hijaz. However, it appears remarkable that Syria only has a 
slightly higher percentage of Arabian tribesmen, and slightly lower percent-
Table 6.2 Scribal identities according to place (numbers and percentages)
Region Total # Quraysh Arab mawlā Christian Persian
Hijaz 21 9/43%  7/33%  5/24% 0 0
Syria 57 1/2% 19/34% 29/51% 8/14% 0
Egypt  3 0  0  2/67% 1/33% 0
Iraq 33 1/3%  9/27% 20/61% 1/3% 2/6%
Khurasan  5 0  2/40%  2/40% 1/20% 0
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age of mawālī, than does Iraq. Additionally, Khurasan has a higher percentage 
of Arabian tribesmen and a lower percentage mawālī than either Syria or 
Iraq (although it must be noted that Khurasan’s data set is quite small). 
These findings are somewhat surprising because the narrative sources often 
present Iraq and Khurasan as full of mawālī, peasants and other ‘non-Arabs’ 
seeking to join the Islamic community. However, I suggest that mawālī does 
not necessarily mean ‘non-Arab Muslim’ in this context, but rather subal-
tern or underling. Whether they were working in Syria, Iraq or Khurasan, 
the Umayyads and their governors apparently often relied on their own 
extended household networks – employing many scribes from among their 
own mawālī, that is, their personal servants and protégés.
Finally, al-Jahshiyārī provides specific occupational information for 64 
out of his 117 scribes, providing a limited glimpse into what kinds of jobs 
different scribes were performing (see Table 6.3). These data indicate that 
the mawālī particularly dominated the epistolary bureau, as well as the tax-
collection bureau. The mawālī also played a prominent role in the bureau 
of the official seal, which might have been used to seal official correspond-
ence or to assess taxes.50 Thus, as other scholars have suggested, the mawālī 
seem to have benefited from their previous knowledge of tax-collecting 
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Figure 6.2 Percentage of scribal identities according to place
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play a  distinctly minor role in running the administration of entire cities or 
regions. Instead, Arabian tribesmen dominated these bureaus.51 Even more 
remarkably, Arabian tribesmen apparently dominated the position of privy 
secretary, the position that would have granted the most intimate access to 
the caliph or governor. It appears that caliphs sometimes granted the privy 
secretary position to their in-laws, in order to cement their tribal alliances. 
For example, ʿAbd al-Malik appointed his own brother-in-law, Qabī‚a ibn 
Dhu’ayb of Khuzāʿa, as his privy secretary; Qabī‚a’s son, Isªāq, served as 
privy secretary for ʿAbd al-Malik’s son, Hishām. While my interpretation of 
this finding is tentative and requires further investigation, I suggest that these 
prestigious positions – privy secretary, and leadership of the bureaucracy of 
a city or region – were parcelled out to tribal allies as a way of cementing 
political alliances. On the other hand, mawālī secretaries did the nitty-gritty, 
day-to-day bureaucratic work such as writing letters and collecting taxes as a 
form of service to their masters’ households.
The Smaller Picture: Case Studies of Scribal Scapegoats
Overall, al-Jahshiyārī’s text suggests that bureaucracy was a complex and con-
tested practice in the Umayyad period. Individual accounts in al-Jahshiyārī’s 
text further illuminate the types of debates associated with changing scribal 
practices. Particularly, I suggest that stories about scribal scapegoats – scribes 
who were blamed for a problem or mistake in the bureaucracy – illustrate 
these debates. Focusing on scribal scapegoats helps us discern what forms 
Table 6.3 Scribal practice according to occupation (numbers and percentages)
Occupation Total# Quraysh Arab mawlā Christian Persian
Muªammad’s scribes (special 
roles, such as scribe of 
revelation)
13 6/46% 6/46%  1/8% 0 0
Epistles (Rasā’il) 16 0 4/25% 11/69% 1/6% 0
Official seal (Khātim)  9 0 3/33%  6/67% 0 0
Tax collection (Kharāj) 12 0 1/8%  7/58% 2/17% 2/17%
Bureaucracy (Dīwān) of a city 
or region
10 2/20% 4/40%  1/10% 2/20% 1/10%
Privy secretary (Khā‚‚)  4 0 3/75%  1/25% 0 0
Other (incl. Jund and Íadaqa)  7 1/14% 2/29%  4/57% 0 0
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of power scribes were able to exercise in certain contexts, and what were the 
limits of that power. More broadly, this analysis of scribal power then allows 
us to discern the shifting contours of the nascent Islamic polity as it slowly 
defined and defended its boundaries.52 In particular, it appears that the early 
Umayyads removed Qurashis from the bureaucracy in order to limit their 
threat to the Umayyad dynasty.53 Arab-Christians then experienced a heyday 
of bureaucratic prominence under the early Umayyads (Sufyanids), but they 
fell from prominence when the Marwanids attempted to more strictly define 
the empire as ‘Islamic’. Finally, by the end of the Umayyad period, the 
mawālī had taken on the bulk of bureaucratic positions. As the previous pros-
opography suggests, however, this mawālī dominance was not without its 
fluctuations, and some mawālī appear to have provoked controversy because 
of their incomplete mastery of Arabic. Ultimately, I suggest that the mawālī 
emerged as the dominant scribal class not necessarily because of their bilin-
gualism or bureaucratic expertise, but because they fit the right power balance 
in an increasingly centralised, autocratic late-Umayyad imperial system.
The most famous example of a Qurashi scribe who threatened the 
caliph’s authority is Marwān ibn al-Óakam (d. 65/685). One account in 
al-Jahshiyārī’s text blames Marwān for writing an inflammatory letter that 
ultimately resulted in the murder of caliph ʿUthmān and the outbreak of 
the devastating First Fitna.54 Blaming Marwān for this letter absolves the 
‘Rightly Guided’ caliph ʿUthmān from wrongdoing, and it instead places 
the blame on a representative of both the old-guard Qurashi polytheists and 
the much-maligned Umayyad dynasty. Marwān also illustrates the threat that 
a Qurashi scribe, in particular, poses to the standing caliph: a Qurashi scribe 
could plausibly manipulate the state right into his own hands, as Marwān 
eventually did.55 Muslim rulers seem to have learned relatively quickly not to 
place Qurashis in such positions of power; the last Umayyad caliph to employ 
a Qurashi in any kind of bureaucratic position, according to al-Jahshiyārī, 
was Muʿāwiya (r. 41–60/661–680).56 After that, the caliphs began hiring 
non-Qurashi Arabian tribesmen, Arab Christians and mawālī as their scribes, 
none of whom were perceived as a legitimate candidate for the caliphate.
After Qurashis stopped holding the position of scribe, stories of scribal 
scapegoats reveal different concerns for the health of the post-conquest umma. 
The Qurashi scribe might be a dangerous insider who could usurp the  caliphate 
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for himself, but Christian and mawlā scribes are semi-outsiders who might not 
fully understand the symbols and language of the Islamic community. These 
scribes might introduce corrupting foreign knowledge unbeknown to the 
mostly monolingual Arab-Muslim conquerors, or they might even deliber-
ately torpedo the Islamic empire from the inside. Thus, stories about such 
scribes reveal broader concerns to define and defend the boundaries of ‘Islam’ 
as a religion and ‘Arabness’ as an ethnicity. As Fred Donner and others have 
suggested, ʿAbd al-Malik and his sons appear to have instituted a number of 
reforms intended to distinguish ‘Islam’ from other monotheistic traditions, 
and to distinguish the ‘Arab’ conqueror-elites from the conquered population. 
Many stories about Christian and mawlā scribal scapegoats appear to come 
from this period of Arabisation, and they reveal both the fears that Marwanid-
era rulers had about employing Christian and mawlā scribes, as well as some 
of the problems they experienced in attempting to Arabise the bureaucracy.
The most prominent example of a religiously suspect scribe in 
al-Jahshiyārī’s text is the Christian Sarjūn (Sergius) ibn Man‚ūr (d. c. 73/693), 
whom al-Jahshiyārī subtly blames for some of the Umayyads’ policies.57 For 
example, in one account, Sarjūn appears responsible for hiring the infamous 
general ʿ Ubaydallāh ibn Ziyād as governor of Iraq. This ʿ Ubaydallāh is the son 
of Ziyād ibn Abīhi, the notorious Umayyad governor we met in Chapter 3; 
ʿUbaydallāh is also responsible for fighting against the Prophet Muªammad’s 
grandson, al-Óusayn. Just as blaming the Qurashi scribe Marwān ibn al-
Óakam protected his caliph ʿUthmān from accusations of malfeasance, so 
blaming Sarjūn for hiring ʿUbaydallāh ibn Ziyād somewhat absolves the 
caliph Yazīd I of this travesty, protecting the legitimacy of the caliphal institu-
tion. However, unlike the Qurashi scribe, now the Christian scribe appears 
almost as a double agent, working to undermine the caliphate from the 
inside. The account implies that Sarjūn deliberately aimed to undermine 
the young Islamic community by getting the grandson of its Prophet killed.58 
Al-Jahshiyārī also famously blames Sarjūn for having caused ʿAbd al-Malik 
to Arabise the bureaucracy in the first place. Sarjūn was reportedly dragging 
his heels, slowing down the working of ʿAbd al-Malik’s government, and 
essentially gloating that the Umayyad empire relied heavily upon his own 
expertise. As a result, so the story goes, ʿAbd al-Malik had the bureaucracy 
translated into Arabic.
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While historians should not accept this simple story as explanation for 
a complex, empire-wide translation and reform project, they should analyse 
what the account implies about the changing contours of the umma. ʿAbd 
al-Malik does not identify Sarjūn’s Christianity as the main problem, but 
rather his knowledge of Greek. Bilingualism is a form of power, one that 
was apparently beyond the grasp of the Umayyad caliph and apparently 
many of the other Arab-Muslim elites who had grown up in the Hijaz.59 
Because Sarjūn possessed this knowledge that was needed to run the empire, 
he gained a measure of personal independence – he could speed up or slow 
down production as he saw fit. Put in the theoretical language of unfreedom, 
Sarjūn’s bilingualism allowed him to exercise individual agency, instead of 
the loyal inter-agency expected of a subaltern. Because the caliph realised that 
Sarjūn’s power lay in his bilingualism, he strove to Arabise the diwans and to 
consolidate linguistic power inside the Arab-Islamic community. Although 
the Arabisation was certainly motivated by more factors than simple frustra-
tion with Sarjūn, this account appears plausible as a memory-marker of the 
end of the ecumenical Believers’ movement and the beginning of a truly 
Islamic empire, as the empire adopted Arabic to articulate stronger religious 
and cultural boundaries.
It is remarkable that Sarjūn’s bilingualism is cited here as a problem, as 
is that of Zādhān Farrūkh, Sarjūn’s Zoroastrian contemporary working in 
Iraq.60 Some scholars have presented bilingualism as the prime requisite for 
working in the bureaucracy during this period. These scholars have presented 
the bilingualism of the mawālī as a boon, as something that caused them to 
‘win out’ as bureaucrats, and that also enhanced their position as translators, 
scholars and nodes of cultural transmission.61 However, I am not convinced 
that bilingualism is in itself enough to explain the prevalence of mawālī in 
the bureucracy. Not only could Iraqi and Syrian Arabs be fully bilingual,62 
but al-Jahshiyārī also indicates that many mawālī struggled to become fully 
bilingual. Al-Jahshiyārī transmits several accounts of scribal error during the 
early and middle Umayyad periods wherein the scribes do not deliberately 
undermine the Islamic state, but accidentally do so. These scribal bloopers 
reveal fears about the increasing numbers of mawālī entering the Islamic 
polity, and fears that corruption of the Arabic language could lead to wide-
spread corruption of state and society.
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Some of al-Jahshiyārī’s stories indicate that scribes were sometimes 
uncomfortable with written Arabic conventions and grammar. For example, 
Ziyād ibn Abīhi discovered a mistake in his bureaucracy (dīwān):
Ziyād used to visit his diwans to oversee the work being done there. One 
day, Ziyād entered his diwan and found a piece of writing which contained 
the phrase: ‘Three dinān.’ He said, ‘Who wrote this?’ They said, ‘That boy 
(ghulām) over there.’ He said: ‘Kick him out of the diwan so that he does 
not corrupt it. Erase this and write: “Three adunn.”‘63
The word in question is the plural of dann, an earthenware jug. The plural of 
abundance (more than ten) is dinān, and the plural of paucity (three to ten) is 
adunn. While the registry in question is clearly a tax registry and has nothing 
to do with the professional prose expected of state epistle-writers, the story 
nevertheless presents a perfect knowledge of Arabic and all its complicated 
broken plurals as a prerequisite for the job. On a purely practical level, writing 
‘dinān’ instead of ‘adunn’ would probably have made no difference in the levy-
ing of the three earthenware jugs. But this account implies that levying taxes is 
only one facet of a larger cultural, religious and political project. The Muslim 
state could hardly present itself as a bastion of Arabic-Islamic values if it 
went around levying taxes in bastardised Arabic. Both the taxation and the 
letter-writing aspects of the secretarial craft are presented here as going hand 
in hand; both are equally important representations of the secretary’s craft, 
and both require an equally excellent knowledge of Arabic. Whether or not 
this anecdote about Ziyād is historically true, it appears to capture a memory 
of the potentially ‘corrupting’ influence of mawālī in the bureaucracy. It does 
not reflect fears about the insertion of Persian values per se, but simply about 
the mis-understanding of Arabic, even in the bean-counting taxation bureau.
It was not only the Umayyads who apparently struggled with their 
scribes, but also the Zubayrids, the family that held much political power in 
the Hijaz and Iraq during the Second Fitna. The Zubayrid governor of Iraq, 
Mu‚ʿab ibn al-Zubayr (d. 72/92), reportedly read over a letter written by 
one of his scribes on his behalf. The letter began, ‘From al-Mu‚ʿab’. Mu‚ʿab 
asked, ‘What are these two additions here?’ meaning the alif and lam, which 
spell the Arabic definite article al.64 It seems likely that an Arabian tribesman 
and native Arabic speaker would innately know which Arabic names start 
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with al (such as al-Óusayn, al-Walīd and al-Zubayr) and which ones do 
not (such as Muªammad, Mu‚ʿab and Yazīd). However, this scribe seems 
to have struggled with this aspect of Arabic nomenclature. Although he is 
not named explicitly here, perhaps the struggling scribe was Mu‚ʿab’s head 
letter-writer, who according to al-Jahshiyārī was called ʿAbdallāh ibn Abī 
Farwa.65 This ʿAbdallāh’s father, Kaysān, was a mawlā of al-Óārith al-Óuffār, 
who was himself a mawlā of ʿUthmān. That is, ʿAbdallāh was the mawlā 
of a mawlā – an incredibly lowly social position – and seemingly a first- or 
second-generation Muslim who might not have been completely comfortable 
with Arabic naming practices.
Finally, the Marwanids apparently continued to struggle with their sec-
retaries. According to al-Jahshiyārī, caliph ʿUmar II (r. 99–101/717–720) 
dictated a letter to his (anonymous) scribe, to be sent to the governor of 
Medina, Abū Bakr ibn Óazm. ʿ Umar’s orders were to conduct a census (aª‚i) 
of the ‘effeminates’ of Medina, a class of entertainers and matchmakers work-
ing in pre-Islamic and early Islamic Medina.66 However, the scribe miswrote 
(‚aªªafa) the letter and instead ordered the governor to castrate (ikh‚i) the 
effeminates of Medina – which he did.67 While there are many plausible 
interpretations of this scribe’s mistake, it is possible to understand it as a 
non-native Arabic speaker’s mispronunciation of the difficult Arabic letter 
ªa. Based on al-Jahshiyārī’s data, six (or seven) out of eight of ʿUmar II’s 
scribes were mawālī68; if they were first-generation mawālī, perhaps they were 
not completely fluent in Arabic. Moreover, ʿ Umar II appears to have dictated 
his letters, which leaves room for listening-comprehension errors on the part 
of his scribes. If this account is understood as a ‘mishearing’ of the ªa as a 
kha by a non-native speaker, it appears as a cautionary tale about the dangers 
of using first-generation mawālī as scribes. It implies that the conquered 
population should not have such great power over the fate of the Islamic 
community; it is potentially subversive and culturally disastrous to let such 
apparent foreigners work for the government. They are responsible not just 
for perpetrating this single, brutal act of castration, but also for figuratively 
castrating Arabic culture in its entirety with their foreign, corrupting ways.
Why did Marwanid caliphs continue to use mawālī scribes if they 
 struggled to master Arabic? Especially if the Marwanids implemented reforms 
that sought to represent the caliphate as explicitly Arabic and Islamic, why 
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did they allow struggling mawālī to write for them? To answer this question, 
I think we must recognise the tension between two Marwanid trends. On the 
one hand, the Marwanids had a desire to delineate the rulers from the ruled, 
the conquerors from the conquered. In seeking to define this boundary, they 
created new, starker definitions of ‘Islam’ and ‘Arab’ than had previously 
existed. I suggest that the mawālī become conflated with ‘non-Arabs’ (ʿajam) 
for the first time in the Marwanid period, and so the Marwanids seem to have 
had some fears about whether these mawālī could really represent the Arabic-
Islamic empire. These fears are reflected in stories about mawālī-scribes who 
made linguistic errors and thus threatened the integrity of the caliphate.
But, on the other hand, the Marwanids had a desire to consolidate the 
empire in their own hands, to cut out rival Qurashi families such as the 
Hasanids, and to control rebels and revolutionaries. They also had to con-
tend with increasing factionalism in the late-Umayyad period; late-Umayyad 
political history was dominated by a fierce and destructive rivalry between 
two military factions, the Qays and the Yaman. While the Umayyad caliph 
(and Quraysh more generally) was technically above these factions, the caliph 
nevertheless had to manage them. If one faction was becoming too powerful, 
the caliph might dismiss governors and generals from that faction and replace 
them with members of the other faction. As they attempted to balance these 
factional rivalries the Ummayads also came to rely heavily on their own 
extended households and personal cronies for loyal service – they accordingly 
became increasingly centralised and autocratic. (We have already seen this 
pattern in Chapter 5, as the Umayyads increasingly practised concubinage 
in order to exclude rivals from other families and clans.) That is, they seem 
to have relied heavily on their mawālī as subaltern, dependent members of 
their extended household, who were expected to have only their master’s 
interests at heart. Such mawālī scribes were supposed to exist only as servants 
of the dynasty. If they made mistakes, they could be punished or dismissed 
without sparking a factional war. I thus suggest that the mawālī emerged 
as the dominant scribal class, not necessarily because they were experts in 
Sassanian bureaucratic practice, but because they were subalterns whose lin-
guistic power could be controlled.
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Conclusion
Early Arabic-Islamic authors wrote hundreds of pages on both the qiyān and 
the kuttāb. I suggest that they did so precisely because these groups are so 
liminal, debatable and difficult to place. Both groups raise intractable prob-
lems about the nature of ethnic identity and the meaning of ‘cultural stuff’ 
such as shared language and lore. Accordingly, the qiyān appear alternately 
as heroines of Arabic culture and as wicked, foreign corruptors. Likewise, 
mawālī secretaries appear alternately as founders of Arabic prose and as 
bumbling slaves and crypto-Manicheans. I suggest that these debates about 
cultural/linguistic definitions of ‘Arabness’, which would continue into the 
Abbasid period (indeed, they continue even today), began in the Umayyad 
period, largely as a result of the increasing prominence of educated, unfree 
groups such as the qiyān and the kuttāb.
Both groups apparently played an increasingly prominent political role 
as the Umayyad caliphate became more centralised and autocratic. Óabāba 
was able to wield power as Yazīd II’s favourite, as a member of the harem 
network. Mawālī scribes served the dynasty as members of the imperial 
household, rising above factional politics. This finding suggests that there was 
no comprehensive, revolutionary sea-change between the Umayyad period 
and the Abbasid period. The late Umayyads were already developing the 
harem system that would later allow concubine-queens such as al-Khayzurān 
and Shaghab to exercise power. The Umayyads were already transitioning 
to an autocratic form of politics based on proximity and subservience to the 
ruler, not based on ‘noble’ Arabian lineage or tribal networks. In this context, 
qiyān and kuttāb could use their language mastery to access political power; 
love poetry and epistolary prose were potent tools that could secure patronage 
and political advancement.
However, these groups also allow us to see that education or expertise 
is not enough to liberate subordinated groups, if that education perpetuates 
unequal power structures. Both groups had to use their language mastery to 
satisfy their masters and to serve the needs of the empire. They were both 
ultimately subalterns, playing by the rules of someone else’s game. Instead 
of blaming subalterns and slaves for corrupting Islamic politics, scholars 
should interrogate the wider political structures that allowed unfree people to 
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access political power precisely so that their power could be monitored and 
controlled.
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to enter the caliph’s inner circle, but their unfreedom placed great limits on 
the power that their language mastery afforded them.
In addition to these findings, several larger conclusions emerge from 
the research presented here. First, enslaved and freed persons shaped Islamic 
society in myriad ways. From their subaltern positions, they negotiated the 
meaning of the Quran; helped create a collaborative (if still not completely 
egalitarian) community in Medina; changed definitions of lineage and eth-
nicity; produced great works of Arabic-Islamic culture; and acted as powerful 
courtiers and queens. Scholars have previously noted the intellectual con-
tributions of non-Arab Muslims, often as a subtle way of trumpeting the 
superiority of Romans and Persians over the barbarian Arabs.1 Here, instead 
of engaging in polemics about which ‘civilisation’ is superior, I have instead 
viewed unfree people as participating in a complex network of dependencies 
and power relationships. For example, I suggest that the courtesans might 
have sung in double-entendres because they were unfree, not because they 
were ‘foreign’. I likewise suggest that mawālī scholars might have contributed 
so greatly to Islamic scholarship not because of their foreign educations, 
but because they were trying to resolve their liminality and prove their true 
belonging to the Arabic-Islamic world. Unfreedom, and not merely ‘foreign-
ness’, is a crucial component in understanding these cultural and intellectual 
contributions.
Second, women have been too often overlooked as agents of historical 
change. Here, I have argued that enslaved and freed women were integral to 
debates about sexual ethics, motherhood, proximity politics and ethnicity. 
Enslaved prostitutes advocated for their own readings of Q 24:33, playing an 
active part in the earliest umma. Enslaved mothers changed the demographics 
of the Umayyad empire and indirectly changed the conception of ‘Arab’ 
lineage. Enslaved musicians participated in Umayyad politics as courtesans, 
producers of Arabic culture and would-be queens. We cannot understand the 
rise of the slave-born caliph in the late Umayyad period without understand-
ing the impact of slave mothers themselves. We cannot understand how 
the increasingly centralised Umayyad caliphate worked without analysing 
the career of women such as Óabāba. If we fail to study women, we will 
 necessarily only see half the picture.
Third, ethnicity is not a timeless category, but a historical and contested 
7
Conclusions
This book has posited that enslaved and freed persons provide a fruit-ful window on to Islamic history precisely because of their liminal-
ity. As liminal figures, they sparked debates about the political, social and 
religious boundaries of the umma: who belongs to the umma, and how do 
they demonstrate that belonging? How can Muslims navigate the tension 
between more egalitarian and more hierarchical readings of religious texts? 
Who should have access to political power and cultural authority? By tracing 
how such debates unfolded in the first two centuries of Islam, this book has 
hoped to shed some light on how Islam transformed from a small Arabian 
reform movement into the official doctrine of a world-spanning empire. It 
has also hoped to combat essentialising narratives that present the first cen-
tury of Islam as a static age that represents some ideal, ‘true’ Islam. Instead, by 
revealing how early Muslims constructed and re-constructed their identities 
to fit changing contexts, this book has celebrated the flexibility and creativity 
of early Islamic history.
For example, we have seen how ‘mawlā’ was simply a marker of shared 
faith for Abū Bakra, while later authors used his mawlā identity as an anti-
Umayyad political symbol. We have seen how enslaved prostitutes in Medina 
advocated for their own interpretation of Q 24:33, even as later Iraqi exegetes 
downplayed or discounted these women’s actions. We have seen how many 
Arabian tribal notables – and not only the Umayyads – had a vested interest 
in excluding ‘half-blood’ children from attaining the imamate; but these 
children of mixed parentage eventually successfully advocated for their own 
‘Arab’ identity by invoking prophetic precedent. Finally, we have seen how 
muwalladāt courtesans and mawālī scribes teetered on the precipice of power 
in the Marwanid polity. They used their mastery of Arabic language and lore 
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to enter the caliph’s inner circle, but their unfreedom placed great limits on 
the power that their language mastery afforded them.
In addition to these findings, several larger conclusions emerge from 
the research presented here. First, enslaved and freed persons shaped Islamic 
society in myriad ways. From their subaltern positions, they negotiated the 
meaning of the Quran; helped create a collaborative (if still not completely 
egalitarian) community in Medina; changed definitions of lineage and eth-
nicity; produced great works of Arabic-Islamic culture; and acted as powerful 
courtiers and queens. Scholars have previously noted the intellectual con-
tributions of non-Arab Muslims, often as a subtle way of trumpeting the 
superiority of Romans and Persians over the barbarian Arabs.1 Here, instead 
of engaging in polemics about which ‘civilisation’ is superior, I have instead 
viewed unfree people as participating in a complex network of dependencies 
and power relationships. For example, I suggest that the courtesans might 
have sung in double-entendres because they were unfree, not because they 
were ‘foreign’. I likewise suggest that mawālī scholars might have contributed 
so greatly to Islamic scholarship not because of their foreign educations, 
but because they were trying to resolve their liminality and prove their true 
belonging to the Arabic-Islamic world. Unfreedom, and not merely ‘foreign-
ness’, is a crucial component in understanding these cultural and intellectual 
contributions.
Second, women have been too often overlooked as agents of historical 
change. Here, I have argued that enslaved and freed women were integral to 
debates about sexual ethics, motherhood, proximity politics and ethnicity. 
Enslaved prostitutes advocated for their own readings of Q 24:33, playing an 
active part in the earliest umma. Enslaved mothers changed the demographics 
of the Umayyad empire and indirectly changed the conception of ‘Arab’ 
lineage. Enslaved musicians participated in Umayyad politics as courtesans, 
producers of Arabic culture and would-be queens. We cannot understand the 
rise of the slave-born caliph in the late Umayyad period without understand-
ing the impact of slave mothers themselves. We cannot understand how 
the increasingly centralised Umayyad caliphate worked without analysing 
the career of women such as Óabāba. If we fail to study women, we will 
 necessarily only see half the picture.
Third, ethnicity is not a timeless category, but a historical and contested 
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one. In the Umayyad period, unfree people sparked debates about whether 
Arab identity is based on blood/lineage or language/culture. Even as the ‘half-
bloods’ re-defined themselves as full Arabs based on their fathers’ lineage, so 
the ostensibly non-Arab courtesans and scribes gained power through their 
mastery of Arabic language and lore. These subaltern groups also reveal many 
ambiguities and ironies inherent in trying to resolve the intractable ques-
tion of ethnicity. For example, while ‘half-blood’ men eventually successfully 
argued for their status as full Arabs, female muwalladāt (who were often also 
technically ‘half-bloods’) remained enslaved and excluded from the category 
of Arab. In short, Muslims of slave origins throw the debates about the mean-
ing of ethnic categories into sharp relief.
Future Trajectories
There is still much left to do to explore the role of unfreedom and the status of 
unfree people in early Islamic history. In particular, many ambiguities remain 
in the identity and meaning of the early Islamic mawālī. In order to continue 
to explicate the meaning of this term, I suggest that scholars should avoid 
adopting ‘non-Arab Muslims’ as their primary definition, but instead adopt 
the lens of unfreedom. One of the pitfalls of glossing mawālī as ‘non-Arab 
Muslims’ is that it has sometimes led scholars to see mawālī where they do 
not actually appear in the sources. For example, in the year 83/702–703, the 
Umayyad governor al-Óajjāj famously returned the peasants of Iraq to their 
farms and forced them to pay the land tax. Otherwise insightful and careful 
scholars use the term ‘mawālī’ when describing this incident. For example, 
Chase Robinson writes of ‘al-Óajjāj returning the mawālī to the garrison 
cities of Iraq’,2 while Gerald Hawting describes how al-Óajjāj responded 
to decreasing tax revenues by ‘rounding up the mawālī in the towns, driv-
ing them out, and forcing them to pay their taxes’.3 However, the primary 
sources for this event do not use the word mawālī. The account in al-˝abarī’s 
Tārīkh simply calls them the ‘protected population (ahl al-dhimma) who had 
submitted (aslamū)’.4
Al-JāªiÕ also gives a version of this same episode in his ‘al-Risāla fī 
al-Nābita’, in which says, ‘He [al-Óajjāj] decreed tattooing the hands of the 
male Muslims and painting on the hands of the female Muslims, and he 
returned them after their hijra back to the villages.’5 The word mawālī here is 
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absent, and the issue at stake here is that people are trying to become Muslims 
by making hijra (emigrating to the cities), not by becoming mawālī. In fact, 
al-JāªiÕ mentions the mawālī later in this same letter, as a group of upstarts in 
JāªiÕ’s own day who claimed to combine the characteristics of the Arabs and 
Persians.6 That is, al-JāªiÕ is perfectly aware of the term mawālī, but he does 
not use it here in this account about al-Óajjāj. The most obvious conclusion 
is that the people fleeing to the garrison towns are not mawālī.7
In another famous incident, the pious ʿUmar II (r. 99–101/717–720) 
reportedly sacked his governor, al-Jarrāª, for perpetrating injustices against 
the people of Iraq. According to the historian al-Yaʿqūbī, ‘ʿUmar heard of 
matters concerning al-Jarrāª which he found reprehensible, such as his col-
lecting the poll-tax from people who had converted to Islam, sending mawālī 
on campaigns without granting them stipends, and displaying factionalism’.8 
Similarly, al-˝abarī reports that a mawlā named Íāliª or Saʿīd complained 
to ʿUmar II, ‘There are twenty thousand mawālī who make raids without 
receiving any stipend or spoils, and there are a similar number of ahl al-
dhimma who have converted to Islam, yet are still made to pay the tribute.’9 
Such accounts actually treat ‘converts to Islam’ and mawālī as two different 
groups facing two different economic problems. Those who converted are 
not called mawālī here, but ‘protected peoples’ (ahl al-dhimma) who had 
‘submitted’ (aslamū); the problem is that they are being unfairly taxed. Those 
who are called mawālī here are not explicitly described as converts, and they 
seem to be dependent military contingents; the problem is that they are not 
being paid for their military service. Moreover, as Gibb has shown, the fiscal 
rescript of Umar II, found in Ibn ʿAbd al-Óakam’s Sīrat ʿUmar, does not use 
the term ‘mawālī’ at all when discussing the caliph’s agrarian tax policies.10 
Accounts such as these suggest that the mawālī and serfs are not exactly 
the same thing. More work needs to be done to explicate the relationship 
between mawālī and serfs, and ‘unfreedom’ might prove a fruitful lens for 
analysing these different statuses.
Finally, several notable scholars, including H. A. R. Gibb, M. A. Shaban 
and Hawting, describe the late-Umayyad rebel al-Óārith ibn Surayj as a 
champion of the mawālī. 11 Al-Harith certainly used religious slogans that 
may have appealed to many groups, including unfree and disenfranchised 
groups. However, al-˝abarī describes al-Óārith’s followers not as ‘mawālī’ 
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but as a ‘numerous assemblage’ made up of Tamīmīs, dihqāns and others. 
Al-Óārith also flees to the lands of the non-Arabs (ʿajam), fights using Persian 
weapons and allies with a Turkish khāqān. That is, the primary sources do 
not call him a champion of ‘the mawālī’, but rather associate him with terms 
such as dihqāns, ʿajam and Turks.12 Such non-Arab groups only become 
synonymous with ‘the mawālī’ in the minds of modern scholars who assume 
that mawālī and non-Arabs must be the same thing, an assumption that our 
primary sources do not always support. As previously mentioned, according 
to al-JāªiÕ, the mawālī of the third/ninth century actually presented them-
selves as something of a hybrid between Arabs and Ajam; they even claimed 
that their hybrid identity made them superior to both the Arabs and the 
Ajam, for ‘he who displays the characteristics of both is superior to he who 
displays only one’.13 To place the mawālī firmly in the ‘non-Arab’ camp is to 
miss a large part of the tension or debate that they caused. It is also to ignore 
the fact that many mawālī seem to have rejected the ascription of ‘non-Arab’ 
identity and, instead, to have identified themselves strongly as Muslims and 
masters of Arabic-Islamic learning. Additionally, recent scholars such as Peter 
Webb and Fred Donner have argued that terms such as ‘Arab’ and ‘Muslim’ 
are second-/eighth--century constructions that do not reflect earlier history.14 
For these many reasons, it seems unwarranted to insist on continuing to gloss 
mawālī automatically as ‘non-Arab Muslims’.
Assuming we read our primary sources carefully, it remains quite unclear 
what the relationship is between individual mawālī-freedmen, and the col-
lective or group called ‘the mawālī’. Many previous scholars have compiled 
evidence on individual mawālī.15 The most comprehensive of these is Jamal 
Juda’s work, detailing numerous references to different mawālī in various 
different sources. One of his most important findings is that the mawālī were 
not a coherent social class; any individual mawlā’s social standing depended 
on that of his master. That is, they were in unfree relationships with their 
masters. In Juda’s analysis, mawālī seem to have been embedded in relation-
ships of dependency on the level of the individual household or extended 
family – they were domestic servants or personal retainers. But what happens 
to the term ‘mawālī’ when it becomes stripped of this personal, relational 
quality? For it does seem that, by the end of the Umayyad period and into 
the early Abbasid period, the sources begin to use the collective term ‘the 
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mawālī’ with more frequency. Who are these collective mawālī, as opposed to 
the individual mawālī of individual masters or patrons?
A few texts provide tantalising hints, but no hard-and-fast answers. For 
example, one version of the peace treaty the Arabian armies made with the 
people of Tiflis (Tblisi) contains the Quranic paraphrase: ‘If you submit 
(aslamtum) and perform the prayer, [you are] our brothers in religion and 
our mawālī.’16 While an in-depth analysis of this Quranic phrasing is beyond 
the scope of this concluding chapter, I find this sentence curious. It slightly 
alters and conflates two different Quranic verses (9:11 and 33:5), and the 
purpose of its conditional clause ‘if . . . then’ is ambiguous. On the one hand, 
the text could be saying to the people of Tiflis: ‘You are currently Christians, 
and you owe us these forms of service. But if you become Muslims, then you 
will become one of us – you will then no longer owe us service.’ However, 
there is another way of reading the text, which accords more with Donner’s 
‘Believers’ Movement’ thesis. This text could be saying to the people of 
Tiflis: ‘You are Christians and owe us these forms of service because God 
said: “If you submit, perform the prayer, and uphold the tax, you are our 
brothers in religion and our mawālī.”’ That is, it could be confirming the 
people of Tiflis as monotheistic brethren and helpers (mawālī), which is pre-
cisely why the people of Tiflis should provide the conquering armies faithful 
service. Military service is a sign of their shared piety. In this case ‘mawālī’ 
would mean something like ‘vassals’, or conquered populations who receive 
protection in return for acts of service. Could ‘mawālī’ in other contexts 
indicate such collective vassalage agreements? If so, it might help explain the 
Umayyad-era debates about whether or not military mawālī should be paid.17 
Perhaps ‘the mawālī’ were not paid because military service was part of their 
vassalage agreement.
The treaty of Tiflis seems to present mawālī as having more of a commu-
nal agreement of political dependency, rather than a domestic relationship of 
personal dependency. But the accounts of the rebellion of al-Mukhtār destroy 
this relational character altogether. Several accounts of al-Mukhtār’s rebellion 
in 66–67/685–687 present ‘the mawālī’ as a stand-alone group, disconnected 
from any communal or personal relationships. Many scholars have noted that 
these mawālī are probably freed slaves. This may well be true, but some of the 
accounts of al-Mukhtār’s rebellion treat slaves and mawālī as slightly different 
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groups. For instance, al-Madā’inī transmits an account that treats mawālī 
and slaves as performing different social roles. In this account, al-Mukhtār’s 
army has been defeated, and a Kufan notable demands that the victorious 
Umayyad general ‘should return our slaves to us, for they are for our widow-
ers and our weak ones. But the mawālī should have their necks struck, for 
their disbelief (kufr), the magnitude of their arrogance, and the paucity of 
their thankfulness have become apparent. I do not trust them with religion.’18 
According to this account, slaves are still needed for personal service; they 
are apparently still considered members of the household, albeit disobedient 
ones. The mawālī appear to be more detached from the familiar household. 
It is noteworthy that this account uses the term ‘our’ slaves as a relational 
term, in contrast to ‘the’ mawālī as a collective. Other accounts also refer to 
‘the’ mawālī, as when the poet Aʿshā Hamdān says, ‘There gathered against 
you the mawālī and their betwitcher [al-Mukhtār].’19 Similarly, Abū Mikhnaf 
transmits a report asserting that ‘nothing was worse than al-Mukhtār assign-
ing the fay’ to the mawālī’.
In short, the identity of the mawālī who joined al-Mukhtār’s rebel-
lion remains somewhat uncertain. Were they masses of freedmen who now 
existed in such numbers, or at such a generational distance from their original 
conquerors, that their bonds of dependency had begun to disintegrate? Or 
were they masses of vassals who had become resentful enough, and powerful 
enough, to re-negotiate the terms of their original vassalage agreement? Or 
were they perhaps a combination of both? In either case, the mawālī in 
al-Mukhtār’s rebellion seem to signal the inadequacy of the individual house-
hold, or ad-hoc vassalage agreements, for cementing the expanding Islamic 
state into a cohesive religio-political unit. The Umayyad state would need to 
create more systematic, centralised political institutions to achieve unity.
And yet, even as the sources begin to speak of ‘the mawālī’ as participat-
ing in al-Mukhtār’s revolt, or forming a class of qayna-trainers in Medina, or 
taking over the reins of Umayyad-era scholarship, it is clear that many indi-
vidual mawālī continued to be enmeshed in personal, domestic relationships 
of dependency. How did individual mawālī involved in such relationships 
relate to ‘the mawālī’ as a political or social collective? Perhaps the lens of 
unfreedom would prove useful in teasing out the nuances of these questions.
Finally, it seems possible that mawālī, converts, peasants and other subal-
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terns played a role in the increasing dominance of the terms ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslim’ 
in the Umayyad period. Several scholars have previously noted that the early 
followers of Muªammad did not call themselves ‘Muslimūn’ (Submitters) 
but rather ‘Mu’minūn’ (Believers). Contemporary non-Arabic sources also 
describe the conquerors not as ‘Muslimūn’ but as ‘Muhajirūn’ (Emigrants). 
In the Quran, it appears that these two terms, Believers and Emigrants, are 
conceptually related: belief entailed emigration, and emigration demonstrated 
belief. According to Q 49:14–15, failing to emigrate in this way rendered one 
merely a ‘Submitter’, not a true ‘Believer’.20 Documentary evidence makes it 
clear that, by the 2nd/8th century, the terms ‘Arab’ and ‘Muslim’ were starting 
to supersede the terms ‘Believers’ and ‘Emigrants’. However, documentary evi-
dence does little to explain why and how such a terminological shift occurred.
In trying to determine why the conquerors dropped the term ‘Emigrants’ 
for themselves, and adopted instead the term ‘Arabs’ in the second/eighth 
century, Peter Webb points out that the descendants of the original conquer-
ors had stopped emigrating to new frontier towns to wage jihad; instead, 
many of them had settled permanently in the original Iraqi garrison towns 
and had taken up civilian occupations. That is, they were no longer techni-
cally ‘Emigrants’. At the same time, as we have seen, the conquered peasants 
of the countryside apparently attempted to make themselves ‘Emigrants’ by 
moving to the garrison towns in the early second/eighth century.21 Because 
the Quran appears to conflate Emigration with Belief, when al-Óajjāj barred 
these Emigrants from entering Basra, he was not merely demonstrating his 
ethnic prejudice or his political injustice, but he was also potentially barring 
people from attaining salvation. That is, hijra may have been just as impor-
tant as a marker of belief for these peasants as, say, prayer or almsgiving. Thus, 
perhaps the Umayyads needed to find a compromise – a name for the religion 
that would allow for all people to achieve salvation, while also maintaining 
a subordinated population of tax-paying peasants. ‘Islam’ seems to strike 
such a compromise, as it implies submission to God, but it can also imply 
submission to worldly authority figures. Likewise, the aforementioned treaty 
of Tiflis might imply that good ‘Muslims’ submit to the conquering armies, 
pay their taxes to the state and offer their services. That is, ‘Muslim’ might be 
a useful term in incorporating new Believers, but also subordinating them to 
the increasingly centralised Islamic state.
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I do not wish to overstate my case. I do not mean to say that the 
Umayyads invented the term ‘Muslim’, or that it must necessarily have 
insidious, autocratic overtones, or that the incorporation of subalterns is the 
only way to explain the change towards ‘Muslim’. Islam is clearly a Quranic 
term that may be a proper name for the religion, as in Q 5:3: ‘On this day I 
have perfected your religion for you, and completed my favour onto you – I 
have chosen Islam for you as your religion.’22 It also seems that the Umayyads 
might have advocated for the term ‘Muslim’ in order to exclude revolutionar-
ies and rebels such as ʿAbdallāh Ibn al-Zubayr or the Kharijites – one can 
only attain salvation if one ‘submits’ to the caliph, God’s viceregent on earth. 
Instead, I merely suggest that the relatively more hierarchical or authoritarian 
ring of ‘Muslims’ (Submitters), as opposed to the relatively more egalitarian-
sounding term ‘Believers’ or the more activist term ‘Emigrants’, may have 
represented a satisfactory compromise between the needs of an orderly, hier-
archical empire and the moral imperative of a universalising religion.
Final Remarks
In the end, I hope future studies of the mawālī, muwalladāt and other unfree 
groups will not attempt to posit some hard-and-fast definition of who these 
groups ‘were’, but instead explore the debates and tensions these groups cre-
ated. These groups linger at the blurred edges of a religio-political community 
that needs to be defined and controlled, but never really can be. These groups 
inhabit the grey area between Arab and non-Arab, slave and free, conqueror 
and conquered, elite and commoner, insider and outsider. Therein lies their 
incredible richness and value.
One might wonder, what is the continued relevance or fruitfulness of 
studying such groups in today’s ostensibly post-slavery world? The term 
hujanā’, (‘half-bloods’) seems to have died out by the end of the Umayyad 
period; the term mawālī ceased describing a distinct social class by the mid-
Abbasid period.23 Umm walads no longer inhabit the homes of the urban 
elite; famous singers of the Arab world today are free, not enslaved. However, 
‘unfreedom’ clearly does still exist in many different guises in today’s world, 
from exploitative labour practices to sex trafficking. Moreover, questions 
persist about the meaning of ‘Arab’ and ‘Islam’, and the relationship between 
the two. The obsolescence of some of the terms investigated in this book does 
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not signal the disappearance of debates about who belongs to the umma or 
how they belong. This book merely provides a glimpse into one chapter of 
how some people have attempted to find meaning, belonging and sense of 
self on a swiftly tilting planet.
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